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Becoming Plastic: Modernist Poetics, (Neuro)Psychoanalysis, and the Material Object is a 
creative-critical thesis comprising approximately 45,000 words of critical prose and a poetry 
collection of sixty pages. Through critical discussion and my own creative writing, the thesis 
explores the continuums between human subjects and nonhuman objects in poetry – arguing 
that there is a disturbance of ontological categories happening in the process of poetic 
composition which functions to involve readers in a radical reappraisal of the material world 
in which they participate.  
The critical component of my thesis engages with the work of neglected modernist 
poets – such as Lola Ridge and the Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven – alongside those 
who have received considerable attention from literary critics – including Amy Lowell, Mina 
Loy and Gertrude Stein – in order to examine the disruptive potential of the material object in 
modernist poetry. Arguing that these poets disturb the theoretical boundaries between subject 
and object via experimental poetic languages and forms, the three chapters of this thesis bring 
together studies in psychoanalysis (Freud, 1919; Kristeva, 1982), the nonhuman turn (Bennett, 
2010), defamiliarization (Shklovsky, 1917), thing theory (Brown, 2004), and neuroscience 
(Malabou, 2004) to demonstrate the capacity for modernist poetry to interrogate what it is to 
be human or nonhuman in a world of things. Acknowledging the assemblages in which we 
participate, Chapter 1 reconceptualises the relationship between anthropomorphism and 
anthropocentrism in the texts of Ridge and Lowell. Demonstrating that the disruption of the 
human / nonhuman binary is accompanied by a disruption of genre, it argues that Ridge and 
Lowell accentuate the complex assemblages at work in the text. Building on this, Chapter 2 
examines Loy’s poetry and artworks as that which actively transform both the nonhuman object 
and the literary text into abject things which interrogate assumptions about people, language, 
and objects. This chapter argues that Loy’s compositions offer a reappraisal of the literary 
object as we know it – its customary spatial notations, typography, punctuation, and 
communicative language – heralding the possibility of a thingly poetics. Advancing this 
investigation into the physical and psychological continuums between human subjects and 
nonhuman objects in modernist poetry, Chapter 3 explores the literary experiments of Stein 
and the Baroness through the study of neuroplasticity. Offering the first plastic reading of a 
modernist poem, it argues that Stein and the Baroness’s literary experiments articulate how the 
brain is physically and psychologically altered through sensory encounters with nonhuman 
objects. Synthesising studies in modernist literary cultures, psychoanalysis, and neuroscience, 
this thesis examines the vitality, potentiality, commonality, and plasticity of matter – 
contending that these poems ultimately challenge our understanding of both the modernist 
object and the limits of genre. 
The thesis also draws on my own creative practice in order to interrogate the 
relationship between the material object, psychoanalysis and the limits of genre – to explore 
the extent to which the poem itself slips between ontological categories. Aiming to accentuate 
the synaptic connections between my chapters, between human subjects and nonhuman objects, 
between theorists, between modernist and modern poetic composition, and between creative 
and critical writing, the thesis includes a manifesto which outlines the principles and 
parameters of the plastic text. Furthermore, I present a collection of my own plastic 
compositions – ‘Museum of Lost and Broken Things’ – which explore the physical and 
psychological continuums between human subjects and nonhuman objects. These poems enact 
the theoretical principles and formal techniques examined in each chapter – consolidating the 
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MODERNIST OBJECTS:  
A CRITICAL INVENTORY OR INTRODUCTION 
 
I begin with a doll, perhaps, or a string quartet, a white cloth, or stack of butter-pats. I begin 
with an alphabet toy, a lampshade – an orange, thing, or manifesto. Begin again with a 
midbrain, a table, a rose, perhaps, or a noun, a ready-made, an advertisement, or portmanteau. 
I begin with this thing we name a poem, and its capacity to articulate the unnameable, 
unimaginable, unpalatable, or unacknowledged slippages between nonhuman objects and their 
human subjects in the material world. Begin with a modernist poet – Lola Ridge, Amy Lowell, 
Mina Loy, Gertrude Stein, perhaps, or the Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven – and their 
material, that is, language, that is, the matter of how to articulate those physical and 
psychological continuums between nonhuman objects and their human subjects via 
experimental poetic language and forms. Begin again in the whiteness of this document, with 
annotations or analyses of analyses on modernist things, with the volatile substance we name 
theory, that is, psychoanalysis, that is, the uncanny, thing-power, defamiliarization, the abject, 
or thing theory, that is, the nonhuman turn, that is, affect theory, neuroscience, brain plasticity, 
and the synaptic connections between critical and creative matter. I begin again with a doll, 
perhaps, or an apple. Begin with a ring pull, the leg of a clothes peg – a bottle cap, balloon clip, 
or six loose teeth from a comb. I begin with an egg, a vacuum cleaner, a cruise ship, a 
contraceptive pill, or assemblage. Begin again with a bird, a house, a cubist portrait, a red 
balloon, a ready-made, perhaps, a selfie stick. I begin this thesis with the aim to articulate the 
plasticity of the nonhuman object and human subject, that is, the plasticity of this thing we 
name a poem and its ability to modulate and excite synaptic connections between people, 
language, and things – those unnameable, unimaginable, unpalatable, or unacknowledged 
slippages between modern and modernist matter in the material worlds of my own poetry.  
Through a critical exploration of modernist composition and my own creative practice, 
Becoming Plastic: Modernist Poetics, (Neuro)Psychoanalysis, and the Material Object 
examines the formative continuums between human subjects and nonhuman objects in poetry. 
I argue that there is a formal disturbance of ontological categories happening throughout the 
process of poetic composition which functions to defamiliarize readers with the material world 
in which they participate – demanding an active reconceptualisation of these things we name 
people, language, or objects. Here, the critical component of my thesis engages academically 
neglected modernist poets – such as Lola Ridge and the Baroness Elsa von Freytag-
Loringhoven – in productive conversations with those who have received some considerable 
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attention from literary scholars – including Amy Lowell, Mina Loy and Gertrude Stein – to 
examine the disruptive potential of the material object in modernist poetry. Arguing that these 
poets disturb the theoretical boundaries between subject and object via experimental poetic 
languages and forms, the three chapters of this thesis bring together studies in psychoanalysis, 
the nonhuman turn, defamiliarization, thing theory, and neuroscience to demonstrate the 
capacity for modernist poetry to interrogate what it is to be human or nonhuman in a world of 
vital, uncanny, abject, or plastic things.  
Acknowledging the assemblages in which we participate, this thesis therefore 
reconceptualises the relationship between anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism in 
modernist poetry. Revealing that the disruption of the human / nonhuman binary is 
accompanied by a disruption of genre, it holds that the modernist poem actively transforms 
both the nonhuman object and literary composition into abject things which interrogate our 
assumptions about people, language, and objects. Furthermore, this thesis argues that 
modernist compositions offer a reappraisal of the literary object as we know it – its customary 
spatial notations, typography, punctuation, and communicative language – heralding the pure 
potentiality of a thingly poetics. Advancing this investigation into the physical and 
psychological continuums between human and nonhuman matter, it examines modernist 
literary objects through the contemporary study of neuroplasticity. Pioneering the first plastic 
reading of modernist poetry, this thesis demonstrates that modernist poets began to articulate 
how the brain is physically and psychologically modified through sensory encounters with 
nonhuman objects. By synthesising studies in modernist literary cultures, psychoanalysis, and 
neuroscience, it therefore explores the vitality, potentiality, commonality, and plasticity of 
matter – contending that these poems ultimately challenge our understanding of both the 
modernist object and the limits of genre. 
The thesis culminates with a critical-creative manifesto and collection of original poems 
which interrogate the relationship between the material object, (neuro)psychoanalysis, and the 
limits of genre – exploring the extent to which the poem itself slips between ontological 
categories. Aiming to accentuate the synaptic connections between chapters, between human 
subjects and nonhuman objects, between theorists, between modernist and modern poetic 
composition, between creative and critical writing, ‘The Text is a Plastic Thing: A Manifesto’ 
outlines and ostends the parameters of the plastic text. Here, the manifesto foregrounds the 
plasticity of my own compositions – ‘Museum of Lost and Broken Things’ – which explore 
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the physical and psychological continuums between human subjects and nonhuman objects.1 
These poems enact the theoretical principles and formal techniques examined in each chapter 
– consolidating the plastic connections between critical and creative matter throughout this 
thesis.  
 
 MATTER IN MODERNISM AND MODERNITY  
 
As a period of radical transformation, the modernist era was one of excessive social and 
political disturbance, technological and philosophical advancement, and literary and artistic 
innovation.2 World Wars I and II occurred alongside a succession of radical cultural 
developments – from the invention of the ballpoint pen, plastic, the tea bag, penicillin, the 
combustion engine, and the incandescent lightbulb to the conception of immunisation and first-
wave feminism – exciting new ways of thinking. Here, an increased dependency on 
technological objects such as the television and the vacuum cleaner accelerated the pace 
through which human subjects experienced daily life, whilst modern warfare reduced soldiers 
to weapons of mass destruction. The result was a complete repudiation of those systems of 
belief which had, for so long, categorised human and nonhuman matter. As Stephen Kern 
contends:   
Technological innovations including the telephone, wireless telegraph, x-ray, cinema, 
bicycle, automobile, and airplane established the material foundations for this 
reorientation; independent cultural developments such as the stream of consciousness 
novel, psychoanalysis, Cubism, and the theory of relativity shaped consciousness 
directly. The result was a transformation of the dimensions of life and thought.3 
For Kern, it is the rapidly changing vistas of political, historical, artistic, and scientific 
possibility that characterize modernity – rendering human subjects and nonhuman objects sites 
of unremitting modification, and allowing modernist practitioners to challenge the traditional 
 
1 The compositions included in my thesis are presented in two halves to foreground the publication of my 
pamphlet, Museum of Lost and Broken Things (Nottingham: Leafe Press, 2020). Those included within the 
publication appear in ‘Exhibition I’ – ‘Exhibition II’ includes poems that are either published elsewhere or 
intended for a future collection.  
2 For the purpose of this thesis, I will consider the modernist era as the epoch of time between the final decades 
of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, which is broadly accepted in modernist studies. 
Jean-Michel Rabaté explores the perimeters of modernism in his ‘Introduction’ to the A Handbook of 
Modernism Studies, ed. by Rabaté (Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), pp. 1 – 14. The period of modernism, its 
partitions, is also the subject of Michael H. Whitworth’s chapter, ‘When was Modernism?’ in Late Victorian 
into Modern, ed. by Laura Marcus, Michèle Mendelssohn, and Kirsten E. Shepherd-Barr (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), pp. 119 – 132. 
3 Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 1 – 2.  
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schemas of knowledge which defined the material world. Nicholas Saunders, furthermore, 
recognises modernism’s explorations of the continuums between matter – the physical and 
psychological slippages between subject and object – as a formal repercussion of World War 
I, which 'breached the boundary between materiality and spirituality, and between emotion and 
object, more than any previous conflict.’4 He reasons that as the earth was 'broken’ into 
disparate ‘fragments’ by the conflict, ‘the differences between war matériel and human beings 
elided perhaps for the first time in human history.'5 Here, Saunders argues that World War I 
had a profound impact on how we experienced and comprehended the difference between 
human subject and nonhuman objects. After Saunders, Aimee Gaston describes the 
commonality between human subjects and nonhuman objects arrested by modern warfare: 
whilst some ‘objects may have surged to fecund life in the domestic safety zone, there were 
plenty less fortunate who would expire on the battlefield, in disparate parts.’6 In the modernist 
era, this apprehension coincides with the inception of psychoanalysis, which, as Noëlle Cuny 
and Xavier Kalck explain, ‘changed our worldview, and showed us how we are fashioned by a 
dialectic of love and hate with the objects of the world around us.’7 For psychoanalysts, literary 
critics, and historians alike, the modernist era becomes a moment of ontological crises in which 
the theoretical distinctions between subject and object – on which cognition and 
communication rely – cannot hold.  
In The Senses of Modernism: Technology, Perception, and Aesthetics (2002), Sara 
Danius argues that the sensory operations of perceiving and knowing are transformed by 
innovations such as chronophotography, phonography, radiography, and cinematography.8 She 
interprets modernism’s experimental literary and artistic praxes as rigorous explorations of 
‘how to represent authentic experience in an age in which the category of experience itself has 
become a problem.’9 For Danius, the era’s distinguishing innovations in literary and artistic 
form – such as the stream-of-consciousness novel, which rejects narrative continuity to 
describe the character’s psychological activity as they encounter people, language, and things 
in the material world – must be understood as critical responses to the experience of modernity. 
 
4 Nicholas Saunders, 'Material Culture and Conflict: The Great War, 1914-2003', Matters of Conflict: Material 
Culture, Memory and the First World War, ed. by Nicholas Saunders (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), 
pp. 5 – 25 (p. 7).  
5 Saunders, pp. 7 – 8.  
6 Aimee Gaston, ‘Phenomenology Begins at Home: The Presence of Things in the Short Fiction of Katherine 
Mansfield and Virginia Woolf’, Journal of New Zealand Literature, Vol. 32 (2014), pp. 31 – 51 (p. 38).  
7 Noëlle Cuny and Xavier Kalck, ‘Introduction’, Modernist Objects (South Carolina: Clemson University Press, 
2020) pp. 1 – 18 (p. 16).  
8 Sara Danius, The Senses of Modernism (New York: Cornell University, 2002).  
9 Danius, p. 3.  
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Here, Danius contends that modernist art and literature responds to political, technological, and 
scientific revolution through its formal and linguistic meditations on the following questions: 
‘What is a human being? What is identity? How can we know what we know? What is the role 
of art and culture?’10 In this thesis, however, I propose that we must add to this catalogue some 
final ruminations: What is a nonhuman object? And, indeed, what is a literary object? As a 
direct result of this ontological crises, Surrealists, Fauvists, Impressionists, Vorticists, Cubists, 
Dadaists, Futurists, and Imagists began to revise the hierarchical classification of human and 
nonhuman matter – rendering the theoretical differences between what is animate and 
inanimate, what is me and not-me, obsolete via their experiments with form and perspective. 
As Phillip Weinstein argues, modernism’s experimental praxes are developed in regards to the 
axiom that ‘To see how things go together requires a strenuous undoing of how they are 
normally said to go together (as knowing subject and object known).’11 After all, in order to 
articulate their experience of modernity, the artist or author must devise original modes of 
composition to better articulate its dynamism, animacy, and plurality. For Bill Brown, the 
contemporary pioneer of thing theory, the modernist author’s efforts to represent the polysemy 
of modernity culminate with their meditations on what a literary object is or does and the 
materiality of language. He reasons that ‘literary modernism worked to dramatize the thingness 
of things – to dramatize its own thingness’ in ‘the design of books and journals as objects […] 
or the effort to insist on the material presence of language itself, from Pound’s use of the 
Chinese ideogram to the typographical experiments of the Futurists, Dadaists, and 
Surrealists.’12 Here, the modernist author’s formal and linguistic experiments aim to render 
obsolete the propriety of the proper noun, releasing the literary object from the autocracy of 
genre, and revealing the continuums between modes of production. In order to communicate 
the ontological ambiguity of the modern human subject and nonhuman object, the modernist 
author begins by defamiliarizing language and form. 
These ruminations on the materiality of language and the literary composition, 
however, are heightened in the realm of modernist poetry. For Brown, the ‘modernist poet, 
whether addressing natural or technological objects, feels the need to rescue them […] not from 
consumer culture so much as from rationalism, symbolism, and language itself.’13 Responding 
 
10 Danius, p. 22. 
11 Philip Weinstein, ‘Introduction’, Unknowing: The Work of Modernist Fiction (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2005), p. 6. 
12 Bill Brown, ‘Materialities of Modernism: Objects, Matter, Things’, A Handbook of Modernism Studies, pp. 
281 – 295 (p. 292).  
13 Brown, ‘Materialities of Modernism’, p. 293.  
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to those political, technological, and scientific vicissitudes which overwhelmed life in the 
twentieth century, the modernist poet sought to free the object – and, indeed, the subject – from 
automatic perception. Through their radical experiments with spatial notation, repetition, 
fragmentation, typography, and portmanteaux, the modernist poem systematically 
defamiliarizes matter by conferring ‘on things a new ontological amplitude,’ acknowledging 
that the ‘recognition of things depends on our capacity to unlearn’ the traditional schemas of 
knowing which may not accurately describe the plasticity of the modern world.14 Brown goes 
on to explain that in modernist poetry, communicative language – through which the process 
of ontological classification occurs – is ousted as nought but an ‘impediment’ to sensory 
discernment which ‘prevents things from being what they are.’15 The modernist poem, after 
all, revels in the slippages between nameable and unnameable matter, overwhelming readerly 
assumption. Jeremey Noel-Todd, for example, argues that the prose poem is ‘the defining 
poetic invention of modernity’ for its disruptions to the boundaries of genre, appropriating 
prosaic and poetic custom simultaneously.16 Here, ‘the cuts, discontinuities, ruptures, cracks, 
fissures, holes, hitches, snags, leaps, shifts of reference, and emptiness’ that we associate with 
modernist composition occur ‘inside the sentence,’ overwhelming the arbitrary connections 
between proper noun and meaning to apprehend the physical and psychological commonalities 
between matter.17 Following Noel-Todd, I argue in this thesis that modernist poetry becomes 
the optimal apparatus for communicating those slippages between human subjects and 
nonhuman objects which saturate modernity, depicting this phenomenon not only in its 
linguistic content, but formally (via its appropriations of disparate literary praxes) in the white 
matter of the page. 
 
CATALOGUING THE MODERNIST OBJECT 
 
In Lola Ridge’s poem, ‘The Ghetto’ (1918), ‘loose jointed’ chairs appear to creak ‘like old 
bones’ in a grubby café.18 Salvador Dali’s The Anthropomorphic Cabinet (1936) is an open 
chest of drawers which spills cloth, burgeoning a human head, legs, and arms; Man Ray’s 
 
14 Brown, ‘Materialities of Modernism’, p. 293.  
15 Brown, ‘Materialities of Modernism’, p. 293.  
16 Jeremy Noel-Todd, ‘Introduction’, The Penguin Book of the Prose Poem (London: Penguin Books, 2018), pp. 
xix – xliv (p. xx).  
17 Rosmarie Waldrop, ‘Why Do I Write Prose Poems/When My True Love is Verse’, Atlantic Drift: An 
Anthology of Poetry and Poetics, ed. by James Byrne and Robert Sheppard (Todmorden: Edge Hill University 
Press, 2017), pp. 315 – 318 (p. 316). 
18 Lola Ridge, ‘The Ghetto’, The Ghetto and Other Poems (London: Book Jungle, 2010), pp. 8 – 30 (p. 22) (first 
publ. New York: B.W. Huebsch, 1918).  
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Indestructible Object (1923) is a ticking metronome with an all-seeing eye. In Marianne 
Moore’s ‘To a Steam Roller’ (1920), the human subject addresses the nonhuman object as if it 
might heed their critique, as if it might make its retort.19 A pioneer of New York Dada, the 
Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven erected sculptures from litter and found objects, 
transforming their ergonomic and aesthetic value – her Cathedral (1918) is a wood fragment, 
her God (1917) a rusty plumbing trap on a mitre box. In 1920, T. S. Eliot classified the 
‘objective correlative’ as a poetic technique in which ‘a set of objects, a situation, a chain of 
events’ become the ‘formula’ of a ‘particular emotion’ – recalling those formative 
psychological connections between the human subject and nonhuman object, their encounters 
in the material world.20 In a letter to Dorothy Brett, Katherine Mansfield proclaims, ‘What can 
one do, faced with this wonderful tumble of round bright fruits, but gather them and play with 
them – and become them, as it were. When I pass the apple stalls I cannot help stopping and 
staring until I feel that I, myself, am changing into an apple too –’ and the boundary between 
what is self and other, what is human and nonhuman, cannot hold.21 Mina Loy crafted and 
traded lampshades made in the likeness of other objects – a desk globe, a vase of calla lilies – 
compelling us to look, look again. When Ezra Pound, in ‘A Retrospect’ (1918), promotes the 
three formal principles of Imagist poetry, ‘Direct treatment of the “thing” whether subjective 
or objective,’ is proclaimed first and foremost.22 In Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time 
(1913), it is the taste of the humble madeleine which famously facilitates an involuntary 
retrieval of memory, inducing a powerful psychological transformation, however momentarily, 
in the human subject. I begin with the recognition that throughout modernist culture, the once 
familiar object – whose name, ergonomic function, aesthetic value, and lack of physical or 
psychological autonomy is taken for granted – must be encountered anew, for the human 
subject is coerced into a radical rethinking of all that they assumed to know and trust about the 
object world. For Brown, ‘Objects cannot be depended on as a source of continuity in the midst 
of human flux because objects, too, are mutable. They too have lives (and deaths) of their 
own.’23 With their subversive experiments in literature and art, modernist painters, authors, 
sculptors, playwrights, and poets therefore began to consider what strange matter the human 
 
19 Marianne Moore, ‘To a Steam Roller’, The Poems of Marianne Moore, ed. by Grace Schulman (London: 
Viking, 2003), p. 92. 
20 T. S. Eliot, The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism (London: Faber & Faber, 1977), p. 85.  
21 Katherine Mansfield, Katherine Mansfield: Selected Letters, ed. by Vincent O’Sullivan (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), p. 59.  
22 Ezra Pound, ‘A Retrospect’ (1918, 2009) <https://www.poetryfoundation.org/articles/69409/a-retrospect-and-
a-few-donts> [Accessed 30 January 2020].  
23 Brown, A Sense of Things: The Object Matter of American Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003), p. 183.  
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subject and nonhuman object might have in common, and how such matters might be 
communicated to the reader, viewer, or audience.24 
In her preface to Machine Art, 1934 (2012), Jennifer Jane Marshall imagines a 
curriculum for a course on ‘Ordinary Objects in Interwar American Modernism,’ concluding 
that ‘the role of things in American modernism was significant enough to have accounted for 
most of it.’25 Here, Marshall appears to echo that poignant prerogative uttered by the speaker 
of William Carlos Williams’ epic poem, Paterson (1946) – ‘no ideas but in things’ – identifying 
the limitless creative potential of the material object throughout modernist culture.26  Many 
critics have laboured over these modernist objects, in all their radical pluralities. In Solid 
Objects: Modernism and the Test of Production (1998), the most substantial study of objects 
in modernist literature to-date, Douglas Mao contends that we cannot understand the products 
of modernism without understanding the twentieth century as a socio-political culture of mass 
consumption, simultaneously captivated and deeply troubled by the buying, selling, 
manufacturing, and owning of things.27 This mode of criticism, in which the modernist object 
is examined according to the historical, social, political, or technological contexts surrounding 
its production, presently overwhelms academic scholarship on the modernist object. Whilst 
acknowledging the productivity of historically motivated analyses, this thesis functions to 
complicate and advance existing studies of the modernist object by exploring its disruptive 
potential – assimilating critical perspectives from psychoanalysis, neuroscience, and 
deconstruction to accentuate the physical and psychological disturbance of ontological 
categories taking place in the twentieth century. For example, though Mao briefly references 
the altercations and transactions between human subjects and nonhuman objects in modernist 
literature, those fixed ontological categories which govern what a nonhuman object is or does 
– what a human subject is or does – persist, however curiously, above reproach throughout his 
study: 
 
24 Though limited scholarship exists regarding the nonhuman objects in modernist poetry, scholars have 
explored the role of the nonhuman object in modernist art, fiction, and performance. Significant works include, 
Ellen Johnson’s Modern Art and the Object: A Century of Changing Attitudes (New York: Harper & Row, 
1976); John Erickson’s The Fate of the Object: From Modern Object to Postmodern Sign in Performance, Art, 
and Poetry (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1995); Lisa Siraganian’s Modernism's Other Work: 
The Art Object's Political Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Julie Bates’ Beckett's Art of Salvage: 
Writing and Material Imagination, 1932-1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). Here, it should 
additionally be acknowledged that a collection of essays exploring the role of the object in modernist poetry, 
prose, visual arts, culture, and performance – Modernist Objects: Literature, Art, Culture, ed. by Noelle Cuny 
and Xavier Kalck (South Carolina: Clemson University Press, 2020) – is due for publication 31st October 2020.  
25 Jennifer Jane Marshall, Machine Art, 1934 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), p. xiv.  
26 William Carlos Williams, Paterson (New York: New Directions, 1995), p. 6.  





To read Woolf’s depictions of the world without humans, or Lewis’s defences of the 
concept of the solid object, or Stevens’s poems on discrete things, or (somewhat more 
problematically) Pound’s discovery of the indifferent splendour of nature in the Pisan 
cantos, is to find the modernists crediting the object world not with some immunity to 
violence or disorder but rather with the profounder innocence of an immunity to 
thinking and knowing, the noble repose that comes of being out of reach of human 
persuasion, though not (and herein lay the trouble) out of reach of the human power to 
destroy.28  
 
For Mao, the human subject retains its status as producer and the nonhuman object retains its 
status as that which is or will be produced. The nonhuman object is consequently aligned with 
otherness, for its traditional appellation as ‘indifferent’ or inactive matter with an ‘immunity to 
thinking and knowing’ – the binary opposite of the physically and psychologically alert human 
subject. However, if the nonhuman object really is as impassive as Mao would contend, then 
how are we to conceptualise those contributions to modernist literature in which the nonhuman 
object appears to come alive, reciprocating physical and psychological connections in a world 
of other people, language, and things? And if the nonhuman object really is, as Mao would 
assert, impermeable to human influence, then how are we to conceptualise the radical 
contributions to modernist art and literature which transform the ergonomic function or 
aesthetic value of the nonhuman object? Here, Mao omits any formal acknowledgment of the 
unnameable, unimaginable, unpalatable slippages between human and nonhuman matter in 
literary modernism – those nonhuman objects which appear to exceed their status as products 
or commodities, manifesting an agency that challenges that of the human subject. In this thesis, 
I therefore begin to elucidate the abject materialities that Mao fails to name, radically disturbing 
the theoretical boundaries between matter which has, for so long, been classified as human or 
nonhuman. After Brown, who argues that ‘mastering things can take the form of submitting to 
them, subjecting oneself to the point where subject and object, human and nonhuman, seem to 
converge,’ I explore the arresting moments in modernist poetry in which the socially, 
politically, technologically, historically, and grammatically regulated distinctions between 
human subject and nonhuman object cannot hold.29  
For Brown, after all, ‘so much of modernism (visual, plastic, and literary) can be 
understood to name the provocation of aesthetic events meant to release things – or thingness 
– from the fetters of modernity.’30 Here, Brown understands the modernist object as that which 
 
28 Mao, Solid Objects, p. 9. 
29 Brown, ‘Materialities of Modernism’, p. 291.  
30 Brown, ‘Materialities of Modernism’, p. 281.  
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exceeds its status as a commodity, disturbing the physical and psychological order of things in 
the modern world. Whilst Brown has comprehensively examined the modernist period and its 
obsession with inventing, producing, distributing, and consuming objects in A Sense of Things: 
The Object Matter of American Literature and Other Things (2003), he exceeds the 
rudimentary concern of how the object is produced by modernist cultures to examine those 
unnameable, unimaginable, or unpalatable continuums between human and nonhuman matter 
in modernist literature.31 Brown therefore begins to embrace what Mao does not: the latent 
psychological and physical vitality of the nonhuman object, that is, the power that things may 
hold over the human subject. In modernist literature, the nonhuman object is not dead or 
absolutely unresponsive matter, but something other – something that vehemently rejects 
binary oppositions, rejecting singularity in definition. When we encounter the modernist object, 
then, we are confronted by the philosophical and psychological debates surrounding 
ontological classifications in the twentieth century.32 In ‘Materialities of Modernism: Objects, 
Matter, Things,’ Brown quotes Virginia Woolf’s Between The Acts (1941) – ‘We live in things’ 
– acknowledging the slippage of physical and psychological material that happens between all 
that has been considered human and nonhuman in modernist prose.33 This thesis therefore 
offers a critical study of the agency and plurality of things, the slippage of physical and 
psychological matter between human subjects and nonhuman objects, in modernist poetry.34  
 
31 Brown, A Sense of Things; Brown, Other Things (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
32 Many philosophers have considered what it is to be a nonhuman object, including Martin Heidegger in The 
Question Concerning the Thing: On Kant's Doctrine of the Transcendental Principles, trans. by James D. Reid 
and Benjamin D. Crowe (London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2018); Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
in Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art (2 Vols), trans. by T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); 
Immanuel Kant in Critique of Pure Reason, ed., trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); Friedrich Nietzsche in Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufman, trans Kaufman & R. J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968). Edwin Henry Frederick Hercock additionally offers a philosophical 
reading of objects in the work of modernist poet, George Oppen, through the theories of Kant, Hegel, Marx and 
Nietzsche in his doctoral thesis, ‘Modernist Objects / Objects under Modernity: A Philosophical Reading of 
Discrete Series’ (Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Sussex, 2015).  
33 Virginia Woolf, Between the Acts (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing, 1970), p. 70 (first publ. 
London: Hogarth Press, 1941). 
34 Here, it should be acknowledged that the productive continuums between human and nonhuman matter in 
modernist explorations of religion, spirituality, magic, and the occult have received some considerable scholarly 
attention. For an introduction to this topic see Roger Luckhurst, ‘Religion, Psychical Research, Spiritualism, and 
the Occult’, The Oxford Handbook of Modernisms, ed. by Peter Brooker, Andrzej Gasiorek, Deborah 
Longworth, and Andrew Thacker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 429 – 444. For further 
explication, see Helen Sword, Ghostwriting Modernism (London: Cornell University Press, 2002); Leigh 
Wilson, Modernism and Magic: Experiments with Spiritualism, Theosophy and the Occult (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013); Pericles Lewis, Religious Experience and the Modernist Novel (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); Elizabeth Anderson, Material Spirituality in Modernist Women’s Writing 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020); Marja Lahelma, ‘August Strindberg’s Art in Modernist and Occult 
Context’, The Occult in Modernist Art, Literature, and Cinema, ed. by Tessel M. Bauduin and Henrik Johnsson 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 67 – 92.  
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I begin again with Things (2004), with Brown’s account of the emergence of material 
culture studies and the ‘return of the real’ in contemporary art, with this renewed, scholarly 
fascination with objects. Brown explains that ‘these days, you can read books on the pencil, 
the zipper, the toilet, the banana, the chair, the potato, the bowler hat’ – publications which 
examine the crossings, attachments, and slippages between human and nonhuman things in the 
material world.35 Following what has since been classified as ‘the nonhuman turn’ – a 
contemporary mode of critical and philosophical scholarship ‘engaged in decentring the human 
in favour of a concern for the nonhuman’ – this thesis explores how Ridge, Lowell, Loy, Stein, 
and the Baroness formally and linguistically disturb the physical and psychological boundaries 
between humans and nonhumans, rendering the privileging of all that is habitually connected 
with this thing we call humanity obsolete in their poetic experiments.36 Here, I position 
modernism’s overwhelming fixation on material objects alongside the contemporary 
nonhuman turn to offer a fundamental reappraisal of the modernist object as that which disturbs 
ontological categories in a radical recognition of the commonality of all matter. As Richard 
Grusin contends, the nonhuman turn is the radical recognition that ‘the human has always 
coevolved, coexisted, or collaborated with the nonhuman – and that the human is characterized 
precisely by this indistinction from the nonhuman.’37 Here, it should be acknowledged that 
there are significant philosophical differences between academics conceptualising the 
nonhuman turn – particularly those associated with object-orientated ontology (or speculative 
realism) and vital materialism. For Graham Harman and the object-orientated ontologists, for 
example, the object’s ‘withdrawal’ or ‘withholding’ of knowledge from direct access is central 
to its existence – it is physically and psychologically inaccessible to all things.38 Despite object-
orientated ontology’s productive rejection of anthropocentricism – its credence that ‘all objects 
must be given equal attention, whether they be human, nonhuman, natural, cultural, real, or 
 
35 Brown, ‘Thing Theory’, Things, ed. by Brown (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 1 – 22 (p. 
2). The Object Lessons series by Bloomsbury Academic, published between 2015 and 2017, provide critical 
analyses on ordinary objects such as the sock, the personal stereo, or the veil – appraising those encounters 
between human subjects and nonhuman objects which alter our modes of thinking, feeling, acting, and working 
in the modern world of things. Such Object Lessons compel the reader to examine materials which may, due to 
their overwhelming abundance in the twenty-first century, be overlooked – neither waste, dust, nor the password 
escaping the critics’ measured investigations. Examples include Kim Adrian, Sock (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2017); Rebecca Tuhus-Dubrow, Personal Stereo (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017); Rafia 
Zakaria, Veil (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017); Brian Thill, Waste (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2015); Michael Marder, Dust (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016); Martin Paul Eve, Password (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2016). 
36 Richard Grusin, ‘Introduction’, The Nonhuman Turn, ed. by Grusin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2015), pp. vii – xxx (p. vii).  
37 Grusin, ‘Introduction’, The Nonhuman Turn, pp. ix – x. 
38 Graham Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything (London: Penguin, 2018), p. 7.  
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fictional’ – it holds that there can be no immediate interactions between things.39 Jane Bennett 
and the vital materialists, however, explore the productive continuums between humans and 
nonhumans as actants in the assemblage that is the material world, advocating the affective 
power of matter. Bennett explores the radical difference between speculative realism and vital 
materialism in her chapter in The Nonhuman Turn (2015); she wonders that even as the ‘plastic 
bottle cap is producing an arresting effect on me and captures my attention, the speculative 
realist (who eschews the label “materialist”) insists that none of the bodies at the scene were 
wholly present to each other.’40 Here, Bennett directly opposes object-orientated ontology’s 
philosophy of apartness or ‘non-relational conception of the reality of things’.41 Following the 
principles of vital materialism, I argue that modernist poets anticipated the nonhuman turn by 
acknowledging the uncanny, abject, thingly, or plastic connections between human subjects 
and nonhuman objects, that is, the critical admission that material is material is affective 
material.  
  I begin with the object in modernist poetry for its facility to actuate a critical 
reconceptualisation of the physical and psychological continuums between language and form. 
To date, the most extensive studies of objects in modernist poetry are Kathleen D’Angelo’s 
unpublished doctoral thesis, Modernist American Poetry as a Study of Objects (2011) and John 
C. Stout’s book, Objects Observed: The Poetry of Things in Twentieth-Century France and 
America (2018).42 Whilst D’Angelo examines the representation of things in the poetry of 
Robert Frost, Marianne Moore, William Carlos Williams, and George Oppen through thing 
theory, Stout’s study considers the centrality of the nonhuman object to twentieth century poets 
in France and in America, providing significant examinations of Pierre Reverdy, Francis 
Ponge, Jean Follain, Eugène Guillevic, and Jean Tortel. Stout contends that modernism’s 
analyses of the nonhuman object became a catalyst for a new form of poetics, reading their 
poems alongside studies in aesthetics, art history, and object-relations theory. Both D’Angelo 
and Stout, however, are much less concerned with the physical and psychological continuums 
 
39 Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, p. 9.  
40 Jane Bennett, ‘Systems and Things: On Vital Materialism and Object-Oriented Philosophy’, The Nonhuman 
Turn, pp. 223 – 239 (p. 226). 
41 Harman, ‘The Well-Wrought Broken Hammer: Object-Orientated Literary Criticism’, New Literary History, 
Vol. 43.2 (2012), pp. 183 – 203 (p. 187).  
42 Kathleen D’Angelo, Modernist American Poetry as a Study of Objects (Unpublished doctoral thesis, 
University of Maryland, 2011); John C. Stout’s book, Objects Observed: The Poetry of Things in Twentieth-
Century France and America (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018).  
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between human and nonhuman things, than with their respective poets’ formal descriptions of 
the object through language.43 
My poets, Lola Ridge, Amy Lowell, Mina Loy, Gertrude Stein, and the Baroness Elsa 
von Freytag-Loringhoven were chosen for the abundance and assortment of interactions 
between human subjects and nonhuman objects happening throughout their compositions.  At 
present, critical scholarship on Ridge, Lowell, Loy, Stein, and the Baroness hinge on biography 
or politics, concentrating on those formative social-historical contexts surrounding their 
compositions.44 Here, it should be acknowledged that there is little published scholarship on 
Ridge and the Baroness beyond the realm of biography – Terese Svoboda’s Anything That 
Burns You: A Portrait of Lola Ridge (2015) and Irene Gammel’s Baroness Elsa: Gender, Dada, 
and Everyday Modernity: A Cultural Biography (2002) are the most substantial publications 
concerning Ridge and the Baroness’ contributions to modernism.45 This thesis therefore offers 
a long-overdue analysis of their respective works, based on the anthropomorphic, uncanny, 
enchanting, thingly, abject, and plastic continuums between language and form – between all 
that is habitually connected with these human and nonhuman things – in the material world of 
the poem. Furthermore, I engage these critically neglected modernist poets, Ridge and the 
Baroness, in productive conversations with those who have received some considerable 
attention from literary critics, including Lowell, Loy, and Stein – recalibrating the modernist 
canon to include their significant contributions. Though critics, including Stout, have explored 
the male modernist poet’s ‘feminization of the object which they manipulate and textualize’ as 
‘a recurring preoccupation within the tradition,’ I consider the female modernist poet’s 
 
43 Here, it should be acknowledged that though D’Angelo and Stout briefly reference Stein’s substantial 
contributions to the study of objects in modernist poetry, neither consider those of Ridge, Lowell, Loy, and the 
Baroness. 
44 Caroline Maun, for example, explores Ridge’s political agenda in her chapter, ‘Imagism, Socially Engaged 
Poetry, and Lola Ridge’ in Mosaic of Fire: The Work of Lola Ridge, Evelyn Scott, Charlotte Wilder, and Kay 
Boyle (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2010), pp. 16 – 47; Amy Lowell, American Modern (New 
York: Rutgers University Press, 2004), edited by Melissa Bradshaw and Adrienne Munich includes essays 
which explore Lowell’s contributions to literary modernism as a woman poet, placing Lowell in her proper 
historical context to demonstrate her centrality to current critical and theoretical discussions surrounding 
feminist, gay and lesbian, postcolonial, disability, and cultural studies; Sarah Hayden, in Curious Disciplines: 
Mina Loy and Avant-Garde Artisthood (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2018), explores Loy’s 
entrance into the art world as a coded act of feminist liberation, allowing Loy financial stability as a female 
artist; Margueritte S. Murphy argues that Stein constructs a new language of queer domesticity, comparing 
Tender Buttons (1914) to Alice B. Toklas’ cookbooks in ‘Familiar Strangers: The Household Words of Gertrude 
Stein's Tender Buttons’, Contemporary Literature, Vol. 32.3 (1991), pp. 383 – 402; Linda Lappin considers the 
cultural and critical significance of the Baroness’ contributions to Dada in a male-dominated canon in ‘Dada 
Queen in the Bad Boys' Club: Baroness Elsa Von Freytag-Loringhoven’, Southwest Review, Vol. 89.4 (2004), 
pp. 307 – 319.  
45 Terese Svoboda, Anything That Burns You: A Portrait of Lola Ridge (Arizona: Schaffner Press, 2015); Irene 




reclamation of the object as a radical stimulus for rethinking the theoretical boundaries between 
human subjects and nonhuman objects, between genres and genders in twentieth century.46 
Despite my contemplations, throughout this thesis, of the alignment of the nonhuman object 
and the female subject with otherness, and the necessity of reappraising the binary oppositions 
which classify all matter in the material world, it is my primary objective to examine the 
compositions of Ridge, Lowell, Loy, Stein, and the Baroness for their radical experiments with 
language and form – concentrating on how and why modernist poets destabilise the ontological 
classification of human subjects, nonhuman objects, and literary texts. 
 As little scholarship exists on the physical and psychological slippages between human 
and nonhuman matter in modernist poetry, this thesis draws on contemporary readings of 
modernist novels and short stories, which consider literature after the nonhuman turn. For 
example, in ‘Phenomenology Begins at Home: The Presence of Things in the Short Fiction of 
Katherine Mansfield and Virginia Woolf,’ Aimee Gaston argues that Mansfield and Woolf 
complicate the human / nonhuman dichotomy with their anthropomorphic objects, 
acknowledging the human subject’s transformative encounters with the nonhuman object, and 
the transference of psychological matter that occurs between human subject and nonhuman 
object in the material world. For Gaston, it is the anthropomorphic object – the nonhuman 
object imbued with motivations, emotions, actions, and behaviours of its own – that therefore 
enables Mansfield and Woolf to successfully articulate the complex, emotionally rich 
‘subjective interiority’ of their characters.47 For Laura Oulanne, however, this slippage is 
considerably more profound than a simple transference of material from human subject to 
nonhuman object. In her paper, ‘Affective Bodies: Nonhuman and Human Agencies in Djuna 
Barnes' Fiction,’ Oulanne asserts that the very concept of ‘humanness’ is overwhelmingly and 
conclusively ‘entangled’ with that which we call nonhuman.48 Here, Oulanne considers Barnes’ 
Nightwood (1936) in conjunction with Bennett’s study of distributed agency in Vibrant Matter: 
A Political Ecology of Things (2010), in which objects are able to ‘act as quasi agents or forces 
with trajectories, forces or tendencies of their own.’49 For Oulanne, ‘Bennett’s deconstruction 
of the boundary between matter and life enables us to look at humans as well as nonhumans 
[…] as simultaneously material and potentially “vital”’ – to acknowledge the physical and 
 
46 Stout, Objects Observed, p. 10.  
47 Gaston, ‘Phenomenology Begins at Home’, p. 32. 
48 Laura Oulanne, ‘Affective Bodies: Nonhuman and Human Agencies in Djuna Barnes’s Fiction’, On Culture: 
The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 2 (2016) <http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2016/12351/> 
[Accessed 3 February 2020].  




psychological continuums between human subjects and nonhuman objects beyond 
anthropocentric conceptions of anthropomorphism, alternatives to which I discuss in Chapter 
1 of this thesis.50 
Another significant study concerning the assimilation of human and nonhuman matter 
in modernist fiction is Kristianne Kalata’s ‘“There was a World of Things… and a World of 
Words”: Narration of the Self through Object in Sylvia Townsend Warner’s Scenes of 
Childhood’ (2005). Kalata argues that Townsend-Warner’s Scenes of Childhood and Other 
Stories (a culmination of stories published in The New Yorker between 1936 and 1973) 
‘articulates a merging of object with subject, of external with internal.’51 She considers 
Townsend-Warner’s writing alongside Stein’s grammatical theories on the connections 
between words – specifically, nouns – and things, her criticism culminating in a study of 
modernist experimental language and its capacity to defamiliarize the object: 
 
Warner seeks to dislocate the thing from its culturally symbolic counterpart – the word  
– in order to reconstruct a set of associations that she deems fit. Thus, throughout Scenes 
of Childhood, objects' traditional uses are deconstructed so that new associations – ones 
that comment upon issues of nation, custom, and tradition – can be made: a chair is not 
for sitting; a bed, not for sleeping; buttons, not for buttoning; cheese, not for eating.52 
 
Here, Kalata argues that Warner detaches the nonhuman object from the meaning of the noun 
which names it ‘chair’ or ‘bed’ or ‘button’ or ‘cheese’ so that it might exceed its status as 
commodity – becoming the Steinian ‘thing in itself,’ which certainly means but does not simply 
mean all that we have come to know about the nonhuman object’s ergonomic function or 
aesthetic value.53 In ‘Poetry and Grammar,’ Stein apprehends ‘this exceeding struggle of 
knowing really knowing what a thing was really knowing it’; she concludes that even the ‘name 
of a thing might be something in itself if it could come to be real enough but just as a name it 
was not enough something.’54 Here, Stein refers to the radical potentiality of language to 
become ‘real’ – to become a thing in our material word, to transcend, however momentarily, 
the process of naming. For Stein, the thingly potentiality of language has not been fully realised 
in literature, but it would mean that ‘there could no longer be form to decide anything’ – and 
‘real narrative’ must ‘be told by any one having come to the realization that the noun must be 
 
50 Oulanne, ‘Affective Bodies’.  
51 Kristianne Kalata, ‘“There was a World of Things… and a World of Words”: Narration of the Self through 
Object in Sylvia Townsend Warner’s Scenes of Childhood’, Tulsa Studies in Women’s Literature, Vol. 24.2 
(2005), pp. 319-339 (p. 320).  
52 Kalata, ‘“There was a World of Things… and a World of Words”’, p. 322.  
53 Stein, ‘Poetry and Grammar’, Lectures in America, (Massachusetts: Little, Brown, and Co., 1957), p. 336.  
54 Stein, ‘Poetry and Grammar’, p. 334 
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replaced not by inner balance but by the thing in itself’ which ‘will eventually lead to 
everything.’55 This is taken up in Chapter 2, which explores the latent thinglyness of our 
language – positing that the modernist object is a physically and psychologically disconcerting 
force which compels us to acknowledge the plurality of the material world and all its volatile 
human and nonhuman matter. It examines the modernist object as that which revels in 
unnameable and unimaginable materialities, confronting us with unpalatable questions: What 
is the purpose of this thing? What is the meaning of this thing? What is this thing doing to me? 
  Following this radical examination of the modernist object’s capacity for physical and 
psychological transformation, I turn to the contemporary study of neuroscience to explicate the 
developmental continuums between people, language, and things in modernist poetry. In his 
paper on neuroplasticity in Joseph Conrad’s novels, Nidesh Lawtoo contends that nothing – 
including modernist literature – ‘seems to escape the neuro turn.’56 He argues that Conrad’s 
depiction of a malleable, plural, or capricious human subject prefigures neuroplasticity, in 
which ‘the structure of the brain itself, in its synaptic, neuronal connections [..] has the capacity 
to change over time,’ modified in direct response to sensory encounters with the material world. 
What Lawtoo does not consider, however, is the potential application of neuroplasticity to the 
nonhuman turn, that is, the critical acknowledgement of the nonhuman object’s capacity for 
affect – its proper name, ergonomic function, aesthetic and sentimental value continually 
modified in direct response to sensory encounters with people, language, and things.57 After 
Lawtoo, I therefore begin this thesis with the purpose of fundamentally reconceptualising the 
modernist object – that is, the unnameable, unimaginable, unpalatable object in modernist 
literature and the unnameable, unimaginable, unpalatable object that is the modernist literary 
composition – as plastic. In Chapter 3, I therefore offer the first neuroplastic reading of those 
often critically distained experiments of Stein and the Baroness, which prefigure the affectivity 
of matter, that is, the formation, modulation, reparation, and termination of the neuronal 
pathways between human subjects and nonhuman objects, in language and form. Throughout 
the critical and creative matter which forms this thesis, I therefore examine the modernist object 
as that which resists ontological classification, revelling in a physically and psychologically 
disquieting plasticity which disturbs the logical, grammatical, communicative dimensions of 
this thing we name a poem. For Saikat Majumdar, after all, ‘modernism is the privileged 
moment when the disruptive object appears, both in its concrete materiality and in its refusal 
 
55 Stein, ‘Poetry and Grammar’, p. 336. 
56 Nidesh Lawtoo, ‘Conrad’s Neuroplasticity’, Modernism/Modernity, Vol. 23 (2016), pp. 771 – 788 (p. 771).    
57 Lawtoo, ‘Conrad’s Neuroplasticity’, p. 772.  
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to be objectified and domesticated.’58 Though Majumdar does not directly refer to the plasticity 
of the modernist object in his analyses, he nonetheless recognises its capacity to resist 
definition, revelling in a vexing malleability that is presently neglected in modernist studies.  
 
EXHIBITING THE MODERNIST OBJECT 
 
Central to my analysis of the modernist object is the apprehension that the nonhuman object 
and the human subject must be ousted as malleable and capricious matter in literary and artistic 
modernism – that the language through which we catalogue things can no longer hold, that 
nonhuman objects and human subjects are continually modified in physical and psychological 
encounters with the other. Following the comprehension of affect theory, which, for Gregory 
J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, signifies ‘a body’s belonging to a world of encounters,’ I 
explore those determinative encounters happening between human and nonhuman bodies in 
modernist poetry.59 Seigworth and Gregg define affect as that which emerges through an 
‘unmediated relatedness’ – in ‘the capacities to act and be acted upon’ – in ‘those intensities 
that pass body to body (human, nonhuman, part-body, and otherwise), in those resonances that 
circulate about, between, and sometimes stick to bodies and worlds, and in the very passages 
or variations between these intensities and resonances themselves.’60 For Seigworth and Gregg, 
an awareness of affect may therefore ‘leave us overwhelmed by the world’s apparent 
interactability’ as our binary oppositions or ‘compartmentalisms’ are rendered obsolete, 
substituted for the tensions between things.61 Affect theorists such as Sarah Ahmed, Jonas 
Frykman, Maja Povrzanović Frykman, and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick have subsequently 
examined how human subjects may project affects onto nonhuman objects, how nonhuman 
objects may provoke affects in human subjects – perturbing, obscuring, and transforming the 
relations between matter.62 Here, affect theory offers a way of conceptualising the radical 
possibilities of a material world that undergoes continual physical and psychological 
transformation. In this thesis, I therefore explore how affect passes between nonhumans and 
 
58 Saikat Majumdar, ‘A Pebblehard Soap: Objecthood, Banality, and Refusal in Ulysess’, James Joyce 
Quarterly, Vol. 42.1 (2004), pp. 219 – 238 (p. 103).  
59 Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, ‘An Inventory of Shimmers’, The Affect Theory Reader, ed. by 
Seigworth and Gregg (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 1 – 28 (p. 2).  
60 Seigworth and Gregg, ‘An Inventory of Shimmers’, p. 1, 4, 1, 4.  
61 Seigworth and Gregg, ‘An Inventory of Shimmers’, p. 1.  
62 Sarah Ahmed, ‘Happy Objects’, The Affect Theory Reader, pp. 29 – 51; Jonas Frykman and Maja 
Povrzanović Frykman, ‘Affect and Material Culture: Perspectives and Strategies’, Sensitive Objects, ed. by 
Frykman and Frykman (Sweden: Nordic Academic Press, 2016), pp. 9 – 30; Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching 
Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).  
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humans – and, indeed, between texts and readers – throughout modernism and beyond, 
overwhelming ontological classification, demonstrating the relativity and potentiality of matter 
through my critical-creative methodology.  
  Despite its experimental praxes, creative criticism is nothing new. This thesis responds 
to an extensive history of critical-creative interventions, from Oscar Wilde’s ‘The Critic as an 
Artist: A Dialogue in Two Parts’ (1891) and Virginia Woolf’s Three Guineas (1938) to Roland 
Barthes’ Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes (1975) and Nicholas Royle’s Veering: A Theory 
of Literature (2012).63 In their introduction to Creative Criticism: An Anthology and Guide 
(2014), Stephen Benson and Clare Connors define creative criticism as that which ‘exploits, 
distorts, works over, hyperbolises, erases or plays with the conventions of academic critical 
prose.’64 Formally appropriating all that is excessive in academic prose, this thesis exaggerates 
the physical and psychological continuums between critical theory and creative writing in 
plastic reparations of repetitions which modulate connections between my chapters and 
compositions. Just as the theoretical boundaries between human and nonhuman matter are 
continually disturbed throughout this thesis, so too are the boundaries between academic genre 
and form. The thesis begins with the expectation of an introduction, its arguments organised 
into chapters, and moves toward something thingly, something plastic, as the thesis develops, 
through its encounters with literary theories and modernist praxes. There ensues, therefore, a 
progressive disturbance of the conventions of academic prose – occurring through the cognitive 
operation of reading. As Benson and Connors describe: 
 
Creative criticism […] is more a matter of part writing, of writing in bits each of which, 
while ostensibly whole, is allied with other bits such that our sense of and desire for 
wholeness are unsettled. Something is happening in the relation of the parts. The writing 
is intermittent, variously interrupting itself; there is a marked rhythm of continuity but 
also of discontinuity, hence of continuity in discontinuity.65 
 
The composition of this thesis therefore heralds the pure potentiality of creative criticism – its 
slippage between ‘continuity’ and ‘discontinuity’ – in a continuous augmentation of 
 
63 Oscar Wilde, ‘The Critic as Artist: A Dialogue in Two Parts’, De Profundis, The Ballad of Reading Gaol, and 
Other Writings (Ware: Wordsworth Classics, 1999), pp. 101 – 71; Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas (London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1938); Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (New York: 
Hill & Wang, 2010); Nicholas Royle, Veering: A Theory of Literature (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2012). Here, it should be acknowledged that there are earlier examples of creative criticism, such as Plato’s The 
Republic, trans. by Desmond Lee (London: Penguin, 1955) (first publ. circa 375 BC); however, for the purpose 
of this thesis, I primarily refer to those examples surrounding literary modernism and beyond.  
64 Stephen Benson and Clare Connors, ‘Introduction’, Creative Criticism: An Anthology and Guide, ed. by 
Benson and Connors (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), pp. 1 – 47 (p. 3).  
65 Benson and Connors, ‘Introduction’, pp. 11 – 12.  
19 
 
experimental plastic techniques, including repetition, fragmentation, spatial notation, 
neologism, and typographical distortion. The critical-creative methodology of this thesis 
therefore culminates in a manifesto, which supplants the anachronous conclusion to originate 
a poetics of plasticity, and collection of poems, which appropriate the theories and modernist 
praxes examined in my chapters. Here, I contemplate the extent to which the text is a plastic 
thing with the ability to form and be formed by other texts – to form and be formed by the 
reader’s physical and psychological interactions with other texts – in the material world. As a 
critical-creative assemblage of affective materialities which repair, relapse, reject, repeat, 
resist, and respond to each other, this thesis therefore alerts readers to those theoretical 
slippages happening between studies in psychoanalysis, thing theory, affect theory, aesthetics, 
the nonhuman turn, modernist literary cultures, modern poetic composition, and neuroscience. 
Throughout this thesis, the modernist object is therefore classified as anthropomorphic, 
uncanny, enchanting, thingly, abject, and finally, plastic – for it comprises all and none of these 
appellations at all. To fully explore the maddening, strange, fragmented, plural, affective, 
disruptive, radical dimensions of the modernist object, I therefore begin with the axiom that 
the thesis must become, formally and linguistically, plastic – synthesising, modulating, and 
repairing its inter-disciplinary methodology through the process of composition, enacting the 
disruption of ontological classification which I argue overwhelms literary modernism. 
In Chapter One, I offer a critical reconceptualisation of anthropomorphism in modernist 
poetry, which has long been connected with all that is anthropocentric. I explore the slippage 
between human and nonhuman matter through Sigmund Freud’s seminal publication, The 
Uncanny (1919) – the strangely familiar – and then, Bennett’s studies concerning distributed 
agency, enchantment, and assemblage in Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things and 
The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics (2001).66 Here, I 
examine the anthropomorphic object’s capacity to disquiet and delight readers in the poetry of 
Ridge and Lowell, formally and linguistically augmenting the complex assemblage of matters 
that is the literary text. I begin with Freud and psychoanalytic theory for the word ‘object’ is 
imperative in the study of psychoanalysis – ‘love objects, hate objects, phobic objects, fetish 
objects, internal objects, part objects, and object representations’ all come to signify elements 
of the psyche.67 For Slobodanka Vladiv-Glover, ‘the interest in the object and its relation to the 
 
66 Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny (London: Penguin Books, 2003) (first publ. in Imago, Vol. 5 (1919), pp. 297 – 
324); Bennett, Vibrant Matter; Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
67 Freud Museum London, Freud’s Objects (2015) 
<https://www.freud.org.uk/education/topic/40037/subtopic/40048/> [Accessed 1 January 2018]. 
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subject of consciousness has motivated modern psychoanalysis since Freud,’ whose structure 
of the unconscious is ‘defined by its relationship to a primary “absent” object’ (the mother’s 
body or the phallus). 68 After Freud, Vladiv-Glover theorises that desire is ‘bound up with the 
instituting structure of absence/presence’ – here, the nonhuman object appears to exceed the 
stasis or stability we have traditionally attributed to objecthood, inducing transformations of 
the human subject, a fluctuation of meanings.69 Through an exploration of Freud’s writings on 
the uncanny and Bennett’s critical study of ‘thing-power’ – ‘the ‘strange ability of ordinary, 
man-made items to exceed their status as objects and to manifest traces of independence or 
aliveness, constituting the outside of our own experience’ – I therefore contend that Ridge and 
Lowell’s anthropomorphic objects implicate their readers in the radical reappraisal of a human 
/ nonhuman binary that cannot hold.70 Here, I examine the uncanny silence of Ridge’s 
anthropoid doll, who appears to emote and reason, in ‘Sun-Up’ (1920) and the uncanny 
clamour of Lowell’s strings in ‘Stravinsky’s Three Pieces, “Grotesques” for String Quartet’ 
(1916) which appear to screech in the absence of a player. I explore Ridge’s doll and Lowell’s 
strings as anthropomorphic nonhuman objects whose uncanny resonances (or, indeed, silences) 
coerce the reader into questioning all they have come to know and trust about human subjects, 
about nonhuman objects, about the material world of the poem. Following Marjorie Perloff and 
Craig Dworkin’s seminal analyses of sound in poetry, I contemplate the phonic reverberations 
of the anthropomorphic object, which appears alongside uncanny poetic forms and phonetic 
patterns with the power to delight and disquiet readers in the work of Ridge and Lowell – 
destabilising the communicative function of a language that does not simply mean.71 
Accompanying the slippage between human and nonhuman forms, I therefore argue that there 
is a slippage between literary genres in Ridge and Lowell’s compositions. By compelling their 
readers to acknowledge the assemblages in which they participate, I argue that modernist poets 
participate in a critical destabilisation of the ontological categories, human and nonhuman – 
compelling us to dwell on the complex, secret lives of those objects that participate in our 
material world. 
Chapter Two brings together studies in material cultures, affect theory, psychoanalysis, 
and thing theory, exploring multi-sensory encounters with nonhuman objects in the literary and 
 
68 Slobodanka Vladiv-Glover, ‘The Representation of the Object as the Other in Modernism/Postmodernism: A 
Psychoanalytic Perspective’, Facta Universitatis, Vol. 10 (2011), pp. 173 – 194 (p. 177). 
69 Vladiv-Glover, ‘The Representation of the Object as the Other in Modernism/Postmodernism’, p. 177.  
70 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, p. xvi. 
71 Marjorie Perloff and Craig Dworkin, ‘The Sound of Poetry / The Poetry of Sound: The 2006 MLA 
Presidential Forum’, PMLA, Vol. 123.3 (2008), pp. 749 – 761. 
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artistic oeuvre of Mina Loy. After Viktor Shklovsky’s defamiliarization theory in ‘Art as 
Technique’ (1917) and Julia Kristeva’s conceptualisation of the abject in Powers of Horror: 
An Essay on Abjection (1980), I examine the strange ability of Loy’s poetic experiments and 
art objects to transform nonhuman objects into unimaginable, unpalatable, undesirable things, 
which Brown defines as that which ‘hovers over the threshold between the nameable and 
unnameable.’72 I argue that that the radical plurality of Loy’s lampshades, art objects, and 
poetic experiments carefully dismantles the boundaries between human subjects and nonhuman 
objects, between sex and gender, between literary and artistic productions, to bring about a 
powerful disruption of the naming function of a language which directs and commands all 
systems of physical and psychological knowing. Furthermore, I contend that Loy’s modernist 
things revel in all that is unnameable, unpalatable, and unimaginable: they startle and confront 
the reader with their strange materialities, demanding an active reappraisal. Following 
Kristeva, I reason that Loy’s act of transforming literary and artistic objects into literary and 
artistic things may reveal the revolutionary potential of a language that revels in instability.73 
Here, I assert that Loy’s things reveal the latent possibilities of the material in which she works, 
be it oil paint, rags, found objects, papier maché, or language – forming excessive, maddening, 
unidentifiable things which resist singularity in classification. Finally, I contend that Loy’s 
texts offer a radical rethinking of the literary object as we have come to know it – its customary 
spatial notations, typography, punctuation, and communicative language – confronting the 
reader with the pure potentiality of a thingly poetics.  
In Chapter Three, I explore the experimental poetics of Gertrude Stein in Tender 
Buttons (1914) and the Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven in Body Sweats (compiled in 
2011) through the concepts of plasticity and neuropsychoanalysis. Here, I consider the ability 
of experimental modernist poetics to formally anticipate the brain’s synaptic junctions and 
neuronal firings in relation to the nonhuman object, repairing and reforming our traditional 
conceptions of the nonhuman object, through Catherine Malabou’s work on neuroplasticity 
and experimental writing in What Should We Do with Our Brain? (2004) and Plasticity at the 
Dusk of Writing (2004).74 Though Jonah Lehrer examines, at length, how the physical and 
 
72 Viktor Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, trans. by Lee T. Lemon & 
Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1965), pp. 3 – 24; Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay 
on Abjection, trans. by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Brown, ‘Thing Theory’, 
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73 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. by Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1984). 
74 Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, trans by. Sebastian Rand (New York: Fordham 
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psychical mechanisms of the human brain is anticipated by modernist writing in Proust Was a 
Neuroscientist (2007), this chapter marks the first examination of neuroplasticity in modernist 
poetry, exploring the human subject’s sensory encounters with the nonhuman object as that 
which excites a radical rethinking of the this thing we name a poem – articulating that which 
Malabou defines as ‘the completeness of form and the possibility of its disintegration.’75 Whilst 
Lehrer explores Stein’s subversive experiments with language in Tender Buttons (1914) – her 
futile attempts and subsequent failure to make language meaningless – he does not ultimately 
consider the extent to which Stein’s compositions append, reveal, and transform the brain’s 
plastic capacity to relate words to things, to relate things to other words. In this chapter, I 
therefore consider the extent to which the plastic human subject is physically and 
psychologically altered through encounters with plastic nonhuman objects in the work of Stein 
and the Baroness – articulating how the brain learns and adapts to its external environment 
through experience. Here, I theorise that the fragmented, hybrid forms in which Stein and the 
Baroness write should be considered ‘plastic’ – articulating ‘the completeness of form and the 
possibility of its disintegration’.76 If, for Malabou, ‘form is plastic’ and ‘the nervous system 
presents the clearest, most striking model of this type of organization’, I contend that we must 
look to brain for creative stimulation – its synaptic connections and neural firings becoming 
poetic techniques, represented on the page via experimental language techniques such as 
fragmentation, repetition, and spatial notation.77 This study therefore culminates with the 
proclamation that it is plastic form which affords the literary text the critical potential to 
articulate the nonhuman object in all its pluralities – synthesising, modulating,  repairing, and 
executing the connections between people, language and things.  
I conclude with a creative-critical meditation on the purpose of a plastic text, its formal 
and linguistic properties – composed in the manifesto form as a direct response to radical 
modernist examples such as Tristan Tzara’s ‘Dada Manifesto’ (1918), Loy’s ‘Aphorisms on 
Futurism’ (1914 – 1919), Stein’s ‘Composition as Explanation’ (1926), Charles Olson’s 
‘Projective Verse’ (1950), and Francis Ponge’s ‘The Object is Poetics’ (1962).78 In Manifesto: 
A Century of Isms, Mary Ann Caws argues that the ‘manifesto moment positions itself between 
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what has been done and what will be done, between the accomplished and the potential, in a 
radical and energizing division.’79 The manifesto, as a form which oscillates between the 
formed and all that has yet to be formed, operating between past, present, and possibility is 
continually modified throughout the history of modernism in response to encounters with 
human subjects, language, and nonhuman objects. Formally, the manifesto therefore signifies 
all that is and will be considered plastic. For Caws, ‘The manifesto is an act of démesure, going 
past what is thought of as proper, sane, and literary.’80 Furthermore, she asserts that when a 
manifesto is at ‘the peak of its performance, its form creates its meaning.’81 The manifesto is 
excessive, innovative, maddening, plastic – it is a text which operates beyond genre, which 
produces its own formal and linguistic conditions between prose and poetry, between critical 
and creative modes of composition. ‘The Text is a Plastic Thing: A Manifesto’ heralds the pure 
potentiality of plastic composition after modernism.  
This critical-creative manifesto directly leads into my collection of original 
compositions – ‘Museum of Lost and Broken Things’ – foregrounding their plastic 
materialities, their meditations on the slippage of physical and psychological matter happening 
between human subjects and nonhuman objects. These poems hyperbolise, appropriate, and 
develop the experimental techniques of my chosen poets, revelling in the productive 
continuums between genres. I begin again with the silence of a doll, perhaps, or an apple. Begin 
with a toothpaste marble, the leg of a clothes peg – a pen cap, bottle cap, balloon clip, or the 
habit of six loose teeth from a comb. Begin with a soft-boiled egg, a thimble, a cruise ship, a 
contraceptive pill, an assemblage of vibrant things. I begin again with a bell, a house, or 
shrunken head. I begin with a ready-made, perhaps, a paper clip, or the pit of a peach to explore 
the volatility of matter which rejects communicative language – revelling in abject plurality to 
stimulate a critical reconceptualisation of what it is to be human or nonhuman in the twentieth 
century and beyond, what is to compose this thing we name poetry in the twentieth century and 
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THE SECRET LIVES OF MODERNIST OBJECTS:  
ANTHROPOMORPHISM IN THE POETRY OF LOLA RIDGE AND AMY 
LOWELL 
 
For Jessica Feldman, it is modernist poets, novelists, short story writers, and playwrights who 
‘brought dead objects back to life: railroad timetables, cracked teacups, golden bowls, heather 
mixture stockings, Connemara cloth, vaseline, and orangeflowers.’1 In modernist literature, 
such ‘dead’ objects are not simply resurrected – their materials recycled, remade, reused – but 
are ascribed physical and psychological agency, a life of their own. Modernist objects are 
afforded human behaviours, sentiments, and motivations; they appear to speak, move, feel, and 
think at will. In Lola Ridge’s poem, ‘The Ghetto’ (1918), ‘loose jointed’ chairs creak ‘like old 
bones’ in a grimy café, their bodies ailing.2 The domestic objects of Ford Madox Ford’s ‘A 
House’ (1921) chatter their glossolalia, living alongside their animal and human occupants: ‘I 
am the Clock on the Shelf! Is… Was… Is… Was! Too late … Because… Too late… 
Because…’3 When Miss Brill, the namesake of Katherine Mansfield’s short story (1920), 
shakes ‘the moth-powder’ from her fur necklet and gives it ‘a good brush,’ it asks, ‘What has 
been happening to me?’ and cries when it is put back in its box.4 Odradek appears, to the 
protagonist of Franz Kafka’s ‘The Cares of a Family Man’ (1919), to be ‘a flat star-shaped 
spool for thread’ with old, tattered fibres hanging from its body – uttering ‘the kind of laughter 
that has no lungs behind it’ in the absence of a mouth.5 In Amy Lowell’s poem, ‘Red Slippers’ 
(1915), shoes coerce human pedestrians into looking through a shop window, ‘festooning from 
the ceiling like stalactites of blood, flooding the eyes of passers-by with dripping colour’ – 
‘screaming their claret’ into the crowded metropolis.6 Here, Lowell’s red slippers act upon the 
material world with an autonomy that should not be – that seems, however momentarily, to 
challenge the autonomy of the human subject. There is something troubling about their 
animacy; it disrupts those seemingly successful assumptions we have made about the world, 
about our things. In Virginia Woolf’s ‘Solid Objects,’ the protagonist fondly recounts the 
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childhood belief that ‘the heart of the stone leaps with joy when it sees itself chosen,’ and the 
stone calls out: ‘It might so easily have been any other of the millions of stones, but it was I, I, 
I!’7 Woolf’s stone appeals to us, as readers, to contemplate what strange matter the human 
subject and nonhuman object might have in common. In modernist literature, there is a radical 
disturbance of ontological categories; the ‘I’ which has belonged, with so little opposition, to 
the human subject, becomes the ‘I’ of the nonhuman object.  
Throughout this chapter, I offer a fundamental reappraisal of anthropomorphism in the 
compositions of Lola Ridge and Amy Lowell, which liberate this critically abhorred 
phenomenon from anthropocentricism by acknowledging the physical and psychological 
continuums between human and nonhuman matter. The term ‘anthropomorphism’ is 
etymologically derived from the Greek words anthropos (meaning ‘human’) and morphe 
(meaning ‘shape’ or ‘form’),8 and is simply defined as the attribution of human-like 
personalities or physiognomies to something nonhuman.9 Historically, anthropomorphism has 
been condemned by philosophers, scientists, and theologists as ‘an insidious 
anthropocentricism that dares not speak its name’ – the human subject positioning his or herself 
as ‘the center of the world’ by imposing human schemas onto gods, animals, and nonhuman 
objects.10 Following the work of Stewart Elliot Guthrie and Pierre Montebello, however, I 
contend that anthropomorphism is not a simple matter of anthropocentricism, but is a 
fundamental disruption of the hierarchical classifications that are ‘human subject’ and 
‘nonhuman object’. For Guthrie, ‘when we see there is no certain line between the human and 
the nonhuman, we can better see that it is not unreasonable to look for features we are 
acquainted with in humans elsewhere as well.’11 There is therefore a palpable commonality 
between subject and object, and it must be acknowledged that human and nonhuman beings 
share more properties and propensities than we have, historically, been willing to admit. Pierre 
Montebello similarly contends that there is a ‘higher anthropomorphism’ which should be 
considered the exact opposite of anthropocentricism. Montebello asserts that higher 
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anthropomorphism does not seek to ‘extend man to the world, but to place man in the world,’ 
for what is ‘man is thus in all things, not because it is in man, but because it is in all things.’12 
Finally, anthropomorphism is offered a pivotal chance of redemption. According Montebello, 
anthropomorphism should no longer be considered a matter of vanity or a foolish projection of 
human personalities and physiognomies onto nonhuman objects, but a critical destabilisation 
of our place as human subjects in the material world.   
More recently, scholars participating in the nonhuman turn have ‘engaged in decentring 
the human in favour of a turn toward and concern for the nonhuman’ – demonstrating that ‘the 
human is characterized precisely by this indistinction from the nonhuman.’13 The nonhuman 
turn is a heterogeneous collection of interdisciplinary studies, including Bruno Latour’s actor-
network theory, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s assemblage theory, and those oppositional 
modes of speculative realism and vital materialism which are Graham Harman’s object-
orientated ontology and Jane Bennett’s thing-power respectively. Richard Grusin therefore 
describes the nonhuman turn as ‘a theoretical or methodological assemblage’ of studies that 
‘argue (in one way or another) against human exceptionalism,’ against ontological 
classification.14 Here, I radically revise the theoretical parameters of anthropomorphism in 
modernist poetry after the nonhuman turn, primarily concentrating on the principles of vital 
materialism, which advocates for the physical and psychological continuums between human 
and nonhuman matter – the agency of things.15  
In the first half of this chapter, I begin with what Aimee Gaston classifies as the 
powerful ‘slippage between the realms of human and material’ in modernist literature – its 
ability to ‘make the reader feel at home in not feeling at home’ in the text, compelling the 
reader to violently reappraise the physical and psychological dimensions of their material 
things, of themselves, as human beings.16 There are, of course, distinctive resonances of 
Sigmund Freud’s seminal publication, ‘The Uncanny’ (1919), in Gaston’s analyses.17 I 
therefore turn to the Freudian ‘uncanny’ – ‘that species of the frightening that goes back to 
 
12 Pierre Montebello, The Other Metaphysics: Essays on Ravaisson, Tarde, Nietzsche and Bergson (Paris: 
Desclée De Brouwer, 2003), pp. 12 – 13.  
13 Richard Grusin, ‘Introduction’, The Nonhuman Turn, ed. by Grusin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
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what was once well known and had long been familiar’ – to elucidate the formal implications 
of the slippages between human and nonhuman material in Lola Ridge’s long-form, free verse 
poem, ‘Sun-Up’ (1920).18 Freud recognises dolls, automatons, and wax figures as objects with 
the potential to elicit an uncanny response. My examination of Ridge’s ‘Sun-Up’ therefore 
primarily concentrates on the anthropomorphic nonhuman object that is Janie – the 
protagonist’s doll. Here, I offer a critical autopsy of Janie’s silent, anthropoid body as that 
which compels the reader to contemplate what the human subject and nonhuman object have 
in common. Furthermore, I argue that the poem’s slippages between animacy and inanimacy, 
sentience and insentience, and homeliness and unhomeliness, are accompanied by a formal 
slippage between poetic and prosaic material. 
Following this radical redefinition of anthropomorphism as that which reveals uncanny 
slippages between human and nonhuman matter in the material world, I turn to Bennett’s 
critical studies of ‘thing-power’ and ‘enchantment’ in Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of 
Things (2010) and The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics 
(2001) respectively.19 In the second half of this chapter, I argue that Amy Lowell’s 
anthropomorphic nonhuman objects manifest what Bennett defines as ‘thing-power’ or the 
‘strange ability of ordinary, man-made items to exceed their status as objects and to manifest 
traces of independence or aliveness, constituting the outside of our own experience.’20 When 
Lowell’s strings play – ‘screeching’ – in the absence of a player throughout ‘Stravinsky’s Three 
Pieces, “Grotesques” for String Quartet’ (1916), I examine their vociferous thing-power as that 
which compels us to revaluate our ontological classification of matter in the material world.21 
Finally, I explore the possibility that just as the anthropomorphic nonhuman’s thing-power may 
disturb the reader with its potential to rival the human subject’s autonomy, it may also delight 
in equal measure. In my analysis of Lowell’s polyphonic prose poem, ‘Spring Day’ (1916), I 
therefore argue that the anthropomorphic nonhuman object may alternatively induce that ‘state 
of wonder’ – the ‘temporary suspension of chronological time and bodily movement’ – which 
Bennett designates ‘enchantment’.22 I explore Lowell’s polyphonic prose, its synthesis of 
human and nonhuman sonance, as that which triggers a powerful slippage between the 
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enchanting and uncanny. Furthermore, I suggest that the slippage between poetic and prosaic 
material happening in Ridge’s ‘Sun-Up’ is also critical to our understanding of Lowell’s 
innovations in polyphonic prose – its strange ability to simultaneously delight and disarm the 
reader with a symphony of things.   
As an assemblage of theoretical material, this chapter then concludes with a critical 
reconceptualisation of Ridge and Lowell’s texts as assemblages, or ‘ad hoc groupings of 
diverse elements, of vibrant materials of all sorts’ – human and nonhuman matter, poetic and 
prosaic material.23 For Bennett, any ‘attempt to disentangle the human from the nonhuman’ is, 
after all, intrinsically ‘futile’ – she argues that we must ‘seek instead to engage more civilly, 
strategically, and subtly with the nonhumans in the assemblages’ in which we all participate as 
actants in and of the material world.24 By compelling readers to acknowledge the assemblages 
in which they participate, I contend that modernist texts participate in a disturbance of the 
ontological categories and classifications which have traditionally ordered the world and all its 
things. Finally, I argue that modernist writers such as Ridge and Lowell alert their readers to 
their active participations in the strange and disturbing assemblage of materials that is the 
experimental literary text.  
 
MY DOLL JANIE: LOLA RIDGE AND THE UNCANNY SILENCE OF DOLLS  
 
When she arrived in Australia from New Zealand in 1903, the Irish born anarchist poet Lola 
Ridge was not ‘Lola Ridge’ at all; as Ridge’s biographer, Terese Svoboda, recounts, ‘for the 
last eight years, she had been Rosa Webster or Lola Webster or Mrs Peter Webster, and before 
that, Rosa MacFarlane after her mother’s remarriage, and before that, Rosalie Ridge and Rosa 
Delores Ridge. She was christened Rose Emily Ridge.’25 By January 1904, however, she had 
declared marital independence and had set about launching her literary identity, publishing as 
Lola Ridge.26 As Svoboda suggests, Ridge – alongside others such as Mina Loy, who had 
‘omitted two letters from her father’s surname Lowry [sic]’ and Hilda Doolittle who had taken 
on ‘the sobriquet H.D.’ – were beginning to ask the question, who, or perhaps more poignantly 
in the context of this thesis, what am I to be in this modern world?27 When she arrived in 
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America in 1907, Ridge would begin to address this question. She attended protests and picket 
lines, worked as an artist’s model, a factory worker, an illustrator, an educational administrator. 
She became an associate editor for Margaret Sanger’s controversial Birth Control Review, 
Alfred Kreymborg’s Others, and later, Harold Loeb’s Broom. In 1919, Ridge travelled to 
Chicago as a lecturer for The Others Lecture Bureau, and gave a speech on ‘how sexually 
constructed gender roles hinder female development’ titled ‘Woman and the Creative Will’ – 
a decade before the publication of Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own (1929).28 She 
published five volumes of poetry, including Sun-Up and Other Poems (1920), Red Flag (1927), 
and Dance of Fire (1935).29  
Despite her substantial contributions to literary and political modernism, there is little 
contemporary scholarship on Lola Ridge. As Svoboda recalls, ‘when she died in 1941, the New 
York Times proclaimed her one of the best poets in America – then her work disappeared, a 
casualty of the anti-liberal, anti-female, and anti-experiment sentiments of the second World 
War and a continued critical disdain for political poetry.’30 To date, the most extensive study 
of Ridge’s work occurs in William Drake’s First Wave: Women Poets in America 1915-1945 
(1987). Though Drake’s chapter on Ridge offers a long-overdue commentary on Ridge’s 
poetry, his analysis largely hinges on political, historical, and biographical contexts, on reading 
Ridge’s life in her compositions.31 In Mosaic of Fire: The Work of Lola Ridge, Evelyn Scott, 
Charlotte Wilder, and Kay Boyle (2010), however, Caroline Maun offers a critical reappraisal 
of Ridge’s poetry; she argues that Ridge’s poems are ‘Imagist-inflected’ studies, combining 
clarity, precision, and concrete observations with other prosaic or ‘narrative techniques’ such 
as ‘employing a first-person persona; creating a sense of story through various characters and 
including some elements of plot’.32 This chapter builds on Maun’s study to consider how 
Ridge’s Janie triggers a slippage between human and nonhuman material, between matters of 
form, in the strangely familiar narrative arc of the child’s doll. This study therefore culminates 
in a radical redefinition of Ridge’s ‘Sun-Up’ as a formally disorientating, uncanny text.  
 
28 Svoboda, Anything That Burns You, p. 5; Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (London: Penguin, 2002) 
(first publ. London: Hogarth Press, 1929).  
29 Ridge, Sun-Up and Other Poems; Ridge, Red Flag (New York: Viking Press, 1927); Ridge, Dance of Fire 
(New York: Smith & Haas, 1935).  
30 Svoboda, Lola Ridge, a great Irish writer and why you’ve never heard of her (2016) 
<https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/lola-ridge-a-great-irish-writer-and-why-you-ve-never-heard-of-her-
1.2816113> [Accessed 25 May 2019].  
31 William Drake, First Wave: Women Poets in America 1915-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1987).  
32 Caroline Maun, Mosaic of Fire: The Work of Lola Ridge, Evelyn Scott, Charlotte Wilder, and Kay Boyle 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2010), p. 35.  
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Ridge’s ‘Sun-Up’ was published by B. W. Huebsch in the volume Sun-Up and Other 
Poems (1920). Spanning thirty-six pages, ‘Sun-Up’ is a long-form free verse poem which has 
received little scholarly attention to date. As Maun surmises, ‘Sun-Up’ is a ‘meditation on early 
childhood’ in which the first-person narrator – Betty, aged four – experiences life in poverty 
with her ailing mother and a troupe of nannies, playmates who may or may not be imaginary, 
and living objects.33 From ‘the poor wooden chair / that knows it isn’t nice to sit on’ to those 
shadows that ‘love to play on the wall with you’ and ‘pull in their heads’ when ‘you poke a 
candle at them,’ nonhumans are afforded physical and psychological agency in Ridge’s ‘Sun-
Up’.34 For Svoboda, ‘Sun-Up’ therefore ‘prefigures Williams’ “no ideas except in things,” 
written seven years later in Paterson.’35 There is, however, no anthropomorphic nonhuman 
object that arouses more dread – or more delight – than Janie, Betty’s doll.   
In ‘The Philosophy of Toys’ (1853) Charles Baudelaire contends, ‘I believe that 
children in general act upon their toys […] However, I would not deny that the contrary can 
occur – that the toy can sometimes act upon the child – above all in cases of literary or artistic 
predestination.’36 Here, Baudelaire addresses the disquieting question of the doll’s agency and 
materiality, as a miniaturised human body. For Baudelaire, the doll is afforded a physical and 
psychological autonomy in literature and art which might remind the reader of their own 
contentious childhood relationships with dolls – when the agency of dolls challenged their own. 
Though Baudelaire’s claims predate literary and artistic modernism, that strangely familiar 
narrative arc of the animate doll – the cruelty and tenderness that the human child may bestow 
upon it – continues to beguile authors and artists of the modernist era. In Anne Parish’s novel, 
The Floating Island (1922), Mr. Doll, Mrs. Doll, and their china children come alive to speak, 
move, and think at will. Hans Bellmer’s sculptures and photographs of The Doll (1934, 1935) 
mutilate the doll body and all its parts. Joseph Cornell’s Bébé Marie (1940) mounts the 
haunting silence of the abandoned doll in a shadow box; Marie’s eyes stare back at the viewer, 
unblinking. In Ridge’s composition, however, if Betty had not communicated at the outset – 
when Janie materialises in her bed on Christmas morning – that ‘Janie is made of rubber,’ it 
would not be apparent that Janie is a doll at all.37 ‘Sun-Up’ is a poem that rejects ontological 
categories, inducing a powerful distortion of the human / nonhuman binary. After all, Janie 
comes to Betty (and to the reader) ready-packaged with a name and the ability to possess 
 
33 Maun, Mosaic of Fire, p. 42.  
34 Ridge, ‘Sun-Up’, p. 7, 27.  
35 Svoboda, Anything That Burns You, p. 161.  
36 Charles Baudelaire, ‘The Philosophy of Toys’, On Dolls, pp. 11 – 21 (p. 17).  
37 Ridge, ‘Sun-Up’, p. 9.  
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objects of her very own – a ‘red and blue jacket’ adhered to the surface of her skin, which will 
not ‘come off’ in Betty’s hands.38 Though Freud asserts that ‘children are not afraid of their 
dolls coming to life – they may even want them to,’ there is something profoundly disturbing 
about Janie’s contradictory qualities: she has a human-like mouth but will not speak, she is and 
is not physically and psychologically autonomous, she has a human-like mouth but will not 
scream, she is and is not aesthetically and ergonomically familiar.39 Actuating a slippage 
between that which is me and not-me, Janie revels in all that is uncanny.   
 Freud classifies the ‘uncanny’ as ‘that species of the frightening that goes back to what 
was once well known and had long been familiar’ – referring to an unsettling conjunction of 
the comfortable and the strange.40 After Ernst Jentsch, Freud recognises dolls, automatons, and 
wax figures as objects with the potential to elicit an uncanny response; he references Jentsch, 
who suggests that ‘doubt as to whether an apparently living being is animate and, conversely, 
doubt as to whether a lifeless object may not in fact be animate’ are both a powerful source of 
the uncanny.41 For Freud, however, Jentsch’s theory of ‘intellectual uncertainty’ cannot alone 
explain the uncanny effect.42 In his detailed examination of the etymology of the Germanic 
word ‘heimlich,’ Freud argues that the most significant element ‘is that among the various 
shades of meaning that are recorded for the word heimlich there is one in which it merges with 
its formal antonym, unheimlich, so that which is heimlich becomes unheimlich.’43 For Freud, 
the ‘word heimlich is not unambiguous, but belongs to two sets of ideas, which are not mutually 
contradictory, but very different from each other – the one relating to what is familiar and 
comfortable, the other to what is concealed and kept hidden.’44 ‘Sun-Up’ confronts the reader 
with this assimilation, this slippage between the heimlich and the unheimlich, through the hole 
in the back of Janie’s head. When Betty’s mother refuses Janie nourishment, Betty apprehends 
a likeness between Janie’s miniature human body and her own: 
 
She wouldn’t let you take one pea 
to put in the hole where the whistle was  
at the back of Janie’s head,  
so Janie should have some dinner  
 
38 Ridge, ‘Sun-Up’, p. 9.  
39 Freud, The Uncanny, p. 141. 
40 Freud, The Uncanny, p. 124.  
41 Ernst Jentsch, ‘On the Psychology of the Uncanny’, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, trans. 
by Roy Sellers, Vol. 2 (1997), pp. 7 – 16 (p. 11). 
42 Freud, The Uncanny, p. 139. 
43 Freud, The Uncanny, p. 132.  
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So you went to the park with biscuits  
and black tea in a bottle.45 
 
Though the scale of their bodies may differ, if Betty’s body hungers, tires, and ails, so must 
Janie’s – a body is a body is a body.46 Though Janie’s body is rubber and Betty’s body is flesh, 
their bodies bear an unbearable resemblance to each other, for they are both miniatures of a 
woman: the woman-like doll and the female child who is not-quite-woman. For Betty, who 
survives in abject poverty, Janie’s famine is so familiar that it becomes analogous with her own 
– it must be satisfied. Just as Janie is humanised by her need for sustenance, however, there 
comes an acknowledgment of the feeding ‘hole’ in the back of her head. Though Janie’s body 
may hunger, starve, and crave like a human body, it does not feed like one at all. Though Janie’s 
arms, legs, eyes, nose, and mouth may resemble human components, their functions may not 
correspond at all. Here, Ridge’s poem is consumed with the question of what strange matter 
the human subject and nonhuman object might have in common. After all, if the female 
anthropoid doll is to be described as human-like, then Betty may also be described as doll-like 
– there is a collusion of forms in ‘Sun-Up’ which compels the reader to radically reappraise 
what constitutes a nonhuman object, and what constitutes a human subject. As Nicholas Royle 
argues in his seminal, book-length study of the uncanny, uncanniness ‘may thus be construed 
as a foreign body within oneself, even the experience of oneself as a foreign body.’47 Ridge’s 
poem, in exploring the contradictions and commonalities between Betty and Janie, may 
therefore coerce the reader into experiencing the foreignness within their own bodies – the 
foreignness of their own bodies – distorting the boundaries between what is heimlich and 
unheimlich, what is human and nonhuman.  
 Betty’s indifferent tone, the pragmatic language with which she describes Janie’s 
feeding hole, further amplifies this formal assimilation of the heimlich and unheimlich, the 
human and nonhuman, happening in the poem. For Royle, ‘Above all, the uncanny is intimately 
entwined in language, with how we conceive and represent what is happening within ourselves, 
to ourselves, to the world, when uncanny strangeness is at issue.’48 Here, Royle suggests that 
 
45 Ridge, ‘Sun-Up’, p. 10.  
46 Here, it should be acknowledged that my phrasing of ‘a body is a body is a body’ is appropriated from 
Gertrude Stein’s ‘Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose’ – this would become a refrain throughout her work, 
variations of which appear in Operas and Plays, The World is Round, Alphabets and Birthdays, Stanzas in 
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47 Nicholas Royle, The Uncanny (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 1. 
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the disorientating power of language is uncanny – manifesting itself in mechanical repetitions, 
a semblance of déjà vu, and ‘un-happenings’ which disturb ‘time and space, order and sense.’49 
The hole in the back of Janie’s head is made conclusively uncanny by the unsophisticated 
vernacular of a child, who does not comprehend the horror of what it is she says – why she 
should, perhaps, apprehend the grotesque anatomy of the woman-like doll, who has a hole in 
the back of her head which should not be. The simplistic language of Ridge’s child protagonist, 
Betty, triggers a recollection of those long-repressed childhood wishes and fantasies regarding 
the living doll – its false promise of camaraderie. Betty’s description of the hole subsequently 
repeats upon the poem, regurgitated twice more with the same descriptors as the original.50 The 
hole in the back of Janie’s head becomes slowly, steadily, strangely familiar to the reader 
through its repetition in the material world of the poem. It refers back to its other 
manifestations, an ‘un-happening’ which disorientates the narrative arc of the poem, 
desensitising the reader enough to make the hole appear as inconsequential as it is to Betty – a 
body is a body is a body. Here, Ridge’s poem actualises Betty’s belief that Janie could, despite 
her physical abnormalities, be like her – compelling the reader, however momentarily, to 
participate in Betty’s reverie. In Janie there is, therefore, a formal merging of antonyms, a 
violent assimilation of matters and meanings as that which is unheimlich becomes heimlich, 
becomes unheimlich once more. The nonhuman object revels in maddening contradictions 
which are never resolved in ‘Sun-Up’, despite Betty’s attempts to coerce the nonhuman object 
into becoming more familiar than strange, more human than nonhuman – to fulfil her desire 
for a sensitive, emoting, conversive companion.  
 When Janie’s body does not respond to pain as Betty knows a human body should, 
Janie must be therefore disciplined and taught how to scowl: 
 
I beat Janie  
and beat her… 
but still she smiled… 
so I scratched her between the eyes with a pin. 
Now she doesn’t love me any more… 
she scowls… and scowls…51   
 
Janie’s stiff, plastered smile endures long after her beating; it triggers, for Betty, the prickling 
sensation that there is something not quite right about the living doll, that is, the 
 
49 Royle, The Uncanny, p. 2.  
50 Ridge, ‘Sun-Up’, p. 21, 23.  
51 Ridge, ‘Sun-Up’, p. 21. 
34 
 
anthropomorphic nonhuman object. Janie’s body is a miniature of woman, but it is not the 
perfect likeness that Betty once supposed: it does not, or perhaps, will not, respond to pain. 
When Betty ‘beats’ Janie, she will not flinch or scream; there is an inertia, a corpse-like silence, 
blow after blow, that should not be. Here, the poetic repetition of ‘beat’ reverberates and there 
is a semblance of Janie’s ‘beating’ in the rapid, sharp ‘beat’ of Ridge’s three-word lines. There 
is a phonetic pattern to the lines, a vacillation between bilabial (‘beat’) and aspirant (‘her’) 
sounds, as the poem replicates Betty’s violent abuse of Janie: a rapid strike followed by an 
exhalation, a ruthless strike followed by an expiration. The ellipses form material signifiers of 
those transitory cessations in Janie’s beating as Betty anticipates an audible response from the 
living doll that never comes – further amplifying the slippage between the heimlich and 
unheimlich, the human and nonhuman, happening in the poem.  
In his essay, ‘Dolls: On the Wax Dolls of Lotte Pritzel’, Rainer Maria Rilke states that 
the silence of the doll is troubling precisely because we do not know if this silence is ‘its 
established form of evasion’ – a terrible, commanding silence in a world ‘where destiny and 
indeed God himself have become famous mainly by not speaking to us’ – or if the doll is simply 
‘useless’ and ‘unresponsive’ matter.52 Betty’s desire for audible communication, that is, for a 
confirmation of the doll’s physical and psychological autonomy, remains unfulfilled by Janie’s 
silence. Though Betty does not know if Janie’s refusal is by will or because she is truly an 
inanimate nonhuman object, her infantile belief in the living doll is disturbed.53 As John 
Biguenet contends in ‘The Silence of Dolls’, if ‘Freud is correct that the familiar, repressed, 
returns as the uncanny, what is it about the doll that we repress? Certainly its silence.’54 It is 
the apprehension of Janie’s silence that causes Betty to scratch her ‘between the eyes with a 
pin’ – carving what Betty determines, in the uncanny absence of sound, to be the ‘correct’ 
human reaction to pain, a ‘scowl,’ into Janie’s brow. Here, Betty desires to compel the doll, by 
force, to become more human than nonhuman. Janie, however, refuses, for such boundaries 
between matters and meanings will not hold in ‘Sun-Up’ – when ‘she scowls’ at Betty, whose 
desire to subjugate Janie into human-like emoting is subverted, her appearance is an uncanny 
thing. When Betty does not want to look upon Janie’s scowl any longer, ‘she scowls… and 
scowls…’ because Janie’s body is a body that does not heal its scars. Though Janie’s arms, 
legs, eyes, nose, and mouth may resemble human components, their functions do not 
correspond at all.  
 
52 Rainer Maria Rilke, ‘Dolls: On the Wax Dolls of Lotte Pritzel’, On Dolls, pp. 51 – 62 (p. 56).  
53 Rilke, ‘Dolls: On the Wax Dolls of Lotte Pritzel’, p. 56.  
54 John Biguenet, ‘The Silence of Dolls’, Silence (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), pp. 81 – 93 (p. 85).  
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When Betty articulates the dreadful comprehension ‘she doesn’t love me any more’, 
she is subsequently compelled to acknowledge her role in the permanent disfigurement of 
Janie’s miniature body, which does and does not resemble her own. Just as Janie coerces the 
reader into questioning what it is to be nonhuman, Betty coerces the reader into questioning 
what it is to be human in a world of physically and psychologically autonomous things. These 
things happen simultaneously, in regurgitations (the hole in the back of Janie’s head), in silent 
contradictions (Betty’s dehumanisation as a result of Janie’s abuse) which are not resolved in 
the text, for it revels in slippages between the heimlich and unheimlich, between the human and 
nonhuman. ‘Sun-Up’ does not seek to answer questions but ask them – it requires an active 
participant. Though Janie’s abuse may be read, according to Maun, as a material representation 
of Ridge’s own disadvantaged, abusive childhood, we must also recognise Janie’s role as a 
physically and psychologically disruptive anthropomorphic object in the poem – responsible 
for disordering the ontological categories, human and nonhuman. 55 Here, Janie the doll, who 
has a human-like mouth but will not speak or scream, becomes a compelling meditation on 
what the human subject and nonhuman object may or may not, after all, have in common. 
Ridge’s ‘Sun-Up’ therefore compels readers to participate in a radical dislocation of the human 
subject, who can no longer be considered at the centre of a world of things.  
For Kenneth Gross, ‘The child’s doll – an object that is itself the scale of a child – 
becomes an object full of equivocal consolations. The violence as much as the care which the 
child lavishes on the doll is part of the story.’56 It is perhaps no surprise, then, that Janie’s 
narrative arc – the narrative arc of the anthropomorphic nonhuman object whose potential for 
autonomy vehemently opposes that of the human subject – concludes with abuse, 
abandonment, and death by asphyxiation. Towards the climax of ‘Sun-Up’, Betty consequently 
begins to dread the confirmation of her infantile wish, that is, the confirmation of Janie’s 
physical and psychological agency. Betty fears that the anthropomorphic nonhuman object will 
overwhelm her status as protagonist in the material world of the poem. She therefore abandons 
Janie, suspecting that Janie will not forgive the violence of her abuse, but Janie the ‘fairy doll’ 
materialises at the door of the house with ‘a little bag’ of sweets ‘tied to her neck’ – a return of 
the repressed. Though Betty’s mother says Janie ‘has forgiven,’ Betty runs to ‘kiss her all over’ 
but is paralysed by the resulting comprehension, ‘Ah… she is still frowning.’57 After all, if 
Janie really is physically and psychologically alert, she must remember those terrible acts that 
 
55 Maun, Mosaic of Fire, p. 45.  
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Betty has committed against her body. And if Janie does remember, she must seek retribution 
in her homecoming. Janie must, therefore, die:  
 
But why aren’t you happy  
if it’s a new day? 
Because something has happened…  
something sad and terrible… 
Now I remember… it’s Janie. 
Yesterday 
I took Janie out  
and tied my handkerchief over her face  
and put sand in it  
and threw her into the ditch 
down in the black water  
under the dock leaves…58 
 
When Janie’s potential for agency appears to rival Betty’s, it is no longer acceptable; she 
manifests a powerful slippage between the heimlich and unheimlich, between the human and 
nonhuman, that Betty cannot hope to resolve. As Rilke contends, ‘soon we realised we could 
not make’ the doll ‘into a thing or a person, and in such moments it became a stranger to us, 
and we could no longer recognise all the confidences we had heaped over it and into it.’59 Janie 
is Betty’s closest companion, a stranger, her hostage, an adversary, and, finally, her victim 
throughout the narrative arc of ‘Sun-Up’ – (in)animate, (in)sentient, (im)material, (not)me, 
(non)human, (un)familiar, (un)heimlich. Janie has a human-like mouth but will not feed like a 
human should; Janie has a human-like mouth but will not scream like a human should. For 
Betty, Janie’s miniature anthropoid body no longer represents camaraderie or commonality, 
but something other: the potential of the anthropomorphic nonhuman object whose physical 
appearance is like-me, whose psychological reasoning is like-mine, to overwhelm Betty’s 
status as the protagonist of the poem.  
  Moreover, amplifying this disintegration of the human / nonhuman boundary in ‘Sun-
Up’ is a disintegration of the first-person / second-person boundary – Betty recounts Janie’s 
story in second and first-person. The ‘I’ of the protagonist is overwhelmed by the ‘you’ that is 
the other, the ‘you’ is and is not the protagonist. There is a confusion between what is me and 
what is not-me, as if the ‘I’ that is protagonist seeks to implicate the ‘you’ which may signify 
Janie and the reader in equal measure, as foreign bodies manipulating the text. There is a 
slippage of formal modes of narration in the text: a formal merging of the antonym, an 
 
58 Ridge, ‘Sun-Up’, p. 22.  
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assimilation of matters and meanings as that which is unheimlich becomes heimlich becomes 
unheimlich. There is a reluctance to accept what has been done, as if Betty seeks to an 
absolution that cannot be, for the friction between the ‘you’ and ‘I’ pronounces her guilt. There 
is a perpetual vacillation as Betty rejects and is subsequently compelled to accept herself as the 
‘I’ which abducted, abused, and abandoned Janie for death. Janie’s visceral ‘death’ scene 
therefore becomes a precautionary silencing – a stilling – of the uncanny anthropomorphic 
nonhuman object. If Betty knots a ‘handkerchief over her face’ and puts ‘sand in it’ – disposes 
of the body in a ‘ditch’ brimmed with ‘black water’ – Janie will not stir or speak, whether she 
was once able or not, for asphyxiation by drowning. And the confusion between what is me 
and what is not-me must cease. As Biguenet summarises, ‘Of course, in the end, nearly every 
doll is actually a silent victim we bend to our will […] Never protesting the contortions and 
amputations and deformities they endure, the dolls are perfect victims: unresisting and silent. 
And yet we fear them.’60 If Betty cannot compel the living doll, by force, to become more 
human than nonhuman, it must become more nonhuman than human, that is, a corpse. The 
physical appearance of a corpse may, after all, be like-me, but it remains inanimate – it borders 
on objecthood. However, this assimilation of matter and meanings – this critical destabilisation 
of the boundary between what is me and not-me – manifesting as a consequence of Janie the 
anthropoid doll, persists throughout the body of Ridge’s composition.  
Accompanying this distortion of the theoretical boundary between the human and 
nonhuman, between that which is me and not-me, is a formal disturbance of the theoretical 
boundary between poetic and narrative technique. ‘Sun-Up’ is a text which is strangely like 
poetry, which is strangely like prose. An assemblage of materials, ‘Sun-Up’ is composed in 
free verse; though there is no metrical formula to its lines, there are spatial notations, a 
spontaneous formation of stanzas. ‘Sun-Up’ also assumes narrative techniques in its 
composition. It is a text internally focalised through its protagonist (Betty) – with plots and 
subplots (Mama’s sickness, Janie’s abuse, Betty’s nightmares) though which the protagonist 
matures and progresses through childhood, with major and minor characters (Celia, Jude, 
Mama, Janie) which produce physical and psychological tensions in the disordered chronology 
of the narrative arc. ‘Sun-Up’ comes to the reader in five numbered sections which are titled 
after significant characters and locations in the story. Betty’s narrations persistently slip 
between the first-person ‘I’ and second-person ‘You’ – between present, past, and future tense. 
 
60 Biguenet, Silence, p. 93. 
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There are, therefore, slippages of time that are never formally acknowledged by the text and 





























‘Sun-Up’ disorientates the reader with its uncanny silences. There are cessations, slippages, 
passages occurring between stanzas, as signified by four black dots – strangely like a pair of 
colons – acting as partitions (see Figure 1). Though the reader is not made privy to what is 
happening in the silences those black dots represent, they serve as reminders of the poem’s 
Figure 1: Ridge, 'Sun-Up', p. 22. 
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materiality: there are occurrences in the plot, after all, that have been omitted in the process of 
composition. The typescript of Ridge’s ‘Sun-Up’ is, therefore, a partial-narrative happening in 
the whiteness of the page and in those punctuated silences simultaneously. Here, we are 
compelled to discern commonalities, connotations, connections between stanzas in the futile 
hope of apprehending that which has been obscured or manipulated by the text’s uncanny 
materiality.  
When Betty begins her confession, the body of the text begins to rupture – splitting into 
asymmetrical lines so that the conclusion to Janie’s story is revealed to the reader slowly, 
steadily, in shards broken by abrupt silences, the terrible whiteness of the page. The poetic 
stanzas that Ridge adopts in ‘Sun-Up’ distort the chronology of the text, which refuses the 
reader the comfort of consistent punctuation, save the ellipses, which serve as calculated 
omissions, as little silences which sunder the connections between phrases and obstruct the 
‘something sad and terrible’ which is to come: Janie’s death. ‘Sun-Up’ is an uncomfortable, 
unhomely, uncanny composition – it spurns any semblance of resolution, its form revels in all 
that is strangely familiar. As Betty concedes, ‘I took Janie out / and tied my handkerchief over 
her face / and put sand in it / and threw her into the ditch’,  ‘and’ becomes connective tissue in 
the body of the composition – ‘and’ severs, synthesises each ‘terrible’ happening in the 
narrative arc, until the reader begins to dread the mechanical reoccurrence of ‘and’ for what 
comes after.61 As Gaston asserts, the ‘slippage between the realms of human and material’ in 
modernist literature is responsible for making ‘the reader feel at home in not feeling at home’ 
in the text, compelling the reader to reappraise the physical and psychological dimensions of 
their material things. It must also be acknowledged, therefore, that the uncanny formal 
dimensions of Ridge’s ‘Sun-Up’ amplify and augment its uncanny subject (or object) matter.62  
Janie materialises for the last time in ‘Sun-Up’ when Betty passes her burial site, 
approximately one year later, accompanied by her childhood companion, Jude, who may or 
may not be imaginary. Betty recounts their conversation: ‘Jude says Janie did love me / only 
that she couldn’t forgive me, / and that you can love people very much / and never, never, never 
forgive them…’63 Only in Janie’s absence is Betty prepared to accept the disquieting plurality 
of the anthropomorphic object – simultaneously companion and adversary, sentient and 
inanimate, human and nonhuman, and none of these appellations at all. ‘Sun-Up’ confronts its 
readers with the contradiction that Janie loved Betty but could not forgive her abuse, that Betty 
 
61 Ridge, ‘Sun-Up’, p. 22. 
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loved Janie but could not forgive her disturbance of the physical and psychological divisions 
between human and nonhuman matter. With these final acknowledgements, it is the uncanny 
materiality of ‘Sun-Up’ which assures that the reader will ‘never, never, never’ forget Janie, 
for the problem of her mute anthropoid form is accompanied and aggravated by Ridge’s 
composition, which is strangely like poetry, which is strangely like prose. ‘Sun-Up’ confronts 
the reader with the silent slippages happening between human and nonhuman matter – between 
poetic and prosaic matter – through the figure of the doll, who has a human-like mouth but will 
not scream. Following the silence of the doll, however, a terrible apprehension remains: what 
happens when the anthropomorphic nonhuman object speaks back?  
 
HEARING THINGS: AMY LOWELL AND THE SONANCE OF THING-POWER 
 
To consider how sonant anthropomorphic objects radically disturb the ontological 
classification of these things we name humans or nonhumans – these things we name poems – 
I turn to Amy Lowell. By 1914, the popular American poet Amy Lowell had become an ‘ardent 
campaigner’ for the Imagist ‘school’ and its primary principles of clarity, precision, and 
concrete observation.64 She had travelled to London and met with the group’s founder, Ezra 
Pound, for the first time in 1913, and he had agreed to include one of her poems in the anthology 
Des Imagistes (1914). However, there was discord within the group; as Lowell’s biographer, 
Carl Rollyson, asserts, ‘Pound wanted her monetary support but scorned her verse.’65 At a party 
Lowell was hosting, Pound famously ‘paraded’ around the room with ‘a tin bathtub on his head 
– his way of ridiculing her bath poem, written in her patented polyphonic prose.’66 With the 
support of F.S. Flint, Richard Aldington, John Gould Fletcher, and H.D., there was a ‘shift of 
alliance and authority’ from Pound to Lowell, and a ‘modified version of the Imagist credo 
which Pound and his colleagues had drafted in 1912’ was born – one reproachfully branded 
‘Amygism’ by Pound.67 Lowell, however, was a force to be reckoned with: she went on to edit 
the three following volumes of Some Imagist Poets (1915 – 17), she went on tour, giving 
popular lectures on modern poetry, and she published volumes of her own verse, 
 
64 Claire Healey, ‘Some Imagist Essays: Amy Lowell’, The New England Quarterly, Vol. 43. 1 (1970), pp. 134 
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including Sword Blades and Poppy Seed (1914), Can Grande's Castle (1918), and Pictures of 
the Floating World (1919).68 As Rollyson argues, ‘She was Poetry, Inc.’69  
Despite her literary successes, Amy Lowell was often criticised for her ‘overly’ 
comprehensive descriptions of ‘things’ – critics condemned her ‘seemingly superficial delight 
in naming colours and limning actions to no particular purpose.’70 This ‘seemingly superficial 
delight’ in things materialises in Lowell’s ‘Grotesques’ (1919) in which the severed heads of 
lilies ‘goggle their tongues’ and ‘shriek’ at their human harvester, and the reader (as material 
accomplice or accessory) is confronted with a moral quandary. When the lilies are woven into 
a ‘wreath of lolling corpses’ to sit atop a human head, the reader is made complicit in the 
massacre of such psychologically alert or physically active things.71  Here, Lowell’s lilies 
writhe and yelp in pain, exceeding their status as mere ornaments – similarly to Ridge’s living 
doll, Lowell’s vociferous lilies encounter the material world with a vitality that appears, 
however briefly, to challenge that of the human subject. As Lowell contends, in a letter to D. 
H. Lawrence, ‘My things are always, to my mind, more than themselves.’72 For Lowell, the 
‘particular purpose’ of her ‘overly’ comprehensive descriptions of ‘things’ is, therefore, much 
more complex than critics to-date have been willing to acknowledge. 
In the second part of this chapter, I explore the extent to which Lowell’s 
anthropomorphic objects become ‘more than themselves’ – chattering amongst themselves, 
calling out to the unsuspecting reader in strange and discordant voices. Building on my study 
of the silence of the living doll in Ridge’s ‘Sun-Up,’ I examine the uncanny soundscapes of 
Lowell’s ‘Stravinsky’s Three Pieces “Grotesques” for String Quartet’ and ‘Spring Day’ in 
which anthropomorphic objects appear to bawl and screech, speaking a language of their own.73 
Here, I argue that Lowell’s nonhuman objects should not be considered dead matter for a 
human subject to act within or upon, but as disruptive agents, revelling in what Jane Bennett 
classifies as ‘thing-power’.74 Furthermore, I consider how Lowell’s vociferous 
anthropomorphic objects challenge what Bennett categorises as the ‘countercultural kind of 
perceiving’ in which ‘the world appears as if it consists only of active human subjects who 
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confront passive objects and their law-governed mechanisms.’75 Though Bennett’s argument 
centres on the potential environmental significance of recognising our objects as dynamic 
agents in the material world, I theorise that this acknowledgment of thing-power is 
accompanied by a radical reappraisal of the human / nonhuman binary which functions, in 
modernist writing, to defamiliarize the working foundations of language and form – of sound 
and sense. Finally, I examine the extent to which Lowell’s anthropomorphic objects may 
enchant the reader with the strange beauty of their symphonies, triggering paralysing moments 
of physical and psychological transformation in the body of the text, where syntactic order, 
genre, and grammatical sense fail the reader. After the silence of Ridge’s living doll, Lowell’s 
anthropomorphic nonhuman objects yell and yawp back.  
In ‘Stravinsky’s Three Pieces, “Grotesques” for String Quartet,’ Lowell’s musical 
instruments appear to communicate in a voice and language of their own, disquieting and 
disarming the listener with the maddening glossolalia of their refrains: ‘Bump! Bump! Tong-
ti-bump!’76 Lowell composed the strange, orchestral sections of her piece after she attended a 
recital of Igor Stravinsky’s ‘Grotesques’ in December 1915, and Samuel Foster Damon details 
her powerful reaction to the performance:  
 
Such sounds had never issued from strings before: there were bagpipes and drums and 
horns and rattling carts, and at the end a very dismal organ. The vitality and poignancy 
of the music, however, appealed instantly to Miss Lowell; by December 11, she was 
informing everybody that she had written one of her best poems about the ‘Three 
Pieces’ or ‘Grotesques,’ and that no editor could ever understand the poem unless he 
also understood Stravinsky.77 
 
Printed beneath the title of Lowell’s poem is her primary aim: to ‘reproduce the sound and 
movement of the music as far as is possible in another medium.’78 Regina Schober describes 
this transformational process as an act of ‘intermedial translation’ from music to poetry in 
which Lowell examines the merits and restrictions of two artistic mediums, transcending their 
boundaries to explore the expressive potential of both.79 Furthermore, Jane P. Ambrose argues 
that the principles of Lowell’s imagism ‘show striking parallels with […] and, in a way, 
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describe Stravinsky’s grotesque achievement’ in ‘Three Pieces’ – both of which aim ‘to create 
new rhythms, as the expression of new moods, and not to copy old rhythms; to allow absolute 
freedom in the choice of subject; to present an image; to consider concentration as the essence 
of poetry’ or movement composition.80 Ambrose also recognises that Stravinsky’s ‘Three 
Pieces’ and Lowell’s imagist manifesto were published together, in the same year.81 Building 
on the work of Schober and Ambrose, I argue that Lowell translates the discordant, dynamic 
timbre of Stravinsky’s music into poetry by detaching the nonhuman object from any 
semblance of a human subject – making the strings appear as if they are ‘screeching’ on their 
own accord, as if there is and can possibly be no player:  
 
  Thin-voiced, nasal pipes 
  Drawing sound out and out  
  Until it is a screeching thread,  
 Sharp and cutting, sharp and cutting,  
 It hurts.82 
 
Here, the strange whine of Lowell’s ‘nasal pipes’ – severed from the image of the playing 
strings – appear to duplicate the painful reverberations of straining vocal chords, ‘screeching’ 
out their music, as if they are striving to communicate something to each other, something that 
the reader (as listener) fails to fathom. The ‘screeching thread’ of noise loosened by Lowell’s 
‘nasal pipes’ appears to ‘cut’ the stanza into a ‘sharp’ and asymmetrical arrangement of lines, 
which come to rest at odd, uncomfortable angles on the page. Lowell’s form and language is, 
for Ambrose, intentionally discordant – mimicking those ‘dissonant chords’ which intensify 
‘the program and emotion of Stravinsky’s music’ and composition.83 Furthermore, the 
repetition of ‘sharp and cutting’ – the shrill, stilted pattern of alternating sibilant and fricative 
sounds – appears to slice the body of the text, and the hiss of the ‘s’ – each crackle of the ‘c’ 
and ‘t’ – threaten to trip the tongue, and familiar words become unfamiliar. Marjorie Perloff 
elucidates this process in ‘The Sound of Poetry’; she argues that ‘Poetic language is language 
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made strange […] by the use of verbal and sound repetition, visual configuration, and syntactic 
deformation. Or, again, it is language perhaps quite ordinary but placed in a new and 
unexpected context.’84 It is Lowell’s maddening repetitions and disjointed poetic forms which 
defamiliarize the reader with the communicative function of language, severing, however 
momentarily, the connection between sound and sense. Just as language is made strange by 
Lowell’s composition, the image of playing strings is made strange by the absence of a player 
– by Lowell’s anthropomorphic connection between the noise such instruments may produce 
and that ‘thin-voiced’ drone of human vocal chords. Granted the semblance of a voice, 
Lowell’s strings appear to overwhelm the text, ‘screeching’ their song in a language that 
appears at once familiar and strange – a language that appears to the reader as a powerful source 
of the uncanny.  
We can understand the effects of Lowell’s use of sound in terms of what Jane Bennett 
calls ‘thing-power’ or the ‘strange ability of ordinary, man-made items to exceed their status 
as objects and to manifest traces of independence or aliveness, constituting the outside of our 
own experience.’85 Lowell’s text sets out to quell the reader’s doubt, and they are compelled to 
admit, however reluctantly, that the strings do appear able, as Bennett would assert, ‘not only 
to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with 
trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own.’86 When Lowell’s strings assault the 
senses with their guttural song, there is an apprehension; the reader does not know for certain 
if the strings are alive or not; they do not know what it is the strings are ‘screeching’ – if the 
strings mean harm. As the human listener, eavesdropping on the recital, confesses, ‘It hurts’; 
the thing-power of Lowell’s strings renders them as grotesque as Stravinsky’s music – as 
surreal, avant-garde, hideous things. It would, perhaps, be no surprise if Lowell intended for 
the two to be heard and read together: a thingly composition of music and language. In Lowell’s 
text, however, there is a violent fracturing that occurs, just as the hierarchical categories that 
are human and nonhuman object are subverted against the reader’s will, and Lowell’s strings 
begin to formally and linguistically direct the poem with their glossolalia:  
   
  Pigs’ cries white and tenuous, 
  White and painful,  
  White and –  
 
84 Marjorie Perloff and Craig Dworkin, ‘The Sound of Poetry / The Poetry of Sound: The 2006 MLA 
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  Bump!  
 Tong!87 
 
Here, the repetition of ‘white’ becomes a peculiar sort of white noise – ‘painful’ to the reader’s 
ear, penetrating and shrill. It overwhelms the text, regurgitated three times in quick succession; 
it appears to lose any semblance of logical meaning, transformed into pure sound by its relapse. 
The poem borders on musical composition, in which sound produces sense beyond language. 
There is a semblance of a wide yawning aspirant, then, a fricative splitting air; the sharp and 
abrasive phonetic pattern offers little comfort to the reader. In ‘The Poetry of Sound’, Craig 
Dworkin argues that ‘Simultaneously bridging and sequestering, sound has accordingly been 
understood as both the opposite of meaning and the essence of meaning.’88 He goes on to assert 
that this ambiguity occurs due to the predominant belief that ‘the value of a poem lies in the 
relation between sound and sense.’89 For Dworkin, there is, therefore, a profound tension 
between sound as expression and sound as inexpression – sound as sense and sound as nonsense 
– that cannot, and perhaps should not, be resolved. Lowell’s composition revels in this 
apprehension to perturb its readers, compelling us to recollect those moments where language 
fails and pure sound – a gasp, a shriek, a hoot – assumes control. The ‘Bump!’ and ‘Tong’ of 
Lowell’s strings therefore revaluates the functionality of human language, as Lowell considers 
what strange vernacular nonhuman objects might use to communicate, just out of human 
earshot. Toward the end of the first movement, the listener’s lines shrink in dimension until 
there is a complete omission and the strings assume complete authority over the text, directing 
its lineation, punctuating it with onomatopoeia. The listener’s description of the performance 
is overwhelmed by a sudden crescendo – the ‘Bump!’ and ‘Tong!’ of the anthropomorphic 
strings drowning out their lines in an uncanny language that the reader cannot comprehensively 
translate, though the connotation is surely ‘painful’, and the reader is left to question if their 
thing-power should be feared.  
 The anthropomorphic object’s thing-power is acceptable only if it does not seek to 
overwhelm the human subject’s physical and psychological autonomy, as the self-proclaimed 
centre of the world. When the nonhuman object exceeds the human subject’s physical and 
psychological autonomy, it therefore becomes a threatening, grotesque, and uncanny thing. 
Bennett, however, states that the familiar ‘image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalised matter 
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feeds human hubris and our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption.’90 For 
Bennett, it is this human-centred rhetoric which prevents us ‘from detecting (seeing, hearing, 
smelling, tasting, feeling) a fuller range of the nonhuman powers circulating around and within 
human bodies.’91 In Lowell’s composition, the reader does not therefore know what it is the 
strings ‘Bump!’ and ‘Tong!’ but it is and will be ‘painful’; the ontological categories, human 
and nonhuman, are rupturing. Lowell compels her readers to acknowledge the startling vitality 
of the material world and all its cognisant, or indeed, articulate things. The strings realise the 
human subject’s worst nightmare, that the anthropomorphic nonhuman will overpower their 
subjectivity, seeking mastery – working, touching, playing, consuming, beating, treating their 
bodies as they have treated those of other objects. Lowell’s composition therefore confronts 
the reader with their anthropomorphobia, striking them with the harrowing question: when the 
anthropomorphic object begins to contradict my desires – crawling, twitching, blinking, or 
‘shrieking’ – what will it do to me? When Lowell’s ‘organ growls,’ the reader must therefore 
heed its strange and guttural warning song, communicating a disquieting thing-power.  
For Bennett, however, it must be acknowledged that though the thing-power of the 
anthropomorphic object-subject may provoke anxiety or horror for the human subject – 
disrupting ontological classification – it may also delight in equal measure:  
 
They disturb perhaps because they explore the possibility of animateness of humans, 
nonhumans, and nonanimals alike. If the power to self-move, to laugh, or to dance 
adheres, albeit differentially, in all material things, then humans must reckon with a 
much larger population of entities worthy of ethical concern, and humanity faces the 
difficult prospect of moderating its claim to uniqueness. At the same time, animations 
can delight, perhaps for the same sensory reasons that a kaleidoscope does – 
metamorphoses of shape, colour, size, and pattern capture the imagination.92 
 
There is, then, a strangely familiar assimilation of matter and meanings happening in Bennett’s 
concept of thing-power. Here, an apperception occurs: there is a commonality between Freud’s 
acknowledgement that the word heimlich ‘merges with its formal antonym, unheimlich, so that 
which is heimlich becomes unheimlich’ and the corresponding manifestation of pleasure and 
displeasure in Bennett’s thing-power.93 There is a plurality to both concepts, a rejection of 
proper categorisation with the power to actuate complex psychological and physical 
transformations in the human subject, the nonhuman object, the literary text.  
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Lowell communicates this plurality, this assimilation of matter and meanings in her 
polyphonic prose – formally combining poetic and prosaic material in a method that 
vehemently opposes Ridge’s use of character, spatial notation, plot, and fragmentation in ‘Sun-
Up’. Assuming the typographical alignment of the prose text, Lowell’s creation must, in 
contrast, be examined according to those theoretical contexts associated with the prose poem. 
In their paper on the history and critical reception of the prose poem, Paul Hetherington and 
Cassandra Atherton contend that prose poetry is ‘a form that is widely written, yet as a 
significant part of contemporary literature in English it exists in a kind of critical half-light – 
perhaps largely because it is ‘strangely like’ both poetry and prose without clearly being one 
or the other.’94 For Hetherington and Atherton, encountering the prose poem is an uncanny 
experience, for ‘what initially appears to be a paragraph of prose is, on a first reading, ousted 
as a prose poem,’ and the ‘experience of reading the text becomes unsettling because the 
familiar is made strange.’95 There is an anxiety – an awe – surrounding this hybrid form, ‘its 
tight rectangular appearance and compression,’ which eludes proper classification.96 In The 
Penguin Book of the Prose Poem, Jeremy Noel-Tod, asserts that it is the prose poem’s formal 
precarity which singles it out as ‘the defining poetic invention of modernity’; he argues that 
the only possible definition of the prose poem is ‘a poem without line breaks,’ for the form is 
so diverse that its principal structure is the only ‘common denominator.’97 
As a close relative of the prose poem, Lowell’s definition of polyphonic prose is 
strikingly similar to Noel-Tod’s contemporary definition, for Lowell asserts that polyphonic 
prose is prose only in ‘typographical arrangement.’98 Many critics credit Lowell as the first to 
experiment with polyphonic prose; Jane Dowson argues, for example, that Lowell’s 
polyphonic prose ‘broke down binary oppositions and allowed for the articulation of plurality’ 
by employing ‘poetic strategies such as metre, rhyme, and alliteration’ to produce a strange, 
‘orchestral effect’ in which a multiplicity of narrators, images, and poetic techniques are 
synthesised. 99 In music, the term ‘polyphonic’ is simply defined as ‘involving the playing of 
more than one note simultaneously; composed or arranged for several voices or parts’ or 
‘consisting of several melodies combined’ or ‘involving the production of many sounds or 
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voices; many-voiced.’100 From this, we might understand Lowell’s polyphonic prose as a 
sonant synthesis, composed from the modern world of other people, language, and objects – an 
experimental symphony in which human subjects and nonhuman objects, manifesting a 
powerful thing-power, may partake simultaneously. Furthermore, just as Mark Goble suggests 
that such ‘noise’ or ‘interference’ in modernist art and literature may confuse this ‘fantasy of 
perfect communication between form and content,’ I explore Lowell’s polyphonic prose as a 
destabilising interference of sound, syntax, and sense.101 
 The sonic interference of Lowell’s ‘Breakfast Table’ – its synthesis of human and 
nonhuman speech – may disturb and delight readers by inducing, simultaneously, that ‘state of 
wonder’ and ‘temporary suspension of chronological time and bodily movement’ which 
Bennett identifies as the ‘enchantment’ effect:102 
 
In the fresh-washed sunlight, the breakfast table is decked and white. It offers itself in 
flat surrender, tendering tastes, and smells, and colours, and metals, and grains, and the 
white cloth falls over its side, draped and wide. Wheels of white glitter in the silver 
coffee pot, hot and spinning like catherine-wheels, they whirl, and twirl – and my eyes 
begin to smart, the little white, dazzling wheels prick them like darts. Placid and 
peaceful the rolls of bread spread themselves in the sun to bask. A stack of butter-pats, 
pyramidal, shout orange through the white, scream, flutter, call: “Yellow! Yellow! 
Yellow!”103 
 
‘Breakfast Table’ was published in Some Imagist Poets, 1916 and appears in a sequence of five 
polyphonic prose poems titled ‘Spring Day’ which follows one human subject and their 
interactions with nonhuman objects, from the bathtub to the bed, on an ordinary day. For 
Andrew Thacker, Lowell’s ‘Breakfast Table’ delivers ‘a kind of defamiliarization of the 
breakfast paraphernalia’ which should be considered a ‘semi-serious attempt to capture both 
the ordinariness and the absurdity of everyday objects’ in the home.104 When it is first 
encountered, Lowell’s breakfast table appears to invite the human subject – and, conversely, 
the reader – to interact with its form: it does not touch, but invites touching; it does not look, 
but invites looking; it does not taste, but invites tasting. There is an absurdity to such an 
invitation, for the human / nonhuman binary is actively disturbed – the reader cannot know for 
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certain whether it is the human subject or anthropomorphic nonhuman object that commands 
the interaction and it borders on mania. This ambiguity is not resolved, for Lowell’s polyphonic 
prose is many-voiced, incorporating human and nonhuman sounds, shouts, and screams. In 
Hearing Things: The Work of Sound in Literature (2018), Angela Leighton argues that the 
phonic plurality of the literary text may mean that the reader cannot ‘finish’ one reading before 
detecting the other, for ‘each reading raises the ghost of a different voice, a different tone, 
rhythm, or stress, and therefore arrives at a different destination of meaning.’105 Leighton 
therefore asserts that though the reading eye witnesses a text physically unaltered by a second 
look, the listening ear may ‘detect’ the ‘murmur of possibilities in every phrase, always still to 
be summoned into speaking life.’106 When Lowell’s ‘butter-pats’ release a ‘scream,’ is it a 
squeal of pleasure – like children at play – or a shriek of terror, comprehending that their bodies 
are about to be carved up, spread out, and eaten by the human subject? Here, Lowell’s 
polyphonic prose entertains the possibility of a line break, a cessation of sound happening in 
silence between sentences, even in the absence of spatial notations. It is a playful and lively 
form, which revels in sonic plurality; it is a maddening and uncanny form for it wallows in 
sonic contradiction. 
  Lowell’s vernacular ambles leisurely in sprawling phrases interposed by commas and 
connectives, ‘tendering tastes, and smells, and colours, and metals, and grains’ – it yawns 
aspirants and plosives (‘wide’ and ‘pot’ and ‘white’), compelling the reader to confront the 
agency of the object world anew. Through Lowell’s polyphonic prose, the reader is therefore 
caught in a ‘momentary immobilising encounter’ with the anthropomorphic nonhuman object 
which Bennett deems ‘enchantment’ – compelled to distinguish ‘new colours, discern details 
previously ignored, hear extraordinary sounds, as familiar landscapes of sense sharpen and 
intensify.’107  It must be acknowledged that this profound attention to sensory experience does 
appear to offer a compelling parallel with the imagist principles of ‘clarity, precision, and 
concrete observation.’108 When the ‘white glitter in the silver coffee pot’ – its sharp fricative 
timbre – ‘pricks’, it sets the tempo of the poem ‘spinning’ toward an end-stop – the sonic ‘whirl’ 
and ‘twirl’ of Lowell’s polyphonic prose accelerating and decelerating with metronomic 
precision, accompanying the symphony of movement happening in the object world. 
Accelerando, allargando. Though the physical and psychological agency of the object world 
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may confront us with our own anthropomorphobia, there is something profoundly compelling 
about the anthropomorphic nonhuman object, whether we are willing to admit it or not. 
 There is a striking resemblance between Lowell’s conceptualisation of polyphony in 
her polyphonic prose and that which Mikhail M. Bakhtin defines as ‘heteroglossia’ in 
‘Discourse in the Novel’ (1981).109 For Bakhtin, heteroglossia is ‘another's speech in another's 
language […] a special type of double-voiced discourse which serves two speakers at the same 
time and expresses simultaneously two different intentions’ through the text.110 There is, then, 
a ‘potential dialogue […] embedded in them, one as yet unfolded, a concentrated dialogue of 
two voices, two world views, two languages.’111 In Lowell’s polyphonic prose, the intentions 
of human subject and nonhuman object diverge, and in the silence between sentences, the 
reader is compelled to determine, through their dialogue, who or what is speaking. This 
compulsion, however, is never satisfied; Lowell’s polyphonic prose distorts the distinction 
between human and nonhuman sonance, and the reader cannot know for certain whether the 
discourse happening between human subject and nonhuman is a venerable conversation or a 
violent disagreement between voices, worlds, and languages.  
There is, then, a vacillation in which the reader is compelled to return to the text’s 
polyphony – to listen anew, to amplify its sonic contradictions. When Lowell’s ‘white cloth 
falls over on its side,’ does it lay down to rest, contentedly, on the breakfast table, or does it 
keel over in submission, knowing that its body is a matter of aesthetic – manipulated by the 
human subject to boast other things, to apprehend stains? There is a slippage of resonances, as 
internal rhymes (‘cloth’ and ‘hot’) are displaced across sentence breaks, and assonants (‘bask’ 
and ‘stack’) reverberate like a piercing white noise; they offer no reasonable pattern of 
frequencies, inducing a painful confusion of the eye and the ear. The reader experiences that 
transient state which Bennett describes as ‘a more unheimlich (uncanny) feeling of being 
disrupted or torn out of one’s default sensory-psychic-intellectual disposition’ – the neglected 
dimension of enchantment which must befall but does not dominate.112 Here, Lowell’s 
polyphonic prose disturbs the reader’s symbolic order of the world with the alarming possibility 
that they have forced themselves upon nonconsenting nonhumans – an alternate scene in which 
Lowell’s anthropomorphic objects are afforded a physical and psychological agency which is 
subsequently appropriated by humans. Before the sensation can take hold, however, there is 
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what Bennett designates a ‘fleeting return to childlike excitement’ as the ‘world comes alive as 
a collection of singularities’ – an extraordinary world in which Lowell’s anthropomorphic 
‘butter-pats’ are enchanted, once again, by the simple pleasure of their ‘Yellow! Yellow! 
Yellow!’ bodies.113 
Just as Leighton contends that ‘the human ear itself only goes so far in the detection of 
sound,’ Lowell’s polyphonic prose amplifies and augments the sonance of nonhuman objects 
that may occur somewhere ‘outside our range’ – ‘too high or too low for human detection’ – 
beyond what Leighton calls the ‘threshold of audibility’.114 Here, Lowell’s polyphonic prose 
begins to make that which has, for so long, been inaudible to the human ear, audible; it is a 
mode of composition which affords its readers the auditory range to listen beyond the human. 
When considered alongside Lowell’s classification of polyphonic prose as an ‘orchestral’ form, 
we must finally acknowledge Bennett’s consideration of the word ‘enchant’ and its phonic 
connection to the French verb chanter or ‘to sing’ – or, as Bennett describes, ‘to surround with 
song or incantation […] to cast a spell with sounds […] to carry away on a sonorous stream.’115 
Lowell’s polyphonic prose appears to ‘surround’ readers with its ‘song’ – its symphony of 
human and nonhuman vocalisation, poetic and prosaic recitations, the deafening resonances of 
that slippage between the uncanny and enchantment effects. An orchestra of sonic human 
subjects and nonhuman objects composed in poetry and prose, Lowell’s polyphonic prose 
therefore ‘immobilises’ the reader in a performance of sound, so they might begin to touch, 
smell, taste, see, and listen to the vociferations, the physically and psychologically vibrant 
matter of the object world anew.116 It compels us to acknowledge the vitality of those 
nonhuman objects which actively participate in our material world, just out of human earshot.  
 
THE AGENCY OF ASSEMBLAGES: A CONCLUSION 
 
Through their silent and sonant anthropomorphic objects, both Ridge and Lowell’s 
compositions alert us to the delighting and disquieting agency of nonhuman matter, and its 
ability to overwhelm our human-centred understanding of the world and all its things. For 
Bennett, after all, any ‘attempt to disentangle the human from the nonhuman’ is ‘futile’ – she 
argues that we must ‘seek instead to engage more civilly, strategically, and subtly with the 
 
113 Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life, p. 5. 
114 Leighton, Hearing Things, p. 20.  
115 Lowell, ‘Preface’, Can Grande’s Castle (Washington: Library of Congress, 1918), p. xv; Bennett, The 
Enchantment of Modern Life, p. 6. 
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nonhumans in the assemblages’ in which we all participate.117 Bennett defines ‘assemblages’ 
as ‘ad hoc groupings of diverse elements, of vibrant materials of all sorts’ in which ‘no one 
materiality or type of material has sufficient competence to determine consistently the 
trajectory or impact of the group.’118 For Bennett, the human subject is simply one genus of 
matter in a world of active materialities – there is and can be no conceivable hierarchy. After 
Bennett, I propose that Ridge and Lowell demonstrate how physical and psychological 
slippages between human and nonhuman matter – between poetic and prosaic matter – may 
begin to obstruct the process of ontological classification, heralding a radical recognition of the 
commonalities between things. To conclude this chapter, I therefore offer a formal 
reconceptualisation of Ridge and Lowell’s compositions as assemblages which revel in the 
agglomeration of human and nonhuman materialities – poetic and prosaic materialities – 
compelling us, as readers, to acknowledge our position as just another genus of vibrant matter 
participating in the transformation of this ‘ad hoc’ collective that is a literary text.  
To theoretically explicate the notion of assemblage, Bennett turns to what Baruch 
Spinoza identifies as ‘affective bodies’, which are ‘associative or (one could even say) social 
bodies, in the sense that each is, by its very nature as a body, continuously affecting and being 
affected by other bodies.’119 For Bennett, the human and nonhuman bodies of an assemblage 
continuously modify their respective counterbodies and are modified by those counterbodies 
in return. The assemblage is, after all, simultaneously a product and process. Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari summarise the assemblage’s capacity for modulation in A Thousand 
Plateaus (1980): ‘The assemblages are in constant variation, are themselves constantly subject 
to transformations.’120 This faculty of the assemblage to affect and be affected is evidenced in 
Lowell and Ridge’s compositions as human subjects and nonhuman objects are continually 
altered via physical and psychological encounters with their counterbodies in the material 
world. In Ridge’s ‘Sun-Up,’ there is an unbearable likeness between Janie, the woman-like 
doll, and Betty, the female child that is not-quite-woman, which compels readers to apprehend 
what strange matter the human subject and nonhuman object might have in common. Janie, 
whose physical appearance is like-me, whose psychological reasoning is like-mine, is afforded 
the potential to disrupt ontological classification, to silently overwhelm Betty’s status as 
protagonist. In Lowell’s ‘Grotesques,’ an anthropomorphic string quartet shrieks a language 
 
117 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, p. 116.  
118 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, p. 23.  
119 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, p. 21. 
120 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London: 
Continuum, 2004), p. 82.  
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that servers the productive connections between sound and sense – granting the reader (as 
listener) the capacity to heed the nonhuman object’s communication of a material world beyond 
a human-centred rhetoric. There is and can possibly be no player. In modernist poetry, the ‘I’ 
which has belonged, with so little opposition, to the human subject, becomes the ‘I’ of the 
nonhuman object. In the assemblages of Ridge and Lowell, both human subject and nonhuman 
object are ousted as affective materialities, which compel readers to participate in a radical 
revaluation of the binary oppositions, the ontological classifications, which have traditionally 
ordered the world and all its things. 
Formally, poetic or prosaic appropriations of plot, spatial notations, character, rhyme, 
and typographical arrangement are transformed by the presence of their counterbodies in the 
assemblage. The reader, too, is rendered but another genus of affective material – a 
counterbody – in the textual assemblage for their repeated participations in the comprehension 
of form, and in the transformation of meaning. In Influx and Efflux (2020), Bennett examines 
the agglomeration of human and nonhuman materialities in the poetry of Walt Whitman – 
exploring the processes by which physical and psychological matter enters and exits bodies, 
stimulating transformations in its counterbodies, within itself.121 She contends that Whitman’s 
poetry offers a critical prototype of an ‘I’ – which may represent the human subject, the 
nonhuman object, or, indeed, the reader – that is a ‘a porous and susceptible shape that rides 
and imbibes waves of influx-and-efflux but also contributes an influence of its own.’122 For 
Bennett, matter transforms matter – is transformed by matter – in happenstance encounters 
which may disturb or delight in equal measure. To comprehensively realise the literary 
assemblages of Ridge and Lowell, the reader must therefore become an affective materiality to 
agitate, facilitate, and modulate the text – an affective materiality which is agitated, facilitated, 
and modulated by the text. In the process of reading Ridge’s ‘Sun-Up,’ we must acknowledge 
the ‘you’ which disrupts the boundary between first and second-person, between human subject 
and nonhuman object, as me and not-me concurrently, permanently implicated in the ‘sad and 
terrible’ narrative arc of Janie the doll.123 In the process of reading Lowell’s ‘Breakfast Table,’ 
we must add our reader’s voice to the symphony of human and nonhuman discourse 
orchestrated by her polyphonic prose – but another form of vociferous matter, yearning to listen 
and be heard, within the composition. In modernist poetry, the reading ‘I’ must be willing to 
coexist alongside the ‘I’ of the anthropomorphic nonhuman object. Lowell and Ridge’s literary 
 
121 Bennett, Influx and Efflux: Writing up with Walt Whitman (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020). 
122 Bennett, Influx and Efflux, p. xi.  
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54 
 
assemblages, as ‘ad hoc groupings’ of poetic and prosaic material, communicate the physical 
and psychological assimilation of human and nonhuman matter through experimental language 
and forms – culminating with the reader’s assimilation with the composition.124 Heralding the 
modernist object’s disruptive potential, Lowell and Ridge’s assemblages facilitate the radical 
disturbance of anthropocentric philosophy which pervades twentieth century literary and 
artistic culture, destabilising the process of ontological classification. Furthermore, Lowell and 
Ridge’s assemblages prompt new enquiries regarding the ways in which readers are implicated 
in the destabilisation of subject and object positions: by what means do modernist poets 
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‘A BINARIAN’S NIGHTMARE’:  
THE MAKING OF MINA LOY’S THINGLY POETICS 
 
In 1940, Mina Loy sketched and submitted her designs for an alphabet game to luxury toy 
manufacturer, FAO Schwartz. As Margaret Konkol describes: 
The package included an introductory letter, a hand-painted scripted dialogue 
demonstrating play between a young child and an older sibling or parent, diagrams of 
two letter sets of the game – one for “Build Your Own Alphabet” and another for “The 
Alphabet that Builds Itself” – and a prototype letter “B” from the third version “An 
Alphabet Toy” / “Jack in the Box Alphabet.”1  
 
The letters of Loy’s alphabet game were comprised of segmental components ‘to be 
manufactured with attractive inexpensive plastics, or lacquered cardboard’ and held together 
by magnetic strips or ‘small perturbances (pegs) fitting into holes’ on each part.2 For Konkol, 
though Loy’s alphabet game has remained ‘an as-yet-unrealized-modernist artefact’ – an 
‘unpublished modernist poem’ – it playfully articulates Loy’s conceptualisation of ‘language 
as a physical substance which infers its own morphology.’3 For Loy, our communicative 
language must be dismantled; it must be made to reassemble in disparate combinations, 
confronting the player with its materiality. Loy’s alphabet game transforms language into an 
object – a thing – for the player to physically and psychologically manipulate. It directs the 
player to modification: ‘Make a magic. Slant a very short piece through the bottom right side 
of O so, Q. It has turned into “Q”.’4 Loy’s alphabet game compels the player to dwell on the 
malleability of language: ‘How many letters can one build with the long and short straight 
pieces?’5 For Konkol: 
 
The activity of play sets the pieces in dynamic flux as letters form themselves into 
familiar icons as well as newly invented shapes, making play an act of writing that is 
part imitation and part invention. This toy is a poem, writing itself through play, and, 
as a poem, it is also a toy, playfully signalling the malleability of its most basic 
signifying elements.’6  
 
1 Margaret Konkol, ‘Prototyping Mina Loy’s Alphabet’, Feminist Modernist Studies, Vol. 1.3 (2018), pp. 294 – 
317 (p. 294).  
2 Mina Loy, ‘Letter to FAO Schwartz’ (1940), Box 7, Folder 184, YCAL MSS 6, Beinecke Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library, Yale University. 
3 Konkol, ‘Prototyping Mina Loy’s Alphabet’, p. 294, 295.  
4 Loy, ‘Build Your Own A B C’ (1940), Box 7, Folder 184, YCAL MSS 6, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript 
Library, Yale University. 
5 Loy, ‘Build Your Own A B C’. 




According to Loy’s instructions, the player begins the game by assembling the letter ‘I’ and 
concludes by assembling the letter ‘U’ – building the alphabet out of sequence.7 There is a 
progressive movement from the ‘I’ of Loy as writer / designer / artist to the ‘U’ which signifies 
the active player / reader, who must become a segmental component in the toy / poem, 
participating in its manufacture and subsequent demolition. In playing Loy’s alphabet games, 
the player or reader is compelled to relive their earliest acquisition of the found material that is 
language in childhood, when the shapes and sounds of letters were strange, their order 
negotiable – when human subjects and nonhuman objects were liberated from ontological 
classification, things with infinite possibilities.  
When encountering Loy’s oeuvre, it is clear that Loy was captivated by the latent 
potentiality of the world and all its materials. As Tara Prescott contends, just as ‘she rescued 
egg cartons and discarded cigarette wrappers for use in her collages, assemblages, and 
ephemeral art, Loy also collected archaic words and forgotten expressions for use in her 
poetry.’8 Though Loy is principally remembered – if she is remembered at all – as a poet, Loy 
trained as an artist in Munich, London, and Paris, where she formed life-long relationships with 
artists such as Wyndham Lewis, Marcel Duchamp, Man Ray, Constantin Brancusi, Joseph 
Cornell, and Stephen Haweis, who would become her first husband.9 As Carolyn Burke recalls, 
‘It was one of her enduring complaints that she never knew whether to develop an idea with a 
pen or with a paintbrush.’10 It is perhaps this complaint that triggered Loy’s radical use of 
material things – combining oil paint, rags, acetate, found objects, electricity, papier maché, 
and language in alternate combinations to bring about her poems, paintings, clothing, hats, 
collages, novels, lampshades, plays, and three-dimensional art-objects. For Prescott, art 
therefore ‘suffused all aspects of her daily life’ and many models, moments, and movements 
would rematerialize ‘in her poetry, and her poetic vision flowed back into her developing visual 
art.’11 There is, then, a resulting plurality to Loy’s life and oeuvre which has been similarly 
noted by Roger Conover in his introduction to The Lost Lunar Baedeker; he sketches Loy as 
‘a binarian’s nightmare’ – simultaneously Feminist, Futurist, Surrealist, Dadaist, Wife, Mother, 
 
7 Susan Gilmore describes Loy’s alphabet game as ‘literally and figuratively “out of order”’ in ‘Imna, Ova, 
Mongrel, Spy: Anagram and Imposture in the Work of Mina Loy’, Mina Loy: Woman and Poet, ed. by Maeera 
Shreiber and Keith Tuma (Maine: The National Poetry Foundation, 1998), pp. 271 – 318 (p. 306).  
8 Tara Prescott, Poetic Salvage: Reading Mina Loy (Maryland: Bucknell University Press, 2017), p. 77. 
9 Prescott, Poetic Salvage, p. 78. For a comprehensive summary of Loy’s training as an artist, see Carolyn 
Burke’s Becoming Modern: The Life of Mina Loy (New York: Farrar Straus, and Giroux, 1996). 
10 Burke, Becoming Modern, p. 338.  
11 Prescott, Poetic Salvage, p. 77.  
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Lover, Poet, Painter, Playwright, Seamstress, Lampshade Maker, and ‘none of the above’ at 
all.12 As a modernist practitioner, Loy was famously eclectic, appropriating a miscellany of 
techniques from the literary and artistic movements with which she was surrounded – refusing 
to align herself completely with one over another. To speak of Mina Loy is always, therefore, 
to speak in plural; there are, after all, innumerable Loys – each one as enigmatic as the last. As 
Conover recalls, a rumour circulated throughout Paris during the twenties that Mina Loy ‘was 
in fact not a real person at all but a made-up persona,’ for such an artist simply could not exist.13  
This chapter explores the unimaginable, unpalatable, and unnameable dimensions of 
Loy’s oeuvre, and its denunciation of scholarly valuation. I contend that the radical plurality 
of Loy’s compositions systematically dismantles the theoretical distinctions between human 
and nonhuman matter, between sex and gender, and between literary and artistic production, 
to bring about a disturbance of genre, and a language which commands all physical and 
psychological interactions with the material world. The first half of this chapter contemplates 
the extent to which Loy’s lampshades (made in the image of other objects) and ‘Songs to 
Joannes’ (made in the image of a poem) defamiliarize the nonhuman object, compelling the 
viewer to interrogate the assumed stability of ontological classification – of communicative 
language.14 Just as Loy’s lampshades defamiliarize the nonhuman object, I argue that Loy’s 
compositions defamiliarize the literary text. What happens, after all, when the reader cannot 
know for certain what it is that they are reading? Following this critical discourse on Loy’s 
rejection of ontological classification, and drawing on Julia Kristeva’s theory of the abject – 
that which ‘does not respect borders, position, rules,’ disturbing ‘identity, system, order’ – I 
explore the ways in which Loy’s experiments stimulate physical and psychological anxiety, 
overwhelming the theoretical distinctions between self and other.15 In the second half of this 
chapter, I therefore examine the unpalatable objects of Loy’s ‘Magasins du Louvre’ and ‘Costa 
San Giorgio’ – contemplating the extent to which they become material analogies for the 
transgressive female subject, and the extent to which Loy’s compositions should be considered 
abject objects in their own right. Sarah Hayden frames Loy’s entrance into the art world as a 
coded act of liberation, against the notion that a woman who ‘did’ anything was, after all, an 
unwomanly thing; she argues that ‘making is both Loy’s entry into modernity and, as she 
 
12 Roger Conover, ‘Introduction’, The Lost Lunar Baedeker, ed. by Conover (New York: Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux, 1996), pp. xi – xx (p. xiii).  
13 Conover, ‘Introduction’, p. xii.  
14 Mina Loy, ‘Songs to Joannes’, The Lost Lunar Baedeker, pp. 53 – 68.  
15 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), p. 4.  
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pursued interstitial occupations as a designer and artisanal producer, a means to support 
herself.’16 By participating in Loy’s literary and artistic experiments, I therefore argue that the 
reader is made complicit in an act of radical resistance – a rejection of those binarised modes 
of cognition which dictate what an object is and does; what a text is and does; what a woman 
is or does. Finally, this leads to an examination of the resulting ‘thingness’ of Loy’s oeuvre. 
Building on Bill Brown’s thing theory, in which ‘thingness amounts to a latency (the not yet 
formed or the not yet formable) and to an excess (what remains physically or metaphysically 
irreducible to objects)’, I argue that Loy’s literary and artistic experiments reveal the latent 
possibilities of the material in which she works – be it oil paint, rags, found objects, papier 
maché, or language – forming excessive, unidentifiable, plural things which resist ontological 
classification. 17 As a result, I propose that Loy’s compositions offer a radical rethinking of the 
literary object – its customary spatial notations, typography, punctuation, and communicative 
language – confronting the reader with the pure potentiality of a thingly poetics.  
 
MAKING LAMPSHADES, MAKING POEMS  
 
When Mina Loy attended the Dada costume ball in 1917, she wore a handcrafted lampshade 
dress. That year, Loy also published ‘Songs to Joannes’, in which an ‘unimaginable family’ 
don their ‘lamp-shade red dresses’, exhibited the long-lost painting Making Lampshades, and 
began selling her avant-garde lampshades to clients.18 In 1926, Loy subsequently opened a 
lampshade shop in Paris with the financial backing of art collector and socialite, Peggy 
Guggenheim. Just as Loy’s compositions appropriate traditional poetic form, rhyme, and meter 
to subvert readerly expectation, many of Loy’s lampshades border on the unnameable, made 
in the image of other objects: a vase of calla lilies, a desk globe, a ship at sea, a swan, a star, an 
aeroplane with incandescent acetate windows and a working headlight and taillight.19 For Julie 
Gonnering Lein, there is, therefore, an ‘electric’ connection between Loy’s creatively charged 
 
16 Sarah Hayden, Curious Disciplines: Mina Loy and Avant-Garde Artisthood (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 2018), pp. 2 – 3.  
17 Bill Brown, ‘Thing Theory’, Things (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 1 – 22 (p. 5). 
18 Loy, ‘Songs to Joannes’, p. 54. For a detailed history of Loy’s lampshade business, see Burke, pp. 341 – 343 
and Jessica Burstein’s discussion of Loy’s lampshade production in ‘Loy, Inc.’, Cold Modernism: Literature, 
Fashion, Art (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University, 2012), pp. 187 – 189. 
19 Though many of Loy’s original lampshades have been lost, a small selection of photographs and designs are 
included in the Mina Loy Papers and the Carolyn Burke collection on Mina Loy and Lee Miller at the Beinecke 
Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Loy, ‘Original design for lampshade decorated with airplane’ (1941), Box 
7, Folder 186, YCAL MSS 6, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University; Jean-Loup 
Charmet Photos Presse Paris, ‘Lamps de Mina Loy’ (1920), Box 7, Folder Loy, Mina: Lamps, circa 1920, 
YCAL MSS 778, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University. 
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acts of making lampshades and making poetry.20 Lein argues that Loy’s poems are afforded 
the same ‘luminous opacity’ as her lampshades (as objects made to obscure and amplify light 
in equal measure), with her poems comprising ‘obfuscating features’ including a lack of 
punctuation, improper grammar, ambiguous and fragmented syntax.21 Lein contends that ‘just 
as her lampshades enfold, direct, and decorate the radiance of electric light, her poetics of 
luminous opacity appropriates, filters, and shapes the brilliance of the avant-garde according 
to her unique and expressive need and desire.’22 Whilst Lein privileges a socio-historical 
reading in which she reads twentieth-century technological advancements to electric power 
alongside Loy’s poems to explore the ‘critical setting’ of her work, I argue that the 
unimaginable forms of Loy’s lampshades and poetry overwhelm the habituative processes of 
ontological classification on which human cognition and linguistic communication rely.  
 Loy’s products stimulate their viewing or reading audience to fundamentally rethink 
their assumptions regarding lampshades, regarding poems. This reading follows Jessica 
Burstein’s discussion of Loy as a designer across artistic mediums in Cold Modernism: 
Literature, Fashion, Art (2012); she offers the term ‘domestica’ to describe Loy’s products in 
order ‘to emphasize the household elements in Loy, crossed as they are with a rigid eroticism 
that makes strange the recognizable circuits of the everyday.’23 In Burstein’s assertion that 
Loy’s products render the domestic strange, there is a subliminal flicker of the uncanny; Loy’s 
products manifest all that is unhomely within the homely. Burstein’s analyses may therefore 
illuminate Loy’s lampshades, which overload ‘the recognizable circuits of the everyday’ with 
their luminous imitations of domiciliary objects, as well as her compositions, which 
defamiliarize the reader with this thing we name language.24 I argue that in exciting a 
transformation of the lampshade’s aesthetic value and ergonomic function, Loy’s 
defamiliarization of the nonhuman object is intensified by a defamiliarization of the human 
subject via a disruption of the ordered, grammatical dimensions of a language that amplifies 
and obfuscates cognition.  
In 1917 – the same year that Loy began producing lampshades – Russian Formalist 
Viktor Shklovsky published ‘Art as Technique’ and introduced the concept of 
 
20 Julie Gonnering Lein, ‘Shades of Meaning: Mina Loy's Poetics of Luminous Opacity’, Modernism/Modernity, 
Vol. 18.3 (2011), pp. 617 – 629.  
21 Lein, ‘Shades of Meaning’, p. 618. 
22 Lein, ‘Shades of Meaning’, p. 618. 
23 Burstein, Cold Modernism, p. 152.  
24 Burstein, Cold Modernism, p. 152.  
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defamiliarization.25 For Shklovsky, defamiliarization is the dynamic process by which art 
‘removes objects from the automatism of perception’ – from that destructive ‘habitualization’ 
which has long desensitized the human subject to the world and all its matter.26 Shklovsky 
contends that habitualization occurs when the human subject encounters the nonhuman object 
more than once, when the human subject begins to recognise its material form, ergonomic 
function, and aesthetic value: ‘The object is in front of us and we know about it, but we do not 
see it – hence we cannot say anything significant about it.’27 Just as the human subject acquires 
knowledge of the nonhuman object, they are powerless to experience its potency, for all future 
encounters with the nonhuman object hinge on assumption. The aim of defamiliarization is 
therefore to make the nonhuman object appear strange or ‘unfamiliar’ to the human subject – 
‘to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception’ so that the human 
subject may encounter the physical and psychical dimensions of the nonhuman object as if for 
the very first time.28 As Shklovsky summarises, the purpose of art is ‘to make the stone stony.’29  
The radical design of Loy’s lampshades therefore offer a striking model of 
defamiliarization in art, masquerading as other objects with other names – with other forms 
and functions – playfully debunking the habituality of the human subject’s perceptions 
regarding the nonhuman object, revelling in the instability of a language that insists on the 
propriety of proper nouns. For Shklovsky, detaching the object from its name is also a powerful 
source of defamiliarization in literature. He contends that when an author does not name the 
nonhuman object or ‘avoids the accepted names of its parts and instead names corresponding 
parts of other objects’ in their descriptions, the object becomes strange to the human subject 
for it verges on the unidentifiable.30 Loy’s desk globe and calla lily lampshades, for example, 
disconnect the ergonomic function of the object from its aesthetic appearance. They do not 
appear to the viewer as lampshades in shape or size; they do not appear to be lamps at all for 
their apparent lack of a visible power wire, or noticeable dock for the lightbulb, or the 
traditional cylindrical shape of the shade which sits atop the stand. Loy obscures the lamp’s 
accepted segmental components by producing them in the likeness of other things – rendering 
the lamp’s customary descriptors obsolete. For Burke, these ‘celestial globes and star shapes 
 
25 Viktor Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska, 1965), trans. by Lee T. Lemon & Marion J. Reis, pp. 3 – 24. For an introduction to Russian 
Formalism, see Lemon and Reis’ preface to the volume, pp. ix – xvii.  
26 Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, p. 13. 
27 Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, p. 13. 
28 Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, p. 12.  
29 Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, p. 12.  
30 Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, p. 13.  
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seemed to have materialized from the pages of Lunar Baedecker […] Indeed, to those who 
knew her poetry, Mina’s lamps transferred its images to an earthly plane.’31 Burke argues that 
these lampshades do not simply reproduce descriptions from Loy’s poetry but reveal high 
voltage currents between two systems of production in which her ‘increasingly abstract 
mediations on the theme of creativity (and creation) could be dramatized in the play of light 
and shadow – the moment of revelation when a mappemonde was lit from within.’32  
Prescott similarly identifies the circuit networks between Loy’s productions; she 
contends that Loy’s ‘art suffused all aspects of her daily life’ – it surged into poetry, and in 
succession, ‘her poetic vision flowed back into her developing visual art.’33 Following Burke 
and Prescott, I propose that we must look to those high voltage circuits of production to 
apprehend the strange filament that conducts this electrical charge, igniting Loy’s literary and 
artistic compositions from within, exciting transformations in nonhuman objects.  Lampshades, 
bulbs, currents, shocks, and illuminations flood Loy’s compositions, from the ‘inconducive 
bedroom’ of ‘At the Door of a House’ to the ‘celestial conservatories / blooming with light’ in 
‘The Starry Sky of Wyndham Lewis’. 34 In the ‘subliminal flicker’ of ‘Songs to Joannes’, there 
is ‘only the impact of lighted bodies / Knocking sparks of each other / In chaos’ – an anonymous 
human subject confesses, ‘I must live in my lantern’.35 What neither Burke nor Prescott 
concede, however, is that these currents between Loy’s systems of production are accompanied 
by a process of defamiliarization. The ‘moment of revelation’ which occurs with the 
illumination of the desk globe, vase of calla lilies, or poetic composition coincides with the 
recognition that the object is something other – something with a disparate name.36 Loy’s 
lampshades amplify the very contradiction that charges her compositions: an unnameability.  
The viewer’s primary encounter with the lampshade is, after all, a playful optical 
illusion – a profound confusion of matters – in which the viewer is led to believe that the lamp 
is a desk globe, a vase of calla lilies. Here, the viewer’s primary physical and psychological 
interactions with the object hinge on an involuntary retrieval of information regarding another 
object altogether – one with a dissimilar aesthetic value, ergonomic function, and proper name. 
With the flick of a switch, however, the viewer is fast alerted to the object’s masquerade. Just 
as the viewer assumes that they have mastered the desk globe (spherical replica of the earth or 
 
31 Burke, Becoming Modern, p. 343.  
32 Burke, Becoming Modern, p. 343.  
33 Prescott, Poetic Salvage, p. 77. 
34 Loy, ‘At the Door of a House’, The Lost Lunar Baedeker p. 33; Loy, ‘The Starry Sky of Wyndham Lewis’, 
The Lost Lunar Baedeker, p. 91. 
35 Loy, ‘Songs to Joannes’, p. 53, 54, 59.  
36 Burke, Becoming Modern, p. 343.  
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other celestial body, miniature map of a world) or the vase of calla lilies (decorative vessel 
without handles, brim with water to display fresh-cut flowers), the object is rendered strange. 
If the desk globe really is a desk globe – if the vase of calla lilies really is a vase of calla lilies 
– there is a discharge of electric light, a power line hum, that should not be. In her description 
of Loy’s airplane lampshade, Prescott discusses a similar contradiction, an assimilation of 
modernity and materiality in Loy’s ‘willingness to juxtapose the old and the new, the artistic 
and the technical.’37 Though this assimilation occurs more overtly in Loy’s airplane design, 
which depicts an airplane ‘painstakingly outfitted with real windows and working lights’ – ‘a 
pinnacle of modern transportation’ – it occurs, too, in Loy’s celestial globe and calla lily lamps, 
for they fuse traditional domestic ephemera with the modern invention of electricity.38 Here, 
the domestic object is defamiliarized; the viewer is compelled to look, look again, to do away 
with all that they once claimed to know and trust about the object.  
As Daniel P. Gunn argues in his commentary on defamiliarization, ‘To produce an 
effect of defamiliarization, then, the artist must consciously violate the accepted ways of 
making meanings – whatever they are.’39 When encountering Loy’s lampshades, the viewer is 
subsequently alerted to the uncomfortable apprehension that their eyes and the resulting 
connotations brought forth by seeing, are deceptive, that the material world of objects and the 
language through which they are named is not as static, logical, or binarised as they have been 
led to believe. The language through which we encounter the object – its name, as accompanied 
by a set of socially, politically, and historically attributed characteristics – might fail us at any 
time. Loy’s lampshades overload the ‘recognizable circuits’ between nonhuman object, 
aesthetic value, ergonomic function, and proper noun.40 They are always, therefore, 
accompanied by the switching on of active cognition – violating the theoretical distinctions 
between all that is knowable or unknowable, identifiable or unidentifiable, nameable or 
unnameable.  
When examined alongside Mina Loy’s status as a female artist in the twentieth-century, 
it must also be acknowledged that her act of making and marketing lampshades troubles the 
distinction between high and low brow forms of art; though applied and decorative arts were 
steadily becoming more accepted in the art world, they were still considered a less rigorous, 
more ‘feminine’ alternative to oil painting or sketching. Female students of art were only just 
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beginning to gain acceptance into art colleges; perceived as hobbyists, they were not taken 
seriously by their male peers. Furthermore, it was expected that they would either teach or 
become wives.41 In Loy’s hands, however, all procurable material – be it oil paint, rags, acetate, 
found objects, electricity, papier maché, or language – was a material apt for producing art, for 
making a proficient name, or perhaps more fittingly in the context of this study, names for 
oneself as an artist. Just as she harnesses the domestic art of lampshade-making to bring about 
an intellectually rigorous defamiliarization of the nonhuman object and the language with 
which we define it, Loy fractures the traditionally ‘highbrow’ form of the poem – its metrical 
formula – to communicate ‘lowbrow’ subjects such as sex, childbirth, abortion, and the 
construct of virginity. As Prescott contends, Loy ‘made no distinction between which materials 
were suitable for art and which themes or words were fit for poetry.’42 Loy’s oeuvre resists 
canonisation with the ideology that material is material is material for producing good art. For 
Loy, good art is not produced though compliance with the customs of a literary genre or 
creative practice, but through their appropriation, that is, through the artist’s ability to combine 
literary genres or creative practices in uncustomary ways – to defamiliarize the product. 
Though critics, including Lein, Burstein, Prescott, and Burke have illuminated Loy’s 
lampshades through the context of twentieth-century lighting technologies, none have explored 
the electric connections between the lamp and the poem that overload the circuits charged with 
naming. Here, I contend that just as Loy overloads the productive circuits between nonhuman 
object, aesthetic value, ergonomic function, and proper noun with her lampshades, she 
overloads the productive circuits between literary genre, practice, linguistic content, and form 
– defamiliarizing this thing we name a poem. It is ‘Songs to Joannes’, a strange and formally 
asymmetrical composition, spanning fifteen pages in Loy’s collection, that offers, perhaps, the 
most startling model of defamiliarization in Loy’s poetry. Comprising thirty-four fragments of 
verse, ‘Songs to Joannes’ communicates its despondent chronicle of romantic coupling in what 
Lucia Pietroiusti calls a ‘disturbed chronology,’ obscuring the boundaries between ‘possibility, 
desire, and reality’ in the text.43 ‘Songs to Joannes’ was printed in 1917, the same year that 
Shklovsky published ‘Art as Technique’ – the same year that Loy began producing lampshades. 
Whilst Loy’s lampshades masquerade as other objects, resisting habitualization and rejecting 
the propriety of proper nouns, Loy’s poems also utilise obfuscating praxes, including the 
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omittance of punctuation and improper grammar. After all, as Lein contends, the connections 
between Loy’s lampshades and her poetry are far more comprehensive than one might assume, 
for like ‘electrical currents, her lines of meaning routinely jump gaps and sometimes risk short-
circuiting the sense of a stanza altogether.’44 Following my analysis of Loy’s lampshades, I 
therefore argue that the conductive language and alternative forms in which Loy composes may 
spark defamiliarization. This is discernible in ‘Songs to Joannes’, as Loy overloads the circuits 
charged with naming human subjects and nonhuman objects:  
 
    IV  
Once in a mezzanino  
The starry ceiling  
Vaulted an unimaginable family  
Bird-like abortions  
With human throats  
And Wisdom’s eyes  
Who wore lamp-shade red dresses  
And woollen hair45  
 
Absent of punctuation, Loy’s ‘Songs to Joannes’ shocks the reader with an electrical surge of 
images, sounds, and metaphors – charging readers with the power to punctuate the composition 
for themselves, to determine where a pause, a resistor, should terminate the current or reduce 
its flow, for the poem is an overloaded circuit, and there can be no inconducive reading. 
Manifesting in a theatre, Loy’s ‘unimaginable family’ border on unreality – they are 
illuminated by a ‘starry ceiling’ of spotlights, which may render choice players visible, brighten 
the auditorium for intermission, or transform the audience’s perception of three-dimensional 
objects onstage.   With the exposition of the stanza – ‘Once’ – the reader anticipates a chronicle, 
the opening monologue to an act that does not come. The reader cannot know for certain 
whether the ‘Bird-like abortions / With human throats’ are players in the production onstage, 
members of the audience, or something without a name: an anthropomorphic nonhuman with 
‘woollen hair’ lurking in the decorated rafters. The defamiliarization is so profound that the 
composition short circuits; the reader cannot know for certain who or what they are 
encountering through the obscurity.  
The composition also sparks a confusion of grammar. ‘Wisdom’ is capitalised, as if it 
is, or could possibly, be a proper name – as if ‘Wisdom’ were not a characteristic, but a 
character. The reader experiences a diversion of current, an alternate circuit of meaning in 
 
44 Lein, ‘Shades of Meaning’, pp. 626 – 627.  
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which ‘Wisdom’ has ‘eyes’ and a corporeal body with which the ‘Bird-like abortions’ share a 
commonality. This commonality, however, is an aborted connection. As Lein asserts, Loy’s 
phrases ‘jump gaps’ and cause the circuit through which meaning is distributed between 
composition and reader to short.46 When considered alongside the definitions of ‘abortion’ – 
the proper noun – as ‘a person or thing not fully or properly formed,’ an ‘arrested or imperfect 
development of a structure,’ or a ‘monstrosity,’ Loy’s ‘Bird-like abortions’ interfere, obstruct, 
or terminate the productive connections between word and meaning on which communication 
relies – rendering the composition grotesque.47 Finally, the obfuscating power of the lampshade 
overloads the composition as Loy’s ‘unimaginable family’ appear in ‘lamp-shade red dresses’, 
the segmental components of their bodies shadowed and intensified by the ambiguity of Loy’s 
language. After all, the reader cannot know for certain if the ‘dresses’ they wear are a ‘lamp-
shade red’ in colour – ‘lamp-shade’ functioning as an underpowered adjective in the clause – 
or if they are comparable to the ‘lamp-shade’ in shape, or if they are ‘dresses’ hewn from ‘lamp-
shades’ themselves. Loy’s ‘unimaginable family’ therefore charges the reader to conduct bad 
connections that are systematically aborted, to determine where punctuation, or resistors, 
should terminate the current or reduce its flow, to rewrite the circuits of meaning in the 
composition.   
In his analysis of defamiliarization Shklovsky asserts that poetic form and its capacity 
to make strange the language through which the human subject comes to the object, produces 
a ‘deautomatized perception’ – making ‘pronunciation difficult’ to slow cognitive 
discernment.48 He identifies the poem’s ‘repetition of identical sounds’ and its ‘disordering’ of 
formal rhythm ‘which cannot be predicted’ as powerful sources of defamiliarization, both of 
which overwhelm Loy’s composition.49 For example: 
 
XVII 
I don’t care  
Where the legs of the legs of the furniture are walking to  
Or what is hidden in the shadows they stride 50  
 
Within the internal repetition of ‘the legs of the legs of the furniture,’ there is a semblance of 
an electrical stutter. The syntax of the line is rendered strange by the inference that ‘the legs of 
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the furniture’ may have functioning ‘legs’ of their own. It borders on short circuitry, for the 
reader is led to believe that the miscommunication is theirs – they have simply misapprehended 
the line and must read it again to restore the directional current of meaning. When the reader 
attempts to ‘rewire’ the line correctly, however, there is a moment of revelation: their mistake 
is not a mistake at all, but a recurring component in the line’s configuration. Here, the reader 
is confronted with the unreadable, unintelligible, or unnameable dimensions of ‘Songs to 
Joannes’ – its ability to conduct bad connections that are systematically aborted, deliberately 
overloading readers with its ambiguity. Then, the process of defamiliarization happening with 
‘the legs of the legs of the furniture’ is amplified. There is a spark of physical agency to their 
alacrity, a surge of anthropomorphism as ‘the legs of the furniture’ interfere with ontological 
categories, human subject and nonhuman object. When considered alongside ‘furniture’ (as a 
collective noun) the reader cannot know for certain who or what they are interacting with 
through the composition, be it chair or table or something without a name. This is further 
intensified by the unimaginable circuitry of a composition that appears to follow no 
metronomic pattern of syllables, omitting punctuation completely in favour of spatial notation 
– its lines erratically aborted or protracted, oscillating between first-person and third-person 
narration. There are stuttering repetitions, and when rhymes do resonate, they are internal – 
‘care’ and ‘Where’ – and superficially impulsive, connecting words which do not strike the 
reader as particularly charged with implication at all. There is, then, something apparently 
unpoetic about Loy’s texts. Coming to the reader in numbered circuits, ‘Songs to Joannes’ 
appears to guarantee the reader that there is a logic to its high voltage form, though the sum of 
its components remains unsolvable. 
In Loy’s compositions, the segmental components of the poem are rendered 
unidentifiable, and the reader cannot know for certain what they are encountering. Loy’s 
compositions, after all, defamiliarize poetic form. For Loy, the reader comes to this thing we 
name poetry with cognitive discriminations that must be aborted if the writer is to do anything 
significant with the circuitry of language. Loy’s compositions alert the reader to the electric 
revelation that there is ‘Something taking shape / Something that has a new name’ forming 
within literary and artistic modernism.51 I argue that this something is a mode of composition 
which overloads the ontological classification of human subjects and nonhuman objects, 
charged with an alternating current of literary genres and artistic practices. Here, Loy’s 
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67 
 
compositions illuminate the transformative potential of a material world beyond the theoretical 




For Loy, there is a maddening commonality between objecthood and womanhood that should 
no longer be permitted to hold. In ‘Virgins Plus Curtains Minus Dots’ (1915) Loy offers a 
penetrating feminist critique with the conjecture that ‘Men’s eyes look into things / Our eyes 
look out’ – the female condition is therefore powerfully aligned with the nonhuman object in 
all its manmade materiality, born into the world with an assigned  proper name, ergonomic 
function, aesthetic and monetary value.52 Just as Loy sought to pluralise the nonhuman object, 
defamiliarizing its physical and psychological dimensions, she also sought to pluralise the 
female subject, demolishing those socially, politically, and historically disseminated nouns 
which moderate the female subject – which name her Wife, Mother, Virgin, Whore, or Spinster. 
In her ‘Feminist Manifesto’ (1914), Loy advocates a complete ‘destruction of virginity’ – 
sacrificing ‘virtue’ in ‘defiance’ of the ‘superstition’ that a woman’s value can be ascribed to 
sexual purity.53 Loy declares that ‘there is nothing impure in sex – except the mental attitude 
to it’ and that a ‘social regeneration’ incorporating these philosophies must be brought about 
to render obsolete the choice between ‘parasitism’, ‘prostitution’ or ‘negation’ that all women 
must make, between becoming an object of desire or an object of repulsion.54  
In ‘Futurism, Fashion, and the Feminine,’ Rowan Harris contends that ‘the issue of how 
to identify or disidentify as a woman […] remained central’ to Loy’s literary and artistic 
practice from the ‘prolonged nerve vibrations’ of childbirth in ‘Parturition’ to her reformation 
of the ‘feminine’ domestic arts.55 However, it must be acknowledged that Loy’s compulsive 
returns to what it is to be a female subject in the twentieth century are not a simple matter of 
identifying or disidentifying with an antiquated lot of ‘feminine’ physical or psychological 
qualities, but of displacing the processes of identification and disidentification completely. For 
Loy, this subject we name a woman comprises the radical potentiality to disrupt the material 
world – the order of things – rejecting the theoretical distinctions between sex and gender, 
between self and other, between human and nonhuman. This critical demolition of conceptual 
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parameters and linguistic systems can be read alongside what Julia Kristeva designates as the 
‘abject’, or that which triggers nausea, antipathy, and horror in its refusal to ‘respect borders, 
position, rules’ – that which revels in ambiguity.56 Reading Kristeva’s conception of the abject 
alongside Loy’s experiments may therefore elucidate their physically and psychologically 
disruptive materialities, engaging readers in a radical modernisation of the conditions of 
womanhood.  
As Prescott describes, Loy’s ‘Magasins du Louvre’ (1915) depicts a ‘looking-glass 
world of shop fronts, where the women walking on the street and their doll versions in the store 
face similar fates’, the poem oscillating between descriptions of the porcelain dolls and the 
female bystanders. Loy’s refrain, ‘All the virgin eyes in the world are made of glass,’ produces 
a radical assimilation of human and nonhuman material, so that the reader cannot know for 
certain to which body the description refers, be it doll, woman, or both simultaneously.57 For 
Kristeva, the abject stimulates ‘a collapse of the border between inside and outside’ – there can 
be no absolute differentiation between self and other, between subject and object.58 There is, 
therefore, a degeneration of binary oppositions, in which Loy satirises the Victorian credence 
that a woman is hewn from absolutely unresponsive matter – that the female subject holds 
‘glass’ eyes in her sockets which do not perceive, but ‘reflect the image of the viewer’ like 
those of a doll.59 The doll-like woman, is, after all, the definitive object of desire: she dare not 
see, speak, or stand at will. Here, there is a disquieting slippage between the nonhuman object 
and human subject, for they are both miniatures of a woman: the woman-like doll and the virgin 
child that is not-quite-woman. The physiological structure of the doll body recalls the feminine 
ideal – a miniaturised ‘Angel in the House’ for little girls to learn and play out the domestic 
fantasy of wife and motherhood, idolising her smooth, coiffed hair and the coy blush of her 
porcelain skin.60  
For Loy, the glass eyes of the doll, which are the glass eyes of the virginal woman, are 
intrinsically fragile; they induce a critical shattering in the composition:  
 
All the virgin eyes in the world are made of glass  
Long lines of boxes  
Of dolls 
Propped against bannisters  
Walls and pillars  
 
56 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 4. 
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Huddled on shelves 
And composite babies with arms extended  
Hang from the ceiling  
Beckoning  
Smiling 
In a profound silence61  
 
Loy’s refrain triggers a process of fragmentation within the composition – its lines are 
spontaneously broken, piercing through the whiteness of the page in asymmetrical shards. 
Here, the fragile glass from which the eyes of the doll-like woman are formed advocate the 
potentiality to shatter those remaining fragments of a ‘Victorian heritage which calculated the 
marriage value of women according to their purity’ and sexual ignorance.62 Then, there is an 
alternate reflection in which the eyes of the woman-like doll are hewn from are absolutely 
unresponsive material, fabricated in the ideal image of woman, who has a human-like mouth 
but cannot speak. Once again, it is the ‘profound’ silence of the doll which disturbs the process 
of ontological classification in the composition; the stillness of its body bears an unbearable 
likeness to a corpse, which is, for Kristeva, a powerful manifestation of the abject. Kristeva 
contends that the corpse is abject precisely because it ‘is death infecting life’ – ‘a terror that 
dissembles’ the theoretical distinction between human subject and nonhuman object altogether, 
for the human body verges on a terrifying and irreversible objecthood.63 Here, the reader cannot 
not know for certain whether the refrain names the body of the doll-like woman or the body of 
the woman-like doll, and this assimilation of dead and living matter overwhelms the body of 
the composition.64 Loy’s ‘Magasins du Louvre’ compels the reader to acknowledge the abject 
mortality of their body and all its material components.  
This abject collusion of bodies is later sharpened with Loy’s use of the collective 
pronoun ‘they’ in the second stanza: 
 
All the virgin eyes in the world are made of glass   
They alone have the effrontery to 
 Stare through the human soul 
 Seeing nothing  
 Between parted fringes  
 One cocotte wears a bowler hat and a sham camellia  
 And one an iridescent boa65  
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Here, Loy’s omittance of punctuation amplifies the assimilation of human and nonhuman 
matter happening in the composition, signifying the irrational materiality of a language which 
revels in ambiguity. Loy’s line breaks therefore become the reader’s only lasting system of 
reprieve from an amalgamation of clauses, for in those terminations, the reader is presented 
white voids in which that perverse confusion of ontological classification is further augmented, 
in which proper syntax cannot not hold. For Kristeva, ‘The abject is perverse because it neither 
gives up nor assumes a prohibition, a rule, or a law; but turns them aside, misleads, corrupts; 
uses them, takes advantage of them, the better to deny them.’66 The reader cannot know for 
certain where one sentence begins and another ends; meaningful connotation begins to 
disintegrate. Loy’s compositions are abject things which corrupt themselves internally to deny 
conclusive understanding – to deny the conception of language as a communicative system, to 
deny the law of grammar. The spatial notations of ‘Magasins du Louvre’ propose the semblance 
of a comma, dash, or end stop which cannot manifest itself into actuality. They deliberately 
mislead us into punctuating – unpunctuating – the composition again with the expectation that 
we may, after all, comprehend its denotations. ‘Magasins du Louvre’ revels in contradictions 
which reject definitive resolution: the glass eyes of the doll-like woman or the woman-like doll 
are afforded the dexterity to ‘Stare through the human soul’ and see ‘nothing’ concurrently.67 
‘Magasins du Louvre’ exploits readerly anticipation with its abject materiality, which may 
aesthetically resemble this thing we name poetry, but delivers as something other, something 
the reader cannot positively identify.   
For Kristeva, the author or poet that is ‘fascinated by the abject, imagines its logic, […] 
introjects it, and as a consequence perverts language – style and content.’68 Following 
Kristeva’s argument, it is clear that the something that remains unnameable and 
overpoweringly unpalatable in Loy’s compositions is, therefore, a perversion of matters, a 
manipulation of proper grammar and literary genre. As Alfred Kreymborg considers in Our 
Singing Strength: An Outline of American Poetry (1929): 
 
Such sophistry, clinical frankness, sardonic conclusions, wedded to a madly elliptical 
style scornful of regulation grammar, syntax and punctuation […] horrified our gentry 
and drove our critics to furious despair. The nudity of emotion and thought roused the 
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worst disturbance, and the utter nonchalance in revealing the secrets of sex was 
denounced as nothing less than lewd.69  
 
He concludes, ‘It took a strong digestive apparatus to read Mina Loy.’70 Her compositions are 
hard to swallow. Loy’s ‘Magasins du Louvre’ first regurgitates the reader’s automated 
observations of the commonalities between the beautiful, silent, and virginal doll-like woman 
and woman-like doll. Then, there is an overwhelming perversion of content as the ‘Long lines 
of boxes / Of dolls / Propped against banisters’ beckon the reader to correct the omittance of 
punctuation, the confusion of syntax in the composition, to become ‘cocottes’ – prostitutes 
seeking customers on the Parisian streets. Loy adopts the doll-like woman and the woman-like 
doll’s sleek, coiffed hair – the coy blush of her porcelain skin – to deny the legitimacy of the 
manmade image, for its appearance conveys no sincere connotation. Loy’s doll-like woman 
and woman-like doll may become a wife, mother, virgin, whore, spinster, all or none of the 
above at all. Finally, the doll-like woman and woman-like doll are ousted as abject things, for 
their the radical materialities border on the unnameable.  Loy’s compositions, too, are ousted 
as abject things, for their radical materialities border on the unnameable.  
Throughout her oeuvre, Loy returns to what Prescott describes as an ‘obsession with 
the cult of virginity that persists across cultures’ – manufacturing a productive connection 
between the female subject and nonhuman object.71 In ‘The Costa San Giorgio’ (1914), she 
satirises the correlation between virginity and economic value as the female subject is 
represented as a fine domestic ornament: ‘the china virgin / Consummately dusted’ on her 
wedding night.72 In the absence of a dowry, the virginity of the object-women which furnish 
Loy’s ‘Italian Pictures’ (1914) becomes their bartering aid, their viability for marriage 
dependent on preserving the illusion of sexual abstinence, for their bodies are commodities. 
For Loy, the virgin body is therefore perceived as though it were made from ‘china’ – a material 
that is notoriously fragile and expensive to produce, effortlessly cracked by slovenly hands, 
and easily procured for the right price. As Susan Zelazo contends, ‘Seeking to instantiate 
herself in a cultural milieu which tended to objectify the female body,’ Loy’s intention was to 
compel readers to ‘sense as she does, and, in so doing, made important advances in the 
sociocultural configuration of women as whole and complex beings worthy of intellectual, 
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physical, artistic and spiritual presence in the world.’73 Here, Loy’s analogy ridicules the 
manmade paradigm of virginity: one must be careful not to break the ‘china’ figure of the 
object-woman, for damaged goods do not hold their worth when they come to market. The 
female ornament must be ‘Consummately dusted’ when the contract of matrimony has been 
satisfied, and thereafter at the desire of the purchaser – her spouse. For Loy, the nonhuman 
object and female subject share a profoundly disturbing commonality: in order to be accepted 
into the order of things in the material world, they must appear to the purchaser as passive 
material, whether they are physically and psychologically autonomous or not. There is, after 
all, an anxiety regarding transgressive matter – its resistance of ontological classification, its 
rejection of those allegedly successful orderings we have made of things in our material world. 
Loy’s analogy compels the reader to radically reappraise the condition of objecthood, that is, 
the condition of womanhood.   
It should be acknowledged, however, that Loy’s object-women are not always a matter 
of porcelain or china, but sometimes something more unpalatable entirely. The narrator of 
Loy’s ‘The Costa San Giorgio’ encounters ‘Oranges half-rotten’ being ‘sold at a reduction’ – 
‘Hoarsely advertised as broken heads’ by the local merchant from his stall.74 Certainly, the 
orange is most commonly encountered as a food object, the human subject stripping its rind to 
consume the sweet, ripened fruit within. However, as Prescott recalls, Loy appears to employ 
these ‘sale pitches’ as ‘analogies for the tacit buying and selling of potential brides’ – the female 
body, as signified by the body of the orange, becoming a commodity and an object of 
consumption.75 The subsequent repetitions of these ‘sale pitches’ formally and linguistically 
disrupt both the construction of text and the speaker’s attempts to synthesise the collage of 
nonhuman objects and human subjects participating in the scene. For Prescott, the reading ‘eye 
jumps from the “BROKEN HEADS” of the orange vendor to head shaved by the barber’ almost 
instantaneously – synthesising that ‘implicit connection between “BROKEN HEADS” and 
broken maidenheads’ almost instantaneously.76 Here, there is a collusion of human subject and 
nonhuman object happening in the pun that confuses the perforated rind of the orange and the 
hymen, and the semblance of a head in the spherical dimension of the orange, its pits. The 
capitalised reiteration of ‘BROKEN HEADS’ materialises, then, just one line down from the 
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original – a repetition, a return of the repressed, a regurgitation of unsavoury matter that 
overwhelms the speaker’s description of the scene: 
 
Oranges half-rotten are sold at a reduction 
Hoarsely advertised as broken heads  
BROKEN HEADS      and the barber  
Has an imitation mirror77 
 
Here, the formal body of the composition begins to sunder alongside the oranges, the heads, 
the maidenheads, as the repetition of ‘BROKEN HEADS’ is immediately followed by a 
perforation in the line – a hole that should not be. There is a peculiarity to the splitting, its 
abject whiteness, which appears to signify all that is uncommunicable through the composition: 
though object-women are something to be purchased, consumed, and discarded at will, if they 
are not peddled before their expiration date, they become unwanted or valueless goods.  
When Loy’s oranges or ‘broken heads’ begin to rot, they also begin to lose their primary 
function as objects of consumption. Here, Loy’s ‘half-rotten oranges’ border on the abject, their 
shrivelled, putrefying forms becoming repulsive and unpalatable, provoking disgust, and even 
horror, and threatening to disrupt the productive distinction between human subject and 
nonhuman object on which language depends. For Kristeva, ‘Food loathing is perhaps the most 
elementary and most archaic form of abjection,’ for it triggers an immediate and powerful 
reaction from human subject.78 Kristeva subsequently describes that physical and 
psychological instant when ‘the eyes see or the lips touch that skin on the surface of milk – 
harmless, thin as a sheet of cigarette paper, pitiful as a nail paring – I experience a gagging 
sensation and […] all the organs shrivel up the body, provoke tears and bile, increase heartbeat, 
cause forehead and hands to perspire.’79 Here, the abject radically affects the conditional stasis 
of the human body, disrupting the theoretical cohesion of the ‘I’: 
 
‘I’ want none of that element, sign of their desire; ‘I’ do not want to listen, ‘I’ do not 
assimilate it, ‘I’ expel it. But since the food is not an ‘other’ for ‘me,’ who am only in 
their desire, I expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself within the same motion 




77 Loy, ‘The Costa San Giorgio’, p. 11. 
78 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 2.  
79 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, pp. 2 – 3.  
80 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 3.  
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Here, Kristeva sporadically contains the ‘I’ within inverted commas, denouncing its supposed 
consistency, manifesting the ‘I’ as an affective materiality which is produced via physical and 
psychological encounters between self and other. As Loy’s human speaker is confronted by the 
abject object, there is, however, an arresting absence of the ‘I’ – the speaker wants none of the 
orange, but it continues to interpolate, to actively interpose their narrations. Here, the speaker 
cannot immediately reject the abject nonhuman object, for it revels in a disobedience that 
should not be, regurgitated by the composition. The abject object does not, after all, ‘respect 
borders, positions, rules’ – it opposes ‘identity, system,’ the order of things.81 There is a 
slippage between human subject and nonhuman object that is manifested on the ‘half-rotten’ 
surface of their ‘broken heads’ – acting as corporeal reminders of what happens to the aging, 
unmarried, or sexually transgressive female subject in the twentieth-century, who becomes an 
unsavoury or hard to swallow thing.  
There is an arresting commonality between Loy’s ‘broken heads’ and those contained 
in the folder of ‘heads’ which is archived at The Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library 
(see Figure 2); predominantly female in form, Loy’s mixed media compositions revel in the 


















81 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 4. 
Figure 2: Loy, 'Heads' (n.d.), Box 7, Folder 185, YCAL MSS 6, Beinecke Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library, Yale University. 
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Severed from their proper contexts, they are ambiguous things which apprehend the female 
subject’s abjection from selfhood, that is, subjecthood. Loy’s artistic products, after all, be they 
manuscripts or drawings, compel the viewer or reader to concede the absurdity of the object-
woman’s status as material commodity in a world of things. Furthermore, the unnameable, 
unimaginable ‘I’ that is present in ‘July in Vallombrosa’ (part one) and ‘Costa Magic’ (part 
three) of Loy’s ‘Italian Pictures’, withdraws from the abject object that is the physically and 
psychologically autonomous female, favouring something more palatable – ‘I C E  C R E A 
M’ – something that is, perhaps, easier to digest.82 Finally, the ‘I’ that is absent from ‘The Costa 
San Giorgio’ (part two) is replaced with the collective ‘we’ – ‘we’ that resists and rejects the 
singular ‘I’ – ‘we’ that is compelled to retain and repeat the nauseating condition that a 
woman’s body is not her own, that the object’s body is not its own, that in resisting this 
condition, they become abject things.   
Finally, Loy’s compositions begin to reject any permanent semblance of a discernible 
form. They spontaneously detach themselves from the comfort of the left margin, transforming 
the reader’s physical and psychological encounters with the poem: 
 
While listening up     I hear my husband  
 Mumbling             Mumbling  
 Mumbling                at the window  
                      Malediction  
           Incantation83  
 
In Loy’s ‘Italian Pictures’, ‘Costa Magic’ follows ‘The Costa San Giorgio’ – it is a composition 
occupied with the abject materiality of language, presenting little context to the reader, who 
cannot know for certain who is speaking, what is occurring, or where the theoretical parameters 
of the composition might lie. There is a semblance of a wife, a negotiation, a conception, a 
daughter. These, however, are matters of little significance, for in ‘Costa Magic’ Loy 
destabilises the communicative operations of language, liberating its radial potential to 
establish a semblance of spontaneous form, which bears an aesthetic likeness to poetic verse, 
but does not function correspondingly at all. Here, the habitual process of reading is rendered 
obsolete – the reader cannot know for certain whether there is one stanza or two, whether they 
are expected to read left to right or down columns. The composition might read ‘While listening 
up I hear my husband / Mumbling Mumbling / Mumbling at the window’ and ‘While listening 
 
82 Loy, ‘The Costa San Giorgio’, p. 11.  
83 Loy, ‘Costa Magic’, pp. 12 – 14 (p. 13).  
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up / Mumbling / Mumbling / Malediction / Incantation’ simultaneously – it revels in formal 
and linguistic plurality. All punctuation is omitted; capitalisation is erratic, occurring in the 
centre of a phrase; spatial notations cut white holes in the composition, where unimaginable 
words assert their repulsive absence-presence. We cannot know how many words – if any – 
have been disordered or displaced, because the composition opposes reading for the sake of 
communication. Loy’s compositions therefore propel us ‘toward the place where meaning 
collapses’ and the abject ‘does not cease challenging its master’ – denouncing the belief that 
our perfunctory knowledge of what an object is or does, what a woman is or does, what a text 
is or does, constitutes mastery.84 
Like the object-women of Loy’s ‘Magasins du Louvre’ and ‘The Costa San Giorgio,’ 
Loy’s material compositions are rendered abject; they participate in a formal and linguistic 
mutiny against the ontological classification of this thing we name poetry – revelling in all that 
is unimaginable, unpalatable, and unclassifiable. Loy’s compositions, after all, border on a 
madness that the reader cannot name, for they participate in a rejection of communicative 
language, that is, punctation, formal grammar, syntax, and spatial notation. They transform in 
the operation of reading, stimulating abjection in their repetitions and regurgitations of 
linguistic matter, which flout readerly digestion. Loy’s texts participate in a critical disturbance 
of those binary oppositions which have, for so long, categorised female subjects, nonhuman 
objects, and literary compositions – heralding the pure potentiality of the abject and all its 
material potentialities, its denial of symbolic order. Throughout the miscellany that is her 
oeuvre, Loy therefore triggers a radical cross-examination of the signifying processes through 
which we name the material world, human subjects, and nonhuman objects. Finally, Loy’s 
abject compositions propel us toward what I term a thingly poetics, one which compels us to 
acknowledge what might happen when the useful function of the object cannot hold – what 
might happen when the useful function of language cannot hold. 
 
MAKING POEMS, MAKING THINGS 
 
Throughout The Lost Lunar Baedeker, the word ‘thing’ appears thirteen times. The anonymous 
speaker of ‘Songs to Joannes’ affirms, ‘I go / Gracelessly / As things go’, and in ‘Der Blinde 
Junge’ an ‘expressionless “thing” / blows out damnation and concussive dark,’ asserting its 
 
84 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 2.  
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strange and unconceivable materiality on the text.85 In the absence of context, the thing is a 
thing that revels in abject plurality; the word ‘thing’ comes to the reader as a radical ancillary 
for when language fails or forgets to name the thing it is attempting to describe. The thing is 
that which rejects borders and rules, resisting proper definition. In things, the pure potentiality 
of language is therefore materialised. Following my analysis of the unimaginable, unnameable, 
unconventional, and unpalatable dimensions of Loy’s oeuvre, I conclude this chapter with a 
reconnaissance of Loy’s poetics, which might be named – if it is to be named anything at all – 
a thingly poetics, placing her disparate compositions in conversation with Bill Brown’s thing 
theory. In his seminal publication, aptly titled Things (2004), Brown contends:  
 
We begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working for us: when the 
drill breaks, when the car stalls, when the window gets filthy, when their flow within 
the circuits of production and distribution, consumption and exhibition, has been 
arrested, however momentarily.86  
 
For Brown, the ‘thing’ is therefore that which appears to ‘hover’ over the ‘threshold between 
the nameable and unnameable, the figurable and unfigurable, the identifiable and 
unidentifiable’ – comparable to those chance encounters with the strangely familiar, the 
uncanny or unheimlich thing.87 Thinglyness is negation. Thinglyness is a state of being, neither 
this nor that – neither here nor there – in the symbolic orders of other people, language, and 
objects. The thing is that which ‘one need not, cannot, or does not wish to give a specific name 
to.’88 As Loy contends in an unidentified fragment archived at The Beinecke Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library, ‘Things have no importance until they are impossible.’89 Here, I argue that 
Loy’s compositions are impossible things in which communicative language and formal 
grammar collapse, confronting the reader with a repellent question: what is this thing doing to 
me? 
 Though the terms ‘object’ and ‘thing’ are frequently used interchangeably in dialogue 
and literary scholarship, they refer to incongruent processes of signification.90 It is here that 
academic studies on objects and things diverge, one signifying the human subject’s encounters 
 
85 Loy, ‘Songs to Joannes’, p. 62; ‘Der Blinde Junge’, The Lost Lunar Baedeker, pp. 83 – 84 (p. 84).  
86 Brown, ‘Thing Theory’, p. 4. 
87 Brown, ‘Thing Theory’, p. 5.  
88 Oxford Dictionaries, Thing (2018) <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/thing> [Accessed 14 August 
2018].  
89 Loy, ‘Unidentified Fragment’ (n.d.), Box 6, Folder 183, YCAL MSS 6, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript 
Library, Yale University. 
90 A significant critical publication in which ‘thing’ and ‘object’ interchangeably is Tristin Garcia’s Form and 
Object: A Treatise on Things (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014). 
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with an identifiable nonhuman object with a given ergonomic function or aesthetic value, the 
other signifying the human subject’s encounters with that unidentifiable matter which resists 
automatic comprehension. When we encounter the familiar nonhuman object, for example, we 
are privy to some prior knowledge of its condition. When we encounter the abject materiality 
of the unnameable thing, however, we are compelled to participate in an active cross-
examination: What is this thing? Have I encountered this thing before? Who, where, or what 
can I compare this thing to? What is the use of this thing? What is this thing doing to me? As 
Brown contends, ‘mastering things can take the form of submitting to them, subjecting oneself 
to the point where subject and object, human and nonhuman, seem to converge.’91 For Brown, 
our physical and psychological interactions with things threaten the theoretical cohesion of the 
material world, for we are compelled to acknowledge the transformative power of things. In 
our happenstance encounters with impossible things, Brown argues that we must surrender 
ourselves to a confusion of matters, a slippage between self and other in which the ontological 
classification of humans and nonhumans, subjects and objects, cannot hold.  
Though this cross-examination may occur during our encounters with nonhuman 
objects, it is automatic – a rapid, spontaneous retrieval of information facilitates our 
comprehension of the nonhuman object’s social, historical, or political function in the material 
world. This is how we are able to recognise, in an instant, the doll’s apparent ‘dollness’ or the 
orange’s ‘orangeness’ – we compare the doll or the orange to every object we have ever 
encountered before, recognising within the doll or the orange a commonality with other dolls, 
other oranges. Our interactions with things, however, overwhelm the theoretical stability of 
cognitive processing – defamiliarizing automatic perception. There is, therefore, an anxiety 
surrounding the thing and all its degeneracies of form; we apprehend the thing until it comes 
to us with a proper noun and ergonomic function. The thing is always a potential object. 
Furthermore, as Loy’s lampshades would attest, the object is always a potential thing.  
Loy’s artistic experiments, Lobster Boy (1930) and Christ on a Clothesline (1955 – 
1959), with their eccentric combinations of materials, human and nonhuman matter, acquire a 
thingly dimension; their transgressions disarm the viewer, challenging those automatic 
cognitive processes concerning object recognition. Lobster Boy, for example, is a model of an 
adolescent with a lobster tail for legs and lobster claws for hands, set inside a glass bell jar. Its 
doll face is a rudimentary thing – black holes for eyes, a black slit for a mouth. As Susan 
Rosenbaum contends, despite its gendered title, ‘the figure clearly has breasts’ and its 
 
91 Brown, ‘Materialities of Modernism’, p. 291.  
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‘ambiguous or hybrid sex, coupled with its conjoining of human and crustacean forms, suggests 
new physical configurations of sex and gender.’92 Its androgyny arrests the viewer in a radical 
denunciation of ontological classification. Lobster Boy revels in the betweenness of sexual and 
gendered matter – the betweenness of human and nonhuman matter. Its segmental components 
are discernible, but the assemblage in which they participate detaches the doll face, the human 
torso, the lobster claw and tail, from their routine contexts. Loy’s Lobster Boy repels the viewer 
with its abject materiality, that is, the excessive commonality of matter liberated from 
ergonomic function and aesthetic value, the autocracy of the proper noun. As Brown argues, 
things represent ‘what is excessive in objects’ and ‘what exceeds their mere materialisation as 
objects or their mere utilisation as objects – their sensuous presence or as a metaphysical 
presence, the magic by which objects become values, fetishes, idols, and totems.’93 With its 
rejection of ontological classification, Loy’s Lobster Boy exceeds the condition of objecthood; 
it resists singularity in form and connotation, rejoicing in the plurality of things. Lobster Boy 
is an effigy of excess, a thing revered.  
We can also apprehend the physical and psychological transgressions of the thing in 
Loy’s Christ on a Clothesline. For Thea Lenarduzzi, Christ on a Clothesline is ‘a collage 
contained in a deep glass box, which, in place of the conventional finery of religious art, shapes 
rags and papier-maché into the Son of God.’94 Here, the body of ‘Christ’ is a dirty bedsheet, 
hung out to dry – his face a white mask on a drooping washing line. ‘Christ’ does not have a 
neck or legs, but a pair of arms dangles, limp, from wooden pegs. Like Ridge’s living doll, 
Janie, the parts do not correlate, entirely, with those of a human body – ‘Christ’ is pegged out 
like a costume. The viewer cannot know for certain if the matters pegged onto that thin, yellow 
cord are more human or nonhuman – are corporeal or artificial members. Loy’s collage 
meticulously suspends this thing named ‘Christ’ over what Brown deems the ‘threshold 
between the nameable and unnameable, the figurable and unfigurable, the identifiable and 
unidentifiable,’ and, as my discussion of Kristeva has shown, the palatable and unpalatable.95 
After all, the viewer cannot know for certain if ‘Christ’ is dead due to some heinous manmade 
intervention, or whether it was hewn from some dead, manmade matter. It borders on lunacy; 
Christ on a Clothesline is a blasphemous thing.  
 
92 Susan Rosenbaum, Mina Loy’s Lobster Boy (2019) 
<https://uploads.knightlab.com/storymapjs/4d955018a26b1e800a1f90d8afedac71/lobster-boy/index.html> 
[Accessed 9 October 2019].  
93 Brown, ‘Thing Theory’, p. 5. 
94 Thea Lenarduzzi, The Many Faces of Mina Loy (2011) <https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/public/the-many-
faces-of-mina-loy/> [Accessed 9 October 2019].  
95 Brown, ‘Thing Theory’, p. 5.  
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 Furthermore, when interacting with Loy’s thingly compositions, the reader is subjected 
to a corresponding experience. The phonetic non-rhythm and non-rhyme of the line, its erratic 
spatial notations and eccentric linguistic formulations, all reject syntactic order – manifesting 
all that is excessive in poetry. There is, after all, ‘Something taking shape / Something that has 
a new name’ forming within literary and artistic modernism: a thingly poetics.96 Loy’s ‘Time-
Bomb’ (1945), for example, is a composition apprehended in the process of detonation, 
paralysing the reader with a disturbance of philological matter, blowing its punctuational debris 
(a comma, an end stop) across the poetic line: 
 
The      present      moment  
is       an      explosion     ,  
a      scission  
of      past    and       future97  
 
Here, there are vacuities in the composition which detach, however momentarily, language and 
punctuation from the contextualising phrase. The anti-structure of Loy’s composition 
necessitates an active methodology of reading, for it explodes the phrase, which must be 
recovered by the reader in the restorative process of interpretation. Loy’s spatial notations, 
however, thwart this act of restoration; though the composition bears a formal resemblance to 
poetry, it violates readerly expectation. Because punctuation does not occur at regular intervals, 
one phrase transverses or interposes another in a scrupulous collage of linguistic matter. The 
reader cannot know for certain where one phrase concludes and other commences. Though 
‘Time-Bomb’ comes to the reader in coherent stanzas, an asymmetrical sequence of words 
expedites the formation of grammatically absurd combinations– ‘moment / explosion / 
scission’ or ‘The present / is an explosion’ – compelling the reader to acknowledge the 
volatility of language. In the two surviving drafts of ‘Time Bomb,’ Loy appears to explode and 
implode the composition once again, experimenting with its typographical dimensions; she 
drafts the manuscript in uppercase letters, as if the text had been cut, violently, into the 
whiteness of the page, and then, in lowercase, save for the first letter of each line, to maintain 
a semblance of proper grammar and formal syntax that is later overthrown by the process of 
reading.98 Here, Loy experiments with its spatial notations until the last, unimaginable form is 
manifested – until the composition revels in excess. Above all, ‘Time-Bomb’ is a composition 
 
96 Loy, ‘Songs to Joannes’, p. 57.  
97 Loy, ‘Time-Bomb’, The Lost Lunar Baedeker, p. 123.  




which compels us to radically reconceive the communicative function of language, and its role 
in the process of ontological classification. For Loy, the segmental components of this thing 
we name language must be dismantled – they must be made to reassemble in disparate 
combinations, challenging the reader to relive their earliest requisitions of the found material 
that is language in childhood, when the shapes and sounds of letters were strange, their order 
negotiable, things with infinite possibility.  
 In ‘Feminist Manifesto,’ Loy further complicates the reader’s encounter with this thing 
that is the literary text – this thing that is language – through the dynamic, disruptive potential 




Here, Loy’s distorted typography disturbs the physical and psychological margins of the 
literary composition as we know it (see Figure 3), demanding an active reappraisal of the 
methods by which we classify the material world and all its excessive things. Loy’s ‘Feminist 
Manifesto’ antagonises the reader: it overwhelms the automatic process of ontological 
Figure 3: Loy, 'Feminist Manifesto', The Lost Lunar Baedeker, p. 153. 
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classification, revelling in the transformative potential of a language that rejects the propriety 
of grammar – of the proper noun. As Mary Ann Caws contends, the manifesto, in particular, is 
a maddening form, ‘an act of démesure, going past what is thought of as proper, sane, and 
literary. Its outreach demands an extravagant self-assurance.’99 The hulking, underscored 
phrases of Loy’s ‘Feminist Manifesto’ – too big for the text – will not simply lie, contentedly, 
in the whiteness of the page. They aggravate oppositions. They brawl and shout, compelling 
the reader to return, to regurgitate, to recite ‘Inadequate,’ ‘Women,’ ‘Wrench,’ ‘Reform,’ 
‘Absolute Demolition’ over and above all other phrases, for the composition rejects the comfort 
of the margin and the reader cannot cohesively apprehend such material from left-to-right. 
After all, ‘At the peak of its performance,’ the manifesto’s ‘form creates its meaning.’100 
Formally, Loy’s ‘Feminist Manifesto’ commands the ‘you’ that is the reader to read astern, to 
read against the linear circuitry of linguistic communication. It charges the reader, by example, 
to reject automatic cognition, for the manifesto should not be reprehensible for ‘scratching on 
the surface of the rubbish heap of tradition’ – the ‘Reform’ it desires must formally operate 
within its composition if the reader is to apprehend its radical condemnation of the binary 
oppositions which have, for so long, classified human and nonhuman matter. It appropriates 
and overwhelms literary genre; the justified margins, the analogous sentences of the prose-text 
cannot hold, for a disturbance must occur within our language, that is, the acquired matter 
through which we philosophise, if we are to appraise the material world anew. Loy’s ‘Feminist 
Manifesto’ borders on thinghood – aesthetically unconceivable, it functions to disorder the 
socially, politically, and historically-governed functions of these things we name literary 
compositions, female subjects, nonhuman objects. It overwhelms those aged techniques and 
archaic traditions that would compromise its thinghood, its radical rejection of the proper noun. 
As Kreymborg asserts, ‘Had a man written these poems, the town might have viewed them 
with comparative comfort. But a woman wrote them, a woman who dressed like a lady and 
painted charming lampshades.’101 In Loy’s compositions, there is an ‘Absolute Demolition’ of 
those binary oppositions which classify poetry and prose, one that is augmented by an 
‘Absolute Demolition’ of the binary oppositions which classify sex and gender. Readerly 
comfort is, therefore, of little consequence to Loy’s compositions, for they are revolutionary 
things which venerate the physical and psychological plurality of matter.  
 
99 Mary Ann Caws, ‘The Poetics of the Manifesto: Nowness and Newness’, Manifesto: A Century of Isms, ed. 
by Caws (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), pp. xix – xxxii (p. xx).  
100 Caws, ‘The Poetics of the Manifesto’, p. xx.  
101 Kreymborg, Our Singing Strength, pp. 488 – 489. 
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It is evident, then, that Loy’s thingly poetics are manifested in her creative appropriation 
and renovation of found material – rendering the unimaginable, unpalatable, unnameable 
dimensions of the overloaded circuit, the womanly doll, the half-rotten orange, the explosion, 
the manifesto, in the whiteness of the page. In literary modernism, this thing we name a poem 
must, above all else, physically and psychologically defamiliarize the reader with the 
communicative function of language, which orders involuntary cognition. This process is 
exemplified in Loy’s compositions, for they render obsolete the reader’s ability to classify 
matter; her use of abjection denounces and revolutionises the propriety of proper nouns, forms, 
syntax, and connotations. Whether they are hewn from cardboard, oil paint, rags, acetate, found 
objects, electricity, papier maché, or language, the volatile materialities of Loy’s things 
command the active viewer or reader to assemble – reassemble – their segmental components 
in disparate combinations, if they are to mean anything at all. Loy’s things thus participate in 
an active severance of the obsolescent, arbitrary connections between forms and functions – 
annihilating the socially, politically, or historically-governed praxes regarding what an object 
is or does, what a woman is or does, what a text is or does. Through this operation, Loy’s things 
offer a vigorous reappraisal of the literary composition as we know it – its habitual spatial 
notations, typographical dimensions, punctuation, and grammatical order – confronting us with 
the physical and psychological potentiality of her thingly poetics. Here, Loy’s things stimulate 
new investigations into the cerebral activity of the modernist composition: how, after all, might 
modernist poets anticipate the modern study of neuroscience in their radical literary 
experiments, corroborating the plasticity of people, language, and objects to excite 













THE BRAIN IS A PLASTIC THING:  
GERTRUDE STEIN AND THE BARONESS ELSA VON FREYTAG-
LORINGHOVEN’S NEUROPLASTIC EXPERIMENTS 
 
By January 1902, Gertrude Stein had failed her final exams as a medical student at John 
Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland.1 Her anatomy professor, Dr Franklin Paine Mall, 
offered her a second chance to graduate on the condition that she would successfully complete 
an anatomical model of an embryonic human mid-brain.2 Throughout Autumn 1902, Stein 
consequently laboured over the model of what ‘we would today call a late-term foetus or infant’ 
midbrain, producing sixty-three drawings and approximately twenty-five pages of text.3 When 
she submitted her portfolio for approval, however, Dr Mall – described by his colleagues as 
‘the greatest living anatomist at the time’ – was baffled by the thing with which he was 
confronted. Following days of introspection, Dr Mall consulted Florence Rena Sabin, who 
graduated one year ahead of Stein by completing a similar assignment; offering Stein’s model 
to Dr Sabin for assessment, he commented, ‘“Either I am crazy or Miss Stein is. Will you see 
what you can make out of her work?”’4 Stein’s midbrain was subsequently consigned to the 
refuse bin. In ‘Strange Anatomy: Gertrude Stein and the Avant-Garde Embryo’, Lynn M. 
Morgan considers what Stein had done to trigger such a powerful retort from her professors: 
 
Stein had twisted the brain stem before the soft brain was fixed. Imagine, for a moment, 
what this entailed. Someone, likely Stein herself, had been sent to the cold storage room 
where Mall was building a collection of hundreds of late-term foetal and infant cadavers 
for use by the medical students. Someone would have had to cut open the skull and 
remove the small brain, which if it were fresh would have been surprisingly malleable, 
the consistency of soft butter. Perhaps someone shuddered. Perhaps someone squeezed 
the delicate brain or dropped it on the floor. (Stein was, by all accounts, notoriously 
clumsy.) By the time someone fixed the brain in a solution of formalin, it had been 
mangled, but the error went unnoticed. Someone cut the distorted brain into sections 
and painstakingly built a model that turned out to be nonsensical and wrong.5  
 
Though Stein’s garbled, enigmatic midbrain was failed by her professors – and therefore lost 
 
1 Steven Meyer offers a comprehensive account of Stein’s medical training in Irresistible Dictation: Gertrude 
Stein and the Correlations of Writing and Science (California: Stanford University Press, 2001). Lynn M. 
Morgan additionally offers insight into Stein’s time at Johns Hopkins University through Stein’s The 
Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas in ‘The Embryography of Alice B. Toklas’, Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, Vol. 50.1 (2008), pp. 304 – 325. 
2 Lynn M. Morgan, ‘Strange Anatomy: Gertrude Stein and the Avant-Garde Embryo’, Hypatia, Vol. 21.1 
(2009), pp. 16 – 34 (p. 18).  
3 Morgan, ‘Strange Anatomy’, p. 19.  
4 Edmund Wilson, Upstate: Records and Recollections of Northern New York (New York: Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux, 1971), p. 63.  
5 Morgan, ‘Strange Anatomy’, p. 20.  
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to history – such visceral, tactile encounters with this miniaturised specimen of the human brain 
must have triggered something in Stein’s own cerebrum. Perhaps Stein’s model was not 
designed to be the textbook specimen that her professors desired, but something else altogether 
– something with a new appellation and function, something that she would go on to explore 
in her literary experiments. As Lewellys Franklin Barker, another of Stein’s scientific mentors, 
considers, ‘I have often wondered if my attempts to teach her the intricacies of the medulla 
oblongata had anything to do with the development of the strange literary forms with which 
she was later to perplex the world.’6 Though Stein’s subsequent departure from Johns Hopkins 
Medical School is often presented as her departure from the scientific community, Stephen 
Meyer argues that Stein’s poetic compositions are theoretically motivated by her studies in 
human brain anatomy.7 For Meyer, Stein ultimately ‘reconfigured science as writing and 
performed scientific experiments in writing.’8  
 Building on Meyer’s critical study of Stein’s writing as science, this chapter considers 
the strange and contorted anatomy of Stein’s midbrain as model for her literary experiments.9 
I explicate the peculiar methodologies of Stein’s compositions through contemporary studies 
in brain plasticity or ‘neuroplasticity’, which describes the ‘ability of the nervous system to 
form and reorganise connections and pathways, as during development and learning or 
following injury’, or the brain’s capacity to modify its physical and psychical structure via 
lived experience.10 Despite the abundance of scholarly material on Stein’s life and work, this 
is the first neuroplastic reading of Tender Buttons (1914), and I propose that it offers a way of 
conceptualising the plasticity of Stein’s seminal publication as that which synthesises, 
modulates, and repairs meaning through the operation of reading.   
Following my analysis of Stein’s neuroplastic experiments, this chapter turns to those 
conducted by the Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven. By juxtaposing their outlandish 
methodologies, I consider the radical literary potential of the three forms of plasticity 
(developmental plasticity, modulational plasticity, and reparative plasticity) examined by 
Catherine Malabou in What Should We Do with Our Brain? (2004) and Plasticity at the Dusk 
 
6 Lewellys Franklin Barker, Time and the Physician (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), p. 60.  
7 Meyer, Irresistible Dictation, pp. xi – xxiii. 
8 Meyer, Irresistible Dictation, p. xxi. For further discussion of Stein’s writing as science, see Jonah Lehrer’s 
‘Gertrude Stein: The Structure of Language’ in Proust was a Neuroscientist (New York: Canongate Books, 
2007), pp. 144 – 167. Lehrer details an experiment Stein conducted regarding automatic writing, the result of 
which was published in the May 1898 edition of the Psychological Review. 
9 Morgan, ‘Strange Anatomy’, p. 19; Barker, Time and the Physician, p. 60.  
10 Oxford English Dictionary, Neuroplasticity (2019) 




of Writing (2004).11 A pioneer of New York Dada, the Baroness erected trash sculptures – her 
Cathedral (1918) is a wood fragment, and God (1917) is a rusty plumbing trap on a mitre box. 
She was frequently arrested for public indecency, composing humorous sound poems which 
she would perform to the streets, parading half-naked around Greenwich Village in costumes 
hewn from found or stolen bric-a-brac which would revolutionise the art world.12 For Amelia 
Jones, the Baroness ‘functioned as a site of violent projections’ and ‘was thus a figure who 
pointed to the limits of avant-gardism’ – resisting any semblance of social etiquette, rejecting 
those sexual and gendered binaries of the early twentieth-century.13 In 1922, Jane Heap, editor 
of The Little Review, similarly argued that the Baroness is ‘the only one living anywhere who 
dresses Dada, loves Dada, lives Dada.’14 Despite her notoriety, however, the Baroness is 
notably absent from the modernist canon; if she is remembered at all, it is only in cameo. Little 
scholarly material exists on the eccentric Baroness, with the exception of Irene Gammel and 
Suzanne Zelazo’s Body Sweats: The Uncensored Writings of Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven, 
which reacquainted the literary world with her experimental compositions in 2011. As Linda 
Lappin asserts,  
 
the Baroness flits (and at times streaks naked) through the memoirs, correspondence, 
and iconography of many artists and writers of the period: Man Ray, Margaret 
Anderson and Jane Heap, Ezra Pound, William Carlos Williams, Hart Crane, Marcel 
Duchamp, Berenice Abbot, Djuna Barnes. Dismissed for decades as a lunatic, she has 
now been recognized as America's first Dada artist.15  
 
We are positioned, then, at the brink of a modern renaissance for the Baroness and her literary 
experiments, which were so far beyond the understanding of her contemporaries that they could 
not be sufficiently appreciated for all that they were and continue to be: empirical studies into 
the peripheral limits of plastic cognitive function and the grammatically coded, found material 
that is communicative language.  
 Rather than aiming to suggest that it is possible to reduce literature to simple matter of 
brain chemistry, my analyses of Stein and the Baroness’ experiments build on Nidesh Lawtoo’s 
study of neuroplasticity in novels of Joseph Conrad; according to Lawtoo, ‘the neurosciences 
 
11 Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, trans by. Sebastian Rand (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008); Malabou, Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction, 
trans. by Carolyn Shread (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
12 Linda Lappin, ‘Dada Queen in the Bad Boys' Club: Baroness Elsa Von Freytag-Loringhoven’, Southwest 
Review, Vol. 89. 2 (2004), pp. 307-319 (p. 309).  
13 Amelia Jones, Irrational Modernism: A Neuraesthenic History of New York Dada (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
2004), p. 8.  
14 Jane Heap, ‘Dada’, The Little Review, ed. by Margaret Anderson and Jane Heap, Vol. 8.2 (1922), p. 46.  
15 Lappin, ‘Dada Queen in the Bad Boys' Club’, p. 308.  
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paradoxically confirm a point theorists in the humanities have been making all along: they 
emphasize the dominant role played by culture, history, and language – not nature – in the 
formation, deformation, and transformation of subjectivity.’16After all, with the modern 
discovery of neuroplasticity, we must acknowledge that if our brains are physically and 
psychologically modified in response to sensory encounters with other people, language, and 
objects, then who or what we read must modulate our experiences and assumptions regarding 
literary compositions. In this chapter, I argue that the garbled, eccentric, and critically disdained 
works of Gertrude Stein and the Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven formally anticipate 
the concept of neuroplasticity, articulating the development and reparation of the neuronal 
pathways accountable for the identification of nonhuman objects in the material world via 
experimental language techniques including fragmentation, repetition, and spatial notation. I 
contend that the literary experiments of Stein and the Baroness produce a radical 
defamiliarization of nonhuman objects, language, and genre, manifesting the defining 
condition of the plastic brain, that is, what Malabou identifies as ‘the completeness of form and 
the possibility of its disintegration.’17 This study culminates with the affirmation that this 
plasticity of form may actuate, within our literary compositions, the disruptive potential to 
signify the material world in all its plurality – synthesising, exciting, modulating, repairing, 
and executing the synaptic connections between people, language, and things.  
 
MODULATIONAL AND REPARATIVE PLASTICITY: GERTRUDE STEIN AND 
THE NEW LANGUAGE OF OBJECTS 
 
For Omri Moses, Stein is fascinated by the ‘material that other novelists discard’ – monotony, 
habit, reiteration, and all that is, or could be, considered ordinary.18 Her Tender Buttons picks 
at little morsels of food and all manner of stuff sitting on the periphery of the domestic home: 
seltzer bottles, pastry, umbrellas, dresses, hats, and the stuffing of a cushion are brought to the 
head of a house where nobody is cooking or cleaning – a house with no obvious occupants at 
all, save an anonymous human subject, who slips in and out of the fragments, a textual 
apparition.19 Tender Buttons is split into three sections – ‘Objects,’ ‘Food,’ and ‘Rooms’ – 
which, in her original carnets and materials for Tender Buttons, archived at The Beinecke Rare 
 
16 Nidesh Lawtoo, ‘Conrad’s Neuroplasticity’, Modernism/Modernity, Vol. 23 (2016), pp. 771 – 788 (p. 771).  
17 Malabou, Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing, p. 2.  
18 Omri Moses, ‘Lively Habits: Gertrude Stein’, Out of Character: Modernism, Vitalism, Psychic Life 
(California: Stanford University Press, 2014), pp. 117 – 152 (p. 117). 
19 Gertrude Stein, Tender Buttons: The Corrected Centennial Edition, ed. by Seth Perlow (San Francisco: City 
Light Books, 2014).  
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Book and Manuscript Library, are continually reorganised.20 Though ruled horizontally, Stein 
turned her notebooks on their side and composed across lines, rejecting the left margin; as Seth 
Perlow describes, Stein ‘began by writing on each recto page, and when she had thus reached 
the end of a notebook, she flipped it and worked back to front, writing on the verso pages.’21 
Tender Buttons is, therefore, a manuscript in which the order of things is frequently subverted.  
There is, I propose, a plasticity to Stein’s manuscript; it need not matter if ‘Food’ occurs before 
or after ‘Objects’ and ‘Rooms’, for each section refers, recurs, repairs the other. On returning 
to a particular segment for close analysis, we find that it has been permanently transformed by 
our physical and psychological encounters with the others – it is a text that revels in revising 
the arbitrary connections between things. Tender Buttons is a manuscript which borders on 
lunacy and monotony in equal measure, making the home and all its anxious furniture thingly 
through its peculiar composition, which does and does not resemble poetry. Jeanette Winterson 
argues that Stein ‘enlarges what is small, reduces what is large, twists and turns her material so 
that she can misrepresent it’ – repeating things, rejecting meaning for the sake of 
communication, resisting the synaptic connections between proper nouns and nonhuman 
objects.22  
For Elisabeth A. Frost, academic scholarship on Tender Buttons has historically hinged 
on biography or reader-response. She contends that such criticism has, to date, either 
deciphered the text alongside Stein’s private life (framing the disjointed, repetitive, nonsense 
text as a method of concealment for her physical and psychological relationship with her lover, 
Alice B. Toklas) or delivered some scathing commentary on the arbitrary nature of language 
and the reader’s fruitless desire to ‘make sense’ or ‘solve’ the problem of the fragment at 
hand.23 This chapter, however, seeks to go beyond such readings with the contention that 
Malabou’s theory of plasticity may offer new ways of interpreting Stein’s thingly process of 
composition. For Rebecca Scherr, Stein’s primary objective as a writer is the synthesis of the 
 
20 Stein, ‘Tender Buttons: Manuscript Notebooks and Typescript’ (1910 – 1912), Box 74, Folder 1367 – 1369, 
YCAL MSS 76, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University. When drafting Tender Buttons, 
Stein composed in three carnets inscribed ‘O’ for ‘Objects,’ ‘Fo’ for ‘Food,’ and ‘Ro’ for ‘Rooms’ – the carnets 
are unnumbered, and it is unclear if Stein composed one before another or intended a particular order in which 
they should be printed. Furthermore, the contents page of the bound typescript for Tender Buttons lists ‘Food,’ 
‘Rooms,’ then ‘Objects’ as the correct order. In the same typescript, however, the sections are printed in the 
following order: ‘Rooms,’ ‘Objects,’ ‘Food’.  
21 Seth Perlow, ‘A Note on the Text’, Tender Buttons: The Corrected Centennial Edition, ed. by Seth Perlow 
(San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2014), pp. 88 – 97 (p. 91). 
22 Jeanette Winterson, ‘Testimony Against Gertrude Stein’, Art Objects (London: Vintage, 1996), pp. 45 – 60 (p. 
54).  
23 Elisabeth A. Frost, ‘Signifyin(g) on Stein: The Revisionist Poetics of Harryette Mullen and Leslie Scalapino’ 
Postmodern Culture, Vol. 5.3 (1995), n.p.  
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senses in poetic form, ‘questioning, resisting, shifting, experimenting with, and undermining 
literary and cultural practices.’24 Similarly, Margueritte S. Murphy, studying the formal 
likeness of Toklas’ cookbooks and Stein’s ‘Food’, reasons that in Tender Buttons, Stein is 
making a new language, and an improved recipe for domesticity.25 I argue, therefore, that 
Tender Buttons brings about a new language of objects – one that synthesises, modulates, 
repairs, and terminates the ontological classification of things in the material world. I contend 
that Stein experiments with the dormant thinglyness of language and object simultaneously, 
appropriating the sense-making function of the plastic brain. In Tender Buttons, the domestic 
object becomes a multisensory playground for neuroplastic operations, and, the brain’s 
potential for (trans)formation after happenstance meetings with people, language, and things.  
 Plasticity is etymologically derived from the Greek word plassein (to mould); for 
Catherine Malabou, ‘it means at once the capacity to receive form […] and the capacity to give 
form.’26 The human cerebrum is simultaneously ‘formable’ and ‘formative’ – a modifiable, 
malleable, metamorphosing thing that is partially determined by our genetic code, and partially 
derived from lived experience.27 For Hugh J. Silverman, neuroplasticity should therefore be 
considered ‘a kind of “indecidable” between flexibility and rigidity, suppleness and solidity, 
fixedness and transformability, identity and modifiability, determination and freedom.’28 It is 
plasticity, after all, which affords the brain its capacity to repair and reorganise itself when one 
of its constituent parts is damaged or fails, its ability to regenerate cells after cell death or 
‘apoptosis’, and its dexterity for synaptic modulation, which adapts and strengthens neuronal 
pathways throughout our lives, when we learn a new word, for example, or a new meaning for 
an old word. Even familiar processes such as ‘thinking, learning, and acting can turn our genes 
on and off, thus producing our brain anatomy.’29 As Norman Doidge states, the brain is not, as 
scientists once believed, ‘a glorious machine’ with a stable or linear mode of processing 
stimuli; ‘while machines do many extraordinary things, they don’t change and grow.’30 
Malabou explicates this potential for transformation with an analogy; she holds that the brain 
 
24 Rebecca Scherr, ‘Tactile Erotics: Gertrude Stein and the Aesthetics of Touch’, Literature Interpretation 
Theory, Vol. 18.3 (2007), pp. 193 – 212 (p. 194). 
25 Margueritte S. Murphy, ‘Familiar Strangers: The Household Words of Gertrude Stein's Tender Buttons’, 
Contemporary Literature, Vol. 32. 3 (1991), pp. 383-402. 
26 Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain? (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), p. 5. 
27 Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, p. 4 – 5. 
28 Hugh J. Silverman, ‘Malabou, Plasticity, and the Sculpturing of the Self’, Concentric: Literary and Cultural 
Studies, Vol. 36 (2010), pp. 89 – 102 (p. 89).  
29 Norman Doidge, The Brain that Changes Itself: Stories of Personal Triumph from the Frontiers of Brain 
Science (London: Penguin, 2008), p. xv.  
30 Doidge, The Brain that Changes Itself, p. xiv.  
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‘sculpts’ its genetic program during development just as the sculptor chisels the form of a statue 
from a block of marble. Upon completion, she argues that there can be ‘no possible return to 
the indeterminacy’ of the marble’s ‘starting point’ – it is permanently changed.31 Malabou 
contends that plasticity must not, therefore, be confounded with elasticity; elastic material can 
return to its original form following its metamorphosis.   
Plasticity triggers irreversible psychological and physical changes as the human 
cerebrum acquires information through lived experience, synthesising, exciting, modifying, 
and executing neuronal pathways in direct response to material stimuli. Synaptogenesis occurs, 
followed by synaptoterminus. Plasticity therefore holds the arresting potential to revolutionise 
the way we encounter nonhuman objects in the world. Every nonhuman object, after all, is 
always a potential thing. Brain plasticity is simultaneously responsible for our ability to 
identify, categorise, and amalgamate nonhuman objects with their proper nouns and our ability 
to defamiliarize nonhuman objects – to render obsolete their aesthetic value or ergonomic 
function in favour of plurality, excess, abjection, thinglyness. Despite our similarities in genetic 
and anatomical structure, the brain’s capacity for synaptic modulation, apoptosis, and 
reparation means that no two brains are comprised of identical neuronal pathways due to the 
exclusivity of our personal histories; without the transformation of these neuronal pathways we 
would not, after all, be able to learn, remember, or adapt to our surroundings.32 The ordinary 
things we encounter on an ordinary day prominently shape the brain’s structure as ‘links among 
simultaneously firing neurons are created or strengthened, making their firing together in the 
future more likely.’33 Brain plasticity is therefore responsible for our acquisition of language 
in childhood, how we adopt socially, historically, and politically acceptable behaviours – how 
we are able to ‘learn and remember the relationship between unrelated items’ to form 
associative memories.34 We need only turn to those complex, synaptic connections between, 
for example, Gertrude Stein and roastbeef, or between the Baroness Elsa von Freytag-
Loringhoven and pubic hair, to observe this in action. Silverman argues that ‘each of these 
plasticities demonstrates an understanding of the brain that has a position between 
determination (rigid, pre-figured, con-figured in advance) and freedom (supple and 
 
31 Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, p. 15 
32 Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, p. 5 
33 Dan Siegel, Interpersonal Neurobiology: Relationships, Health, and the Brain (2015) 
<http://www.drdansiegel.com/blog/2015/01/07/brain-insights-and-well-being-2/> [Accessed 4 May 2018].  
34 Wendy A. Suzuki, Associative Memory and the Hippocampus (2005) 
<http://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2005/02/suzuki.aspx> [Accessed 9 January 2018].  
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transformative)’; the plastic brain simultaneously produces and annihilates form, cultivating 
and denouncing stasis, revelling in contradiction.35  
 Throughout Tender Buttons, there are repetitions, refrains which are duplicated within 
and between fragments – modulating and repairing what can only be described as the synapses 
between word, object, and meaning:  
 
A TABLE. 
A table means does it not my dear it means a whole  
steadiness. It is likely that a change. 
A table means more than a glass even a looking glass is tall.  
A table means necessary places and a revision a revision of a  
little thing it means it does mean that there had been a stand,  
a stand where it did shake.36 
 
There is a return to things past, a redefinition or ‘revision’ of all that we once assumed to know 
about the object, that is, the table, in a house where nobody is cooking or cleaning. Stein begins 
her description with that ‘steadiness’ or stability which has traditionally characterised the table, 
whose primary resolve is to hold other objects. Next, Stein quantifies the aesthetic value and 
ergonomic function of the table in relation to another object entirely – ‘a glass’ or ‘looking 
glass’ – manifesting, in the whiteness of the page, those arbitrary comparisons that the plastic 
brain must produce between objects to recollect or appraise their merit. Here, Stein 
acknowledges ‘a revision a revision’ which necessarily occurs in the plastic brain when the 
human subject physically or psychologically encounters the nameable object in the material 
world. With this encounter, the human subject acquires knowledge of the object, and after their 
initial comparison between objects, comes a modification to aid future recognition or 
evaluation of the object in question. With the repetition of ‘it means it does mean’ Stein 
therefore amplifies the human subject’s futile desire for ‘steadiness’ – a stability in meaning – 
that is never corroborated. Stein consequently defamiliarizes the object – the table – once again, 
as the composition experiences a synaptic modulation and the table becomes ‘a stand, a stand 
where it did shake.’ Here, Stein’s composition postulates that objects, the language with which 
we name objects or assign objects an ergonomic and aesthetic value, are precarious or ‘shaking’ 
things.  
 For Malabou, language has always been plastic. It cultivates and annihilates form, 
physically and psychologically modifying the human cerebrum in the operations we name 
 
35 Silverman, ‘Malabou, Plasticity, and the Sculpturing of the Self’, p. 89.  
36 Stein, ‘A Table’, Tender Buttons, p. 28. 
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reading or verbal discourse. We experience the material world, after all, through the found 
matter that is language – proper nouns and adjectives facilitate our ontological classifications, 
and our sensory encounters with things. Having acquired the basic principles of grammar, we 
are able to produce eloquent sentences which allow us to describe and communicate our 
experiences to others – concurrently stable enough to signify according to the dictionary and 
volatile enough to reject singularity in meaning. When known words appear out of context, our 
language simply will not mean for the sake of articulation. Just as the plastic brain is 
simultaneously genetically coded and subject to continuous neuronal transformation, language 
is simultaneously grammatically coded and subject to continuous formal transformation. 
Language, too, is modified as we use it; the meaning of a word oscillates, distends, and 
contracts with its use throughout history. We form new words from old words (neologisms or 
portmanteaux) in happenstance meetings with unnameable things. What, then, might the 
plasticity of language and the brain lend the composition that is literary form? Just as Malabou 
theorises that ‘form is plastic’ – that ‘the nervous system presents the clearest, most striking 
model of this type of organization’ – I propose that literary form may hold a latent potentiality 
for plasticity, though we are just beginning to know it. Tender Buttons is, after all, a manuscript 
which articulates what Malabou considers ‘the completeness of form and the possibility of its 
disintegration,’ in which the brain’s capacities for synaptic modulation and repair are 
manifested via experimental praxes, augmenting the grammatical, referential, communicative 
function of language.37 
 In some fragments of Tender Buttons, modulations are localised, occurring within a 
phrase. For example, in ‘An occasion for a plate, an occasional resource is in buying and how 
soon does washing enable a selection of the same thing neater.’38 Here, the words ‘occasion’ 
and ‘occasional’ resemble each other; their alliterations and phonetic ornamentations bear the 
same texture of fricatives and sibilants; their spelling is near identical, and they occupy a near 
analogous space on the line, save some ‘occasional’ extra letters. Their meanings, however, are 
not analogous. Stein’s ‘occasion for a plate’ might be an ‘a particular event’ or the time of its 
occurrence, a ‘ceremony or celebration,’ a ‘conjunction of circumstances favourable or suitable 
to an end or purpose,’ an ‘opportunity’ or ‘something that produces an effect’ – the word 
‘occasion’ is endowed with a multiplicity of meanings, dependent on who is reading and how.39 
 
37 Malabou, Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing, p. 1, 7, 2.  
38 Stein, ‘A Plate’, Tender Buttons, p. 17.  
39 Oxford English Dictionary, Occasion (2020) 




Meanwhile, Stein’s ‘occasional resource’ might be a resource that appears (or is used) 
‘irregularly’ or ‘incidentally’ – it is perhaps a resource ‘made or adapted for use on a particular 
or special occasion,’ it is perhaps an ‘imperfect’ or ‘incomplete’ resource inappropriate for 
general use.40 Stein’s fragment comprises all and none of these meanings at all. For Joseph 
LeDoux: 
 
When someone speaks to you, for example, you decode the sentence meaning of the 
words (semantics), the grammatical relations between the words (syntax), and your 
knowledge about the word (pragmatics). You usually are not aware of performing these 
operations, but simply do them. While you end up consciously knowing what the person 
said, you don’t have conscious access to the processes that allowed you to comprehend 
the sentence.41  
 
Stein’s Tender Buttons is a composition which renders the plasticity of language (that is, the 
plastic operations happening in the brain as we interact with language) distinguishable. To read 
Tender Buttons is to negotiate plasticity – to defamiliarize the automatic procedure of reading. 
Here, the reader (becoming neurotransmitter) is compelled to participate in the formation, 
excitation, modification, and termination of those neural pathways between word, object, 
grammar, and meaning which constitute communicative language. Tender Buttons is a plastic 
thing, though we do not yet know it. Tender Buttons is a plastic thing, though we are just 
beginning to know it.  
 Linda Mizejewski argues that Tender Buttons is a rebellion, a mutiny ‘against the 
confinements of definition’ in which Stein ‘liberates our habitual ways of seeing ordinary 
objects’ – turning ‘our eye to what the domestic woman traditionally deals with: household 
objects, kitchen items, the home.’42 She does not, however, consider the revolutionary potential 
of habit in the Steinian home. As Moses recalls, habit, for Stein, ‘is not a fixed, rigid, and 
permanent part of a person’ but ‘the inner movement of repetition’ that ‘is the very principle 
of liveliness’ – a habit disrupts the present moment with its recurrence, but ‘never repeats in 
the same way twice.’43 We are not born with habits, but acquire them through lived experience; 
they are adaptations, (trans)forming neuronal pathways in our plastic brain. Such habits are 
anything but stable; like Stein’s linguistic repetitions, they manifest differently with each 
 
40 Oxford English Dictionary, Occasional (2020) 
<https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/130118?redirectedFrom=occasional#eid> [Accessed 19 May 2020].  
41 Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Viking Penguin, 2002), p. 
11.  
42 Linda Mizejewski, ‘Gertrude Stein: The Pattern Moves, the Woman Behind it Shakes’, Women’s Studies, 13 
(1986), pp. 33 – 47 (p. 38).  
43 Moses, ‘Lively Habits: Gertrude Stein’, p. 117. 
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reiteration; they encompass the possibility of un-happening, of un-doing the theoretical 
permanency of the human subject and nonhuman object at any given moment. As Moses 
contends, ‘We are regular beings because we accumulate manners and behaviours and because 
that accumulation has a history that allows us simultaneously to recognise ourselves and depart 
from ourselves.’44 It is habit, after all, which affords the plastic brain its capacity to 
contextualise objects – ‘without habits, objects have no way of slotting themselves into place 
in a form that the body understands’ – and repetitions modify those neuronal pathways which 
connect the object with its proper name, ergonomic function, and aesthetic value.45 
It is habit which affords us the capacity to act as a resolute subject in a material body, 
able to identify (with) other people, language, and objects. Our habits, however, modulate and 
repair existing neuronal pathways; we adapt and acquire knowledge through repetition, which 
transforms the physical and psychological structure of the cerebrum. For Paul B. Armstrong, 
‘although the objects we become accustomed to may change with experience, […] the capacity 
to recognize visual shapes is a fixed, inherited feature of the cortex that is localised in particular 
areas of the brain’ that are specialised for form, motion, colour, and facial recognition.46 The 
plastic brain is, therefore, contingent on a paradox of being both genetically-coded and open 
to constant neuronal variation – able to (un)consciously assimilate complex multi-sensory 
information in a rational, localised manner and acquire new behaviours, skills, knowledge, and 
words in response to stimuli. Though we are made privy to the proper names of Stein’s 
‘Objects’ – our plastic brains are able to conjure an image, some contextualising information 
on ‘Eye Glasses’ or ‘Cake’ in the operation of reading – her descriptors contradict all that we 
once presumed to know or trust about the material world.47  
Stein’s descriptors defamiliarize objects, amending or terminating our habitual 
discernments, rendering objects uncanny, abject, or thingly via the process of reading. It is 
through habit, Moses argues, that ‘two or more different tendencies enter into conflict, one 
pattern of expression intersecting or interfering with another, causing sequences of repetition 
to unravel or veer in a new direction’. Such habits, for Stein, may therefore hold the potential 
to modify our conceptions of all objects, including the literary composition, by acknowledging 
the plastic materiality of language.48 Referencing The Principles of Psychology (1890) by 
 
44 Moses, ‘Lively Habits: Gertrude Stein’, p. 117. 
45 Moses, ‘Lively Habits: Gertrude Stein’, p. 124 
46 Paul B. Armstrong, How Literature Plays with the Brain: The Neuroscience of Reading and Art (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 2013), pp. 35 – 36.  
47 Stein, ‘Eye Glasses’, Tender Buttons, p. 22; Stein, ‘Cake’, Tender Buttons, p. 51.  
48 Moses, ‘Lively Habits: Gertrude Stein’, p. 122.  
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William James, who mentored Stein as a psychology student at the Harvard Psychological 
Laboratory, Moses recognises the propensity to develop habits as that which ‘involves change 
and adaptation to change, not repetition in its pure form’ – a plastic operation between 
‘unadaptability (an extreme rigidity that leaves it unfit for new circumstances)’ and ‘self-
dissolution (excessively rapid change)’.49 Plasticity is not the absence of form, but the 
possibility of its transformation. The linguistic habits of Stein’s Tender Buttons modify its 
physical and psychological structure, thereby modulating our ability to identify, name, and 
ontologically classify nonhuman objects, and these things we name literary compositions.  
Stein’s linguistic habits repeat, facilitating synaptic modulation throughout the 
composition as neuronal pathways between fragments are synthesised, repaired, and 
terminated. Between ‘Glazed Glitter’ and ‘Careless Water’ there is an active synaptic junction. 
In ‘Glazed Glitter,’ ‘There can be breakages in Japanese.’50 Then, in ‘Careless Water,’ a 
modification of the habit: ‘No cup is broken in more places and mended, that is to say a plate 
is broken and mending does do that it shows that culture is Japanese.’51 Tender Buttons is a 
composition with a mind – a memory – of its own, and its readers must act as neurotransmitters, 
relaying and maintaining significations between parts. Upon delivery, the reader or 
neurotransmitter expediates a transformation in the composition: linguistic connections are 
formed, strengthened, or, as in the juncture between ‘Glazed Glitter’ and ‘Careless Water’, 
permanently altered. Across both fragments, Stein refers to the ancient Japanese art of Kintsugi 
(also known as Kintsukuroi), which is a ‘method for repairing broken ceramics with a special 
lacquer mixed with gold, silver, or platinum.’52 It is, therefore, apt that a reparative plasticity 
happens between them in the operation of reading. Whilst ‘Glazed Glitter’ declares that there 
‘can be breakages in Japanese,’ ‘Careless Water’ adds lacquer to the broken statement, 
mending the ‘cup’ – the composition – through repetition; there can be no return to the original 
form. Stein engages the reader, as neurotransmitter, to enable reparations in Tender Buttons, 
for there could be no variation without their activity. Stein engages the reader, as 
neurotransmitter, in the plastic materiality of the literary composition, that is, the plasticity of 
the material world.  
 
49 William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1890); Moses, ‘Lively 
Habits: Gertrude Stein’, p. 124.  
50 Stein, ‘Glazed Glitter’, Tender Buttons, p. 11. 
51 Stein ‘Careless Water’, Tender Buttons, p. 23. 
52 Collins Dictionary, Kintsugi (2017) <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/submission/19460/Kintsugi> 
[Accessed 07 November 2018].  
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In Lectures in America (1935), Stein reasons, ‘When I was working with William James 
I learned one thing, that science is continuously busy with the complete description of 
something, with ultimately the complete description of anything, with ultimately the complete 
description of everything.”53 In her draft materials, Stein even subtitles one of the three sections 
for Tender Buttons, ‘Studies in Description’ – manifesting, once more, the philosophical 
connection between her scientific training and literary experiments.54 In Tender Buttons, Stein, 
who made a science of literary composition, therefore formulates a new language of objects, 
manifesting complete descriptions of matter in all its plasticity. For Stein, the description of 
the object must be amended in the operation of reading if it is to communicate its potential for 
transformation, the arbitrary constitution of ontological classification. Tender Buttons is, 
therefore, a composition which physically and psychologically modulates as we are reading – 
assimilating phonetic and descriptive repetitions which facilitate spontaneous connections 
between parts, compelling us to acknowledge the unbearable likeness of matter – departing 
from the original form to produce modifications in the meaning of things. Stein is occupied 
with the complete description of those plastic neurological progressions which occur in the 
human cerebrum when we encounter nonhuman objects in the material world. Tender Buttons 
is therefore a plastic composition, with a mind – a memory – of its own, remembering and 
reacting to sensory interactions with nonhuman objects in the material world, to the 
referentiality of this thing we name language.  As readers or neurotransmitters, we are made 
privy to only those transitory significations of matter which enable us to apprehend reparations 
in the composition. Tender Buttons articulates a maddening glossolalia, for there is always 
more to the plastic composition than the material we are reading. It is (un)stable enough for us 
to distinguish its habitual phonetic and descriptive repetitions, to facilitate its obsessive 
modifications; Stein’s repetitions are habits which modulate and repair our automatic sensory 
comprehensions regarding the nonhuman object, for they never appear in the same condition 
twice.  
For Scherr, ‘poetic language itself becomes an object that Stein touches, strokes, and 
explores with her hands, and in following the dips and curves of both the solid objects she 
names in the titles and language itself.’55 She argues that Tender Buttons vigorously subverts 
the traditional hierarchy of the senses, in which sight and hearing are most often privileged, 
 
53 Stein, Lectures in America (Massachusetts: Little, Brown, and Co., 1957), p. 156.  
54 Stein, ‘Food Studies in Description’ (n.d.), Box 74, Folder 1366, YCAL MSS 76, Beinecke Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library, Yale University. 
55 Scherr, ‘Tactile Erotics’, p. 196.  
97 
 
making touch, which is habitually categorised as a marginal sense, aligned with all that is 
feminine or other, the principal operation by which the speaker encounters the object.56 Just as 
Stein’s titles are often solid objects with the capacity to touch or be touched (‘Cucumber,’ ‘A 
Red Hat,’ ‘Book,’ ‘A New Cup and Saucer’) textures are manifested through her language, 
which strives to adjourn, however momentarily, the plastic brain’s capacity to refer via an 
omittance of the contextualising forces that are visual and sonic description.57 In ‘Objects,’ the 
anonymous speaker therefore appears to interact with the thing at hand in the absence of sight, 
‘The kind of show is made by squeezing’ – ‘Within, within the cut and slender joint alone, with 
sudden equals and no more than three, two in the center make two one side.’58 Reading Renu 
Bora, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick argues that ‘to perceive texture is always, immediately, and de 
facto to be immersed in a field of active narrative hypothesizing, testing, and reunderstanding 
of how physical properties act and are acted upon over time.’59 She concludes, ‘Textural 
perception always explores two other questions as well: How did it get that way? and What 
could I do with it?’60 Stein’s ‘Objects’ condemns reader and speaker alike to conjecture; neither 
is made privy to the proper name of the object, what it does, what it looks, smells, or sounds 
like. This is the age-old guessing game in which the anxious child must plunge their hand 
‘within, within’ the small, dark opening in a box and, ‘squeezing,’ apprehend the thing 
obscured.61 To surmise its identity in the absence of visual or sonic descriptors, we are left only 
with the textural perceptions of Stein’s language, which must become the object. Stein’s 
composition is a dense thing with crudely squared, fricative edges, abruptly spliced with 
commas – a sharp and cutting plosive. In the assemblage, there is a semblance of an 
asymmetrical or geometric shape. Part-metal? Part-wood? Part-concrete? Stein’s descriptors 
grant us the ability us to perceive the pure potentiality of the object, rendering obsolete our 
traditional schemes of knowing.  
According to Moses, ‘If one subtracts from the perception of an object the habit that 
allows the object to be recognised and therefore positioned in a context, one is left only with 
fugitive sensations and potentialities that overwhelm the body’s capacity to act.’62 In the 
absence of visual or sonic descriptors, we are left with unidentifiable, unpalatable, 
 
56 Scherr, ‘Tactile Erotics’, p. 195.  
57 Stein, ‘Cucumber’, Tender Buttons, p. 55; Stein, ‘A Red Hat’, Tender Buttons, p. 19; Stein, ‘Book’, Tender 
Buttons, p. 30; Stein, ‘A New Cup and Saucer’, Tender Buttons, p. 22. 
58 Stein, ‘Objects’, Tender Buttons, p. 22.  
59 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2003), p. 13.  
60 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, p. 13.  
61 Stein, ‘Objects’, p. 22. 
62 Moses, ‘Lively Habits’, p. 134.  
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unimaginable, unnameable things which radically denounce the ontological classifications of 
matter – we cannot name an object without first naming another, then, another. In arresting 
sight and sound, Stein therefore circumvents plastic referentiality, that is, our ability to 
contextualise objects, to distinguish, in an instant, its proper name, ergonomic function, and 
aesthetic value. In reading ‘Objects,’ we therefore touch the possibility of the unnameable thing 
– ‘squeezing’ through the small, dark opening in the box that the composition provides, 
modulating and repairing our physical and psychological comprehensions of the material 
world. Here, the textural perceptions of Stein’s Tender Buttons manifest the thing’s capacity to 
overwhelm – exciting the radical potential of matter once it has been liberated from automatic 
cognition. However, even as we are deprived of the ability to see or hear, Stein acknowledges 
that we are powerless to suspend the plasticity of our brains for long. We seek to contextualise 
and refer – to manufacture significations between things – however arbitrary the pursuit.  
L. T. Fitz therefore associates Stein’s modality of composition with the cubist paintings 
of Pablo Picasso:  
 
We have said that Stein sees Picasso as attempting to express only what is really seen 
by the eye and not what is interpreted by memory. Stein herself presents only those 
aspects of a nonhuman object or a character which present themselves to our five 
senses.63  
 
Here, Fitz is referring to the plastic brain’s capacity to anticipate the other side of the object; 
when sight fails us, when our ability to hear, touch, smell, or taste fails us, the plastic brain 
anticipates, associating the object at hand with some connected, retained memory. When we 
encounter an apple in a bowl, for example, we assume that the other side is round simply 
because this is what we have learnt from turning over other apples. We interact with Stein’s 
experiment in arresting the plastic brain’s ability to contextualise matter through ‘Objects’ – 
she obstructs those senses which dominate automatic cognition so that we might begin to 
experience the material world anew.  
 Fitz’ paper centres on three similarities between Stein and Picasso’s methods: ‘(1) a 
cubist approach; (2) a style which concentrates on what is seen rather than what is remembered; 
and (3) a calligraphic or nonsymbolic concept of language.’64 What, however, is a cubist 
approach to language? The cubist portrait does away with ‘the illusion of depth’ and instead, 
shatters its object, situating its form on one two-dimensional ‘plane’ – it is non-linear and non-
 
63 L. T. Fitz, ‘Gertrude Stein and Picasso: The Language of Surfaces’, American Literature, Vol. 45.2 (1973), 
pp. 228 – 237 (p. 232).  
64 Fitz, ‘Gertrude Stein and Picasso’, p. 230.  
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representational.65 Just as the cubist portrait does away with the focal point, Stein does away 
with spatial notation, metre, and rhyme; Tender Buttons is a manuscript composed in crude 
squares of typographical matter, which does and does not simply communicate.  Stein’s 
‘Objects,’ ‘Food,’ and ‘Rooms’ occupy ambiguous, two-dimensional, white ‘planes’ in which 
the reader is compelled to labour, however arbitrarily, to contextualise the pluripotent matter 
they describe – they are non-linear and non-representational. Tender Buttons, however, 
overwhelms our aptitude for object recognition, that is, our hypothetical mastery over the 
material world; Stein’s compositions accost readers with the plasticity of other people, 
language, the order of things, poems. Perhaps it is the cubist technique of Stein’s Tender 
Buttons that has continually perplexed readers and critics. Perhaps it is the cubist technique of 
Stein’s Tender Buttons that prevents us, quite extraordinarily, from realising this desire; our 
plastic brains synthesise, repair, contextualise, but Tender Buttons resists. We assign it 
connotation: ‘Tender Buttons is a series of cubist portraits’ or ‘Tender Buttons is a semi-
autobiographical text on Stein’s physical and psychological relationship with her female lover,’ 
but Tender Buttons modulates, revelling in its plasticity.  
 In her 1913 poem, ‘Sacred Emily,’ Stein famously pens, ‘Rose is a rose is a rose is a 
rose’ – a line which would become a refrain throughout her work, variations of it appearing in 
Operas and Plays, The World is Round, Alphabets and Birthdays, Stanzas in Meditation, 
Lectures in America, As Fine as Melanctha, Bee Time Vine, and, finally, Four in America.66 It 
asserts the materiality of language on the reader; the name of an object is an object is the name 
of an object. We are (perhaps justly) suspicious of its certainty – it provokes contradiction, 
anxiety. Here, Stein compels her readers to interrogate the functionality of language; as she 
contends in Lectures in America, ‘Nouns are the name of anything and anything is named [...] 
but do they go on just using the name until perhaps they do not know what the name is or if 
they do know what the name is do they not care about what the name is.’67 For Stein, those 
neuronal pathways which allow us to recognise, remember, and repeat the structures of 
language are so often stimulated that they have become routine. Stein’s ‘Rose is a rose is a rose 
is a rose’ therefore confronts readers, once more, with the volatility of a language which directs 
cognition, which has transformed the physical and psychological constitution of the human 
cerebrum, which has rendered proper nouns and formal syntax obsolete,  manipulating 
 
65 Tate Britain, Cubism (2018) <https://www.tate.org.uk/art/art-terms/c/cubism> [Accessed 09 November 2018].  
66 University of Pennsylvania, Stein’s Rose (2017) <http://writing.upenn.edu/library/Stein-Gertrude_Rose-is-a-
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67 Stein, Lectures in America, pp. 325 – 326.  
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language into becoming meaningless. It compels us to read, read again. Stein’s experiment 
momentarily apprehends the communicative function of language, that is, the referentiality of 
the plastic brain. On close reading, however, the reader may begin to perceive those invisible, 
embedded remains of punctuation in the clause; perhaps it is not ‘Rose is a rose is a rose is a 
rose’ but ‘Rose is a rose? Is a rose? Is a rose?’ What is, after all rose-like about the rose? Does 
a rose exist, outside of the found material that is language? How has the name, rose, come to 
signify the object, rose, so completely? If a rose is not a rose by any other name, a rose is a rose 
by its name. Despite Stein’s overwhelming desire to do away with meaning, there are meanings 
in her description. Our language is a plastic thing, though we do not yet know it. Our language 
is a plastic thing, though we are just beginning to know it. As Joseph Lehrer explains, ‘Stein’s 
experimental failure, her inability to make prose entirely meaningless, was her greatest 
achievement. Although she aimed for obscurity, her art still resonates. Why? Because the 
structure of language – a structure that her words expose – is part of the structure of the brain.’68 
In making meaning in Stein’s ‘failed’ literary experiments, perhaps readers have been 
supporting what Stein confirmed about the referentiality of language, about the structure of the 
human cerebrum, all along, quite unwittingly – that our plastic brains must make meaning in 
literary compositions, that there must be synaptic junctions between Stein’s phrases. 
 
DEVELOPMENTAL PLASTICITY: THE BARONESS ELSA VON FREYTAG-
LORINGHOVEN, SPATIAL NOTATION AND PORTMANTEU  
 
If there are synaptic junctions between Stein’s words, words are the Baroness Elsa von Freytag-
Loringhoven’s synaptic junctions. We do not know the function or form of those neuronal 
pathways in which her synapse-words participate, but there must be a logic to them, for her 
compositions revel in the manifestation of plastic operations – synthesising, modulating, 
repairing, terminating associations between word, object, and meaning in response to stimuli 
in the material world. For Irene Gammel, the Baroness enjoyed a dynamic, artistic connection 
with ordinary objects, adorning herself with an eclectic wardrobe of assemblage and ready-
made accessories – ‘a bra made of tomato cans, celluloid curtain rings covering her arms as 
bracelets, a blinking battery taillight on the bustle of her dress’ are but a small assortment of 
her fashions.69 Just as she transforms the use-value of the common object in her art, the 
 
68 Lehrer, Proust was a Neuroscientist, p. 167.  
69 Irene Gammel, ‘She Strips Naked: The Poetry of Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven’, The Literary Review, Vol. 
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Baroness’ poetry overturns the boundary between what has traditionally been considered 
‘poetry’ and ‘trash’. Certainly, her eclectic poetics are not the sort to be measured in metrics 
or consort with some ancient, pre-meditated form. For Gammel, the Baroness’ poetry ‘slashed 
the English syntax, dispensed with sentences, and used word columns for onomatopoeic sound 
effects and flexible meaning’ – dealing a ‘death blow to the old, comatose language to create a 
new chemistry’ between word, sound, construction, and meaning.70 Like Stein, the Baroness 
sought to radically overwhelm the mundanity of ordinary, grammatical, communicative 
language. The Baroness’ experimental praxes, however, often transcended the literary 
composition; her Enduring Ornament (1913), her famous birdcage hat (with live bird), and her 
starring role in the 1921 film by Man Ray and Marcel Duchamp: Baroness Elsa von Freytag-
Loringhoven Shaves her Pubic Hair are all strategically devised to render ordinary matter 
strange, abject, thingly. It is perhaps due to her excessive, interruptive methodologies that the 
Baroness was ultimately censored from mainstream magazines, and with time, The Little 
Review, which had previously championed her compositions alongside those of James Joyce.71 
Though Lapin contends that the Baroness’ work demands a readership for its ‘high humour 
and plastic approach to language,’ she does not grant any further attention to the revolutionary 
plasticity of her compositions.72 In light of this, I consider the Baroness’ compositions as 
rigorous experiments in developmental plasticity – articulating the slippery continuum between 
‘the completeness of form and the possibility of its disintegration’ which organises the human 
cerebrum.73 
 For Gammel and Zelazo, the Baroness’ compositions are ‘multisensual’ – ‘not simply 
visually, acoustically, and orally charged, but also as kinaesthetic and tactile, and deeply 
aromatic’ – things which compel the ‘reader, listener, viewer [to] sense as she does, and act her 
will.’74 Though Gammel and Zelazo are principally referring to the multisensuality of the 
Baroness’ sound poetry, it must be acknowledged that their conclusions are similarly apposite 
for her printed manuscripts, in which phrases are abstracted from the comfort of the left margin, 
and confounded with rough diagrams and faux mathematical equations. They manifest the 
latent plurality of people, language, objects, stimulating compulsive repetitions of repetitions, 
which modify themselves in the operation of reading. They are messy, loud, outlandish 
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compositions, penned in her notorious sharp-edged, all-caps scrawl, which herald the radical 
potential of all that is unpalatable, all that is unnameable. I argue that the Baroness’ 
compositions revel in excess, coercing readers to negotiate plasticity – exciting those arbitrary 
connections between multi-sensory stimuli in the material world. For Julie Godspeed-
Chadwick, the Baroness was ‘so far ahead of her time that her performances could not register 
as anything other than grotesque’ – she is ‘an abject subject due to her excesses’ – we 
experience a primitive anxiety, a repugnance, a queasiness, during physical and psychological 
interactions with radical matter, which disrupts the ontological classification of things.75 I 
contend that the Baroness’ rigorous appropriations of portmanteaux, typography, echolalia, and 
spatial notation are plastic, synthesising, modulating, repairing, and terminating our habituative 
apperceptions of the literary composition. The Baroness’ compositions, after all, actuate a 
fundamental criterion of plasticity: plasticity is not the absence of form, but the possibility of 
its transformation.  
 The Baroness’ ‘Subjoyride’ (1919) is a composition occupied with the materiality of 
our language, and the plastic method of its acquisition and amendment; as Lappin explains, 
‘Impressed with the advertising slogans designed to publicize the new consumer products of 
the twenties, Elsa created a new genre of poetry […] pieced together from scraps of advertising 
language.’76 For Lappin, the Baroness’ experiments culminate in ‘ready-made poems’ – 
manufactured from temporal images of commodified objects, detached from their contexts, and 
slogans adapted from those popular billboard advertisements circulating around New York 
City.77 Arranging her found material into stanzas, the Baroness fabricates a product which 
resembles this thing we name a poem: 
 
Wake up your passengers — 
 Large and small — to ride 
 On pins — dirty erasers and 
 Knifes 
 These three graces operate slot 
 for 5 cents. 
 Don’t envy Aunt Jemima’s 
 Self raising crackerjack 
 Laxative knitted chemise 
 With that chocolaty 
 
75 Julie Godspeed-Chadwick, ‘Reconsidering the Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven and Kay Boyle: 
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 Taste — use pickles in pattern 
 Follow green lyons.78 
 
With its appropriation of ‘Aunt Jemima,’ the composition actuates neuroplastic function – the 
human cerebrum’s facility to assimilate multi-sensory stimuli in the material word with 
previously retained experiences, spontaneously collating past and present encounters with 
things to form cohesive apperceptions.  For the Baroness, twentieth-century commodity culture 
is so pervasive that slogans, advertisements, and products may overwhelm the human subject’s 
cognitions as they encounter other people, language, and objects in the milieu. Because we 
continually interact with brands or branding, those neural pathways associated with saleable 
goods are repeatedly stimulated concurrently with others, and ‘when two neurons fire at the 
same time repeatedly (or when one fires, causing another to fire), chemical changes occur in 
both, so that the two tend to connect more strongly.’79 Subsequently, when one neuron is 
excited, the other is concurrently. Associative memory is established and retained, however 
arbitrarily. As Kimberly Lamm asserts, ‘by the time the Baroness wrote this poem in 1919, 
‘Aunt Jemima’ and ‘Crackerjack’ had become ubiquitous as products and brands. Boxes of 
Crackerjacks began to offer a small plastic prize in 1912, which made them highly sought after, 
and in 1914, the image of Aunt Jemima was popular enough that the Pearl Milling Company 
was named after her.’80 Simulating the arbitrary, referential process which links recurrences of 
‘Aunt Jemima’ in twentieth-century women’s magazines, radio advertisements,  billboards, 
and the original pancake and waffle mix on the domestic kitchen shelf or awaiting purchase at 
the supermarket, to disparate matter, ‘Subjoyride’ articulates the physical and psychological 
(dis)equilibrium of the human cerebrum, between logic and madness. The linguistic matter that 
is acquired and appropriated by ‘Subjoyride’ is overwhelmed with synaptic junctions which 
facilitate the concurrent excitation of two or more meanings, connecting slogans and 
merchandise with the cityscape, all its human and nonhuman litter – ‘passengers,’ ‘dirty 
erasers,’ ‘Knives,’ ‘5 cents,’ ‘pickles’ – in an overload of multi-sensory matter. We cannot 
know for certain which neuronal pathways are stimulated in the plastic brain of the composition 
to establish or retain the connections between ‘Aunt Jemima’ and ‘green lyons,’ for it 
synthesises meaning as we read; it does not corroborate one before exciting the next. Just as 
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the Baroness’ costumes, performances, and sculptures render common matter strange, her 
poems appropriate the communicative function of language to actuate its radical neuroplastic 
potential – to articulate the material world in all its excess. ‘Subjoyride’ stimulates the reader 
to modulate arbitrary connections, to act as neurotransmitters regulating ambiguities between 
the complex synaptic junctions that are words. Our language is a plastic thing, though we are 
just beginning to know it.  
 In her correspondence with Djuna Barnes, the Baroness provides some supportive 
contextualising material on her unorthodox composition process. She considers merging 
simultaneous drafts of a poem, printing ‘Firstling’ and ‘He’ (1923 – 1924) on one page:  
 
What is interesting about the 2 together is their vast difference of emotion — time 
knowledge — pain. That is why they should be printed together. For they are 1 + 2 the 
same poem — person sentiment life stretch between one — divided — assembled — 
dissembled.81  
 
For Tanya Clement, ‘versioning for the Baroness was more than a method to arrive at some 
final, perfect poem’; instead, versioning produced a sort of ‘transtextual dialog’ within the 
poem.82 Though Clement does not name it so, the Baroness’ methodology is certainly 
neuroplastic; what Clement terms ‘transtextual dialog’ may also be considered a formal 
manifestation of the human cerebrum’s ability to acquire knowledge, to modulate its physical 
and psychological organisation through experience, to regenerate after injury (necrosis) or cell 
death (apoptosis). The Baroness’ intent to articulate the complex development of a poem, a 
person, continually ‘divided — assembled — dissembled’, parallels Malabou’s assertion that 
plasticity articulates the slippery continuum between ‘the completeness of form and the 
possibility of its disintegration.’83 The Baroness recognises the operational contradictions that 
regulate poetry and people simultaneously, both of which are stable enough to maintain the 
coherency in form, yet unstable enough to experience absurd formal transformations in direct 
response to encounters with other people, language, and objects. In her correspondence, the 
Baroness therefore outlines a plastic methodology for composition in which the printed 
manuscript is erected from its prior iterations, in direct response to encounters with other 
compositions, which permanently modulate its form and content. Here, the original draft – that 
is, the neuronal genesis of the plastic composition – undergoes apoptosis as the Baroness 
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meticulously terminates and then assimilates its phrases, phonetic patterns, punctuation. 
Synaptogenesis occurs, followed by synaptoterminus.  
 There is a developmental plasticity in the genetic execution of the composition, for 
‘determinacy and nondeterminism cross paths in an astonishing way’ in its regulation.84 As 
Malabou contends, this genetically coded ‘template’ of the human cerebrum is ‘then refined 
(sculpted) during development and, in a subtler but always powerful way, throughout life. The 
nervous activity of pre-established circuits thus takes over from apoptotic sculpting.’85 The 
Baroness’ methodology develops the grammatically or ‘genreically’ coded structure of the 
composition through the plastic operation of versioning – modulating the linguistic activity, 
that is, the connotations of those pre-established sentences in the original draft. After, the 
meaning of the composition is subtly refined through its encounters with readers. There can be 
no return to the original form. Like Stein’s manuscript for Tender Buttons, in which ‘Food,’ 
‘Objects,’ and ‘Rooms’ are compulsively reordered, there is a plasticity to the Baroness’ 
methodology, for both synthesise, modulate, repair, and terminate connections between 
arbitrarily related parts. Material is material is material. Whilst the neuroplastic action of 
Tender Buttons is primarily contingent on its readers and the referentiality of their human 
cerebra, the Baroness’ methodology manifests neuroplastic action in the white matter of the 
page, actuating psychological and physical modification through versioning.  
 It is possible, therefore, to examine neuronal pathways in the Baroness’ spatial 
notations. In a handwritten draft for ‘Orchard Farming’ (1927), for example, the Baroness 
employs linear annotations to function as neurotransmitters, conveying signals between 
synapse-words, across the chemical junction of the page:  
 
 
84 Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, p. 21.  

























The Baroness excites connections between ‘Burning’ and ‘Contrast’ –  between ‘Contrast’ and 
‘That/Popps/With/Fruits’ (see Figure 4) – in annotations which render the complex neuronal 
pathways between words, on which linguistic communication relies, palpable to the reader.86 
Here, the composition foregrounds its neuroplastic materiality, experimenting with its ability 
to associate words with things, to modulate the connotations of words, to appropriate words for 
operation within a particular context. The Baroness expends one or two words per line only, 
producing voids within the composition in which the reader’s plastic brain must anticipate 
when, how, or if the next line will contextualise or review the last. Localised within the 
sentence, a word may revel in plastic ambiguity (we cannot know for certain what links ‘Dung’ 
 
86 Freytag-Loringhoven, ‘Orchard Farming’, Body Sweats, p. 129. 
Figure 4: Freytag-Loringhoven, 'Orchard Farming', Body Sweats, p. 129. 
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and ‘Space’ or ‘Buff’ and ‘Sulphur’) or may shut down, reduced to its dictionary definition, so 
that the sentence may mean for the sake of meaning something to communicate. In ‘Heir’ (1924 
– 1915), the Baroness rigorously examines this process, as ‘Love = Rhythm – / Rhythm = Logic 
– / Logic = Beauty – / Beauty = Sense – / Sense = Love’. Synaptic modulation occurs between 
word and punctuation, where the word means and subsequently means differently in context, 
when subtracted from or equated with other words.87 The Baroness’ compositions therefore 
render the opening up and shutting down of the word (which is habitually overlooked in any 
text; it is happening now, in this thesis) material. There is a plasticity to her writing, which 
modifies the connotations of words by connecting two or more via linear neurotransmitters; 
they propagate one or two-word lines which rapidly detach and reattach word to context (there 
are junctions between words; the word is a junction), exciting their plastic ambiguity. The 
Baroness’ compositions are brain-like – they stimulate, modulate, and terminate the neuronal 
pathways between words in the plastic operation of reading.  
 In ‘To Home’ (1923) the Baroness’ dash-like notations order neuronal pathways in the 
composition, communicating the semblance of a stimulus that the reader is not privy to, which 
excites chemical activity in the synapse word. The Baroness renders this chemical activity in 
the sonance of her synapse-words, which hiss, toot, and whir in excitation:   
 
Twirrly — whirrly — green-gem-studded-deep miriardbreasted —  
spume milk laced — carbonpaper — tinsel — tinfoil tinted —  
frothknit — crochet — scallop filigree — galloping — stamping  
horse —88 
 
The Baroness’ synapse-words modulate networks between phonetic patterns, which refer to 
and bear a likeness to each other (the plosive ‘p’ of ‘galloping’ and ‘stamping’ – the assonance 
of ‘twirrly’ and ‘whirrly’); they assimilate repetitions, ‘tinsel’ and ‘tinfoil tinted,’ in which the 
second syllable-word repairs the meaning of ‘tin’ and all its grammatically coded associations. 
Ordered with dash-like notations, the Baroness’ compositions exacerbate the plastic 
connections between sign, sound, and sense. They assure the reader that there is or must be a 
logic to their order, however arbitrary. There is a formal dissolution, then, as the 
neurotransmitters facilitating these referential connections begin to disintegrate:  
Swish — sh — sh — sh — sh —  
Sish —  
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Sish —  
Sh — sh — sh — sh —  
S—s—s—s—r—r—r—r—  
Suuuuuuu —  
Suuuuuu  
Suu — suu — suu — s — s — s — s — s — 
Sushpl —  
Pl — pl — — up —  
Plup lup — p — lup p —  
Llllup — ee — ee ee —  
Ee — ee — ee — — — —  
Sussa — tout!89 
 
This is the guttural, excessive, delirious clamour of the Baroness’ sound poetry. There, in its 
sibilance, a semiotic babble, a susurration of aluminium foil, a hiss of water through a faucet, 
a rasping, a tearing, a popping in the plosives. For Richard Kostelanetz, ‘though superficially 
playful, text-sound art embodies serious thinking about the possibilities of vocal expression 
and communication; it represents not a substitute for language but an expansion of our verbal 
powers.’90 Here, there are dashes to fire sound-neurons, to synthesise, to modulate, to terminate 
the productive connections between sound and sense; these dashes are stammers, the babbling 
echolalia of a child that is learning why and how to speak, ‘dislocating and liberating meaning 
in an on-going proliferation of fissions and fusions.’91 Finally, the Baroness compels the reader 
to relive their earliest requisitions of the plastic material that is language in childhood, when 
the shapes and sounds of letters were strange, their order negotiable – when those neuronal 
pathways between sign, sound, and sense were not absolutely formed, but still in the abstract 
process of formation. The Baroness’ sound poems grant us the ability to perceive the pure 
potentiality of language, rendering obsolete our traditional schemes of communication.  
 For Francesca Chiappini, the Baroness’ spelling ‘oddities’ and ‘word-formations’ are 
another dominating trait of her work; where there is no word for what she seeks to articulate, 
she constructs another, often merging German and English.92 Chiappini posits that the Baroness 
has a ‘physical, manual relationship with language, which she treats like modelling clay’ – 
kneading, splicing, pinching, grafting, squeezing, pounding letters into words (old and new, 
hybrid, multi-lingual) to air-dry on the page. There is a textural sensitivity in the Baroness’ 
 
89 Freytag-Loringhoven, ‘To Home’, Body Sweats, p. 186. 
90 Richard Kostelanetz, Text-Sound Texts (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1980), p. 16. 
91 Gammel and Zelazo, ‘Harpsichords Metallic Howl’, p. 269.  
92 Francesca Chiappini, ‘Spelling Errors as a Cry of Protest: The Idiosyncratic Language of the Baroness Elsa 
von Freytag-Loringhoven’, Altre Modernità, Vol. 1 (2017), pp.190 – 203 (p. 198).  
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compositions, similar to that of Stein’s ‘Objects’ which, in the absence of visual or sonic 
descriptors, manifest the thing’s capacity to overwhelm. The Baroness, however, excites the 
radical potential of linguistic matter, once liberated from automatic communication, in 
portmanteaux or neologisms. Though Chiappini does not refer to plasticity in relation to the 
Baroness, modelling this sticky, supple thing we name language like clay, it conjures 
Malabou’s analogy of the artist sculpting a block of marble:  
 
Plastic material retains an imprint and thereby resists endless polymorphism. This is 
the case, for instance, with sculpted marble. Once the statue is finished, there is no 
possible return to the indeterminacy of the starting point. So plasticity designates 
solidity as much as suppleness, designates the definitive character of the imprint, of 
configuration, or of modification.93 
 
Whilst the Baroness’ portmanteaux or neologisms retain a semblance of the grammatically 
coded material, that is, the primary word, they are physically modified – they are assimilated, 
affixed to one and other in such a way that their psychological meaning is permanently mutated. 
There is ‘solidity as much as suppleness’ in the portmanteau and it borders on a madness.94 Its 
type-set manifestation on the white matter of the page resists polymorphism, and yet a 
transformation has surely taken place in ‘phalluspistol,’ ‘spinsterlollipop,’ ‘kissclangor,’ 
‘amatriculate,’ ‘fieldadmarshmiralshall,’ or ‘laurellaquergreen’.95 There can be no return to the 
original form. These are rebel words which should not, according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, exist. The Baroness’ portmanteaux or neologisms are grotesque, excessive, plastic 
words, which simply will not mean for the sake of communication. They synthesise, modulate, 
and repair arbitrary connections between things, revelling in the referentiality of language. 
They contemptuously flaunt their abject materialities, that is, the radical plasticity of their 
composition, formed in the peculiar image of their creator, adorned in her tomato can bra, 
celluloid curtain ring bracelets, and birdcage hat, which transform the aesthetic value or 
ergonomic function of ordinary matter just as her poems render obsolete the mundanity of our 
grammatical, communicative language. 
 For their maddening, excessive, garbled contributions to the literary world, the 
Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven and Gertrude Stein must therefore be acknowledged 
 
93 Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, p. 15. 
94 Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, p. 15. 
95 Freytag-Loringhoven, ‘Cosmic Chemistry’, Body Sweats, p. 153; Freytag-Loringhoven, ‘A Dozen Cocktails – 
Please’, Body Sweats, p. 48; Freytag-Loringhoven, ‘Last Gesture’, Body Sweats, p. 134; Freytag-Loringhoven, 
‘Ultramundanity’, Body Sweats, p. 164; Freytag-Loringhoven, ‘To Home’, Body Sweats, p. 185; Freytag-
Loringhoven, ‘Haunt’, Body Sweats, p. 232.  
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as pioneers of those plastic modes of writing that twenty-first century writers, with their modern 
comprehension of the human cerebrum and its developmental, modulational, and reparative 
plasticity, are only just beginning to articulate through this thing we name the literary text. 
From Stein’s linguistic habits, which are radically modified via repetition in direct response to 
multi-sensory interactions with things in the material world, to the Baroness’ plastic spatial 
notations and neologisms, which may repair or terminate the neural pathways between word, 
meaning, and object, there can be no return to obsolete modes of composition. Through their 
rigorous experiments into the peripheral limits of cognitive function and the grammatically 
coded material that is language, Stein and the Baroness therefore activate the pure potentiality 
of plastic composition, its revolutionary dexterity to signify, once and for all, the material world 
in all its plurality – synthesising, exciting, modulating, repairing, and terminating the synaptic 
connections between people, language, and things. We must, therefore, actuate a critical 
modification to our habitual comprehensions of Stein and the Baroness, acknowledging their 
notoriety as literary scientists, whose radical and intellectually rigorous experiments in 
language prefigured plastic modes of composition – stimulating a permanent alteration in the 
physical and psychological chemistry of the text. After all, the formulation of neuroplasticity 
perhaps confirms what academics have argued all along about literary modernism – that it 
excites a powerful articulation of the slippery continuum between annihilation and creation, 
solidity and malleability, tradition and experiment. To this end, I therefore contribute the 
contention that modernist literary objects, in all their uncanny, enchanting, defamiliarized, 
abject, or thingly dimensions, excite a powerful articulation of the slippery continuum between 
human subject and nonhuman object, denouncing anthropocentric rhetoric, and alerting readers 
to the overwhelming plasticity of the material world in which they participate. The modernist 
object, after all, has always been plastic, though we are just beginning to know it. The human 
subject and nonhuman object, after all, have always been plastic, though we are just beginning 
to know it. The literary text, after all, has always been plastic, though we are just beginning to 








THE TEXT IS A PLASTIC THING:  
A MANIFESTO 
 
BEFORE PLASTICITY – the semblance of absurd rigidity – BEFORE PLASTICITY – 
knowledge and no knowledge on the method of its acquisition or adaptation or application – 
BEFORE PLASTICITY – form and the absence of veridical form – BEFORE 
PLASTICITY – the ludicrous belief that you, dear reader, are useless and absolutely 
unresponsive matter – BEFORE PLASTICITY – communicative language – BEFORE 
PLASTICITY – categorical negation, that is, oblivion –  
BECAUSE BEFORE 
PLASTICITY THERE WAS 
ALWAYS PLASTICITY!  
We, after all, have always been plastic. Our language, after all, has always been plastic, 
though we could not yet know it – though we are just beginning to know it. 
Plasticity is etymologically derived from the Greek word plassein (to mould); ‘it means at once 
the capacity to receive form […] and the capacity to give form.’1 Those neuronal pathways 
which comprise our brains, our texts, are simultaneously ‘formable’ and ‘formative’ – 
modifiable, malleable, metamorphosing things which are partially genetically coded, that is, 
genreically coded, that is, grammatically coded, and partially derived from our personal 
encounters with the material world, with other people, language, texts, and nonhuman objects.2  
YOU ARE NOT A MATTER OF BEING THE RIGHT 
CELLS AT THE RIGHT TIME.  
 
1 Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, trans by. Sebastian Rand (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008), p. 5. 
2 Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, p. 4 – 5. 
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THE TEXT IS NOT A MATTER OF BEING THE 
RIGHT WORDS AT THE RIGHT TIME.  
BEFORE PLASTICITY – the abstraction of genre, the hypothesis of definition and 
definitions for the sake of meaning anything at all – BEFORE PLASTICITY – was the poem 
poetic, was the novel novel, was the short story sufficiently short or the play particularly 
playful?  
BEFORE PLASTICITY – text was simply text, that is, it should appear to you, dear reader, 
in perennial and omniscient forms – BEFORE PLASTICITY – categorical negation, that is, 
delirium –  
BECAUSE BEFORE 




BETWEEN FORMS!  
and yet – BEFORE PLASTICITY – slippages between forms were grotesque and 
surreptitious things – BEFORE PLASTICITY – all hybridity was profanity, that is, mutation, 
that is, distasteful, that is, punishable by law of genre – BEFORE PLASTICITY – 
dictionaries, that is, the farcical conviction that a word is as good as a word is word which 
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should mean analogously every other sentence – BEFORE PLASTICITY – the knowledge 
that our language has never been abiding nor authentic! 
(Our language, after all, has always been plastic, though 
we are just beginning to know that etymology is revision 
and remembrance and returning and revolution is 
translation, is portmanteau, is the breeding of words, is the 
conceiving of words, is neologism. Here, a habit in which 
Sigmund Freud’s examination of the etymology of the 
Germanic word, heimlich, signifies the plasticity of all 
language, in which the word heimlich ‘merges with its 
formal antonym, unheimlich, so that which is heimlich 
becomes unheimlich,’ in which the word, heimlich, 
becomes the other as you are looking. 3 There can be no 
return to the original form –  
and let it be known that our language is volatile matter, 
that plastic language excites, modulates, repairs, and 
terminates those neuronal connections between word, 
meaning, and object as it is used in a sentence or a stanza 
–  
and portmanteau, that is, neologism, means that a word 
may retain a semblance of its grammatically coded 
material as it is physically modified – as two or more 
words are assimilated, affixed to one and other in such a 
way that their psychological meaning is permanently 
mutated. Synaptogenesis, followed by synaptoterminus. 
These are rebel words, unimaginable words, delirious 
words, unpalatable words, excessive words, 
uncategorizable words, plastic words, which do not 
simply mean for the sake of communication, but for 
naming things our old language never new to name 
 
3 Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny (London: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 132, (first publ. in Imago, Vol. 5 (1919), pp. 
297 – 324).  
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neuroplasticity, that is, the plasticity of the cerebrum, that 
is, the plasticity of our language, that is, the plasticity of 
the nonhuman object.) 
BEFORE PLASTICITY – there could be no human subject or nonhuman object – BEFORE 
PLASTICITY – the pure potentiality of things in the presence of the pluripotent subject – 
BEFORE PLASTICITY – there could be no acquisition of knowledge or adaption or 
application of language to things, the thing that is language – BEFORE PLASTICITY – no 
remembering, no repairing, no revolutionizing the relations between language and the functions 
and forms of other things – BEFORE PLASTICITY – no slippages between human subject 
and nonhuman object, for all slippages revel in plastic materialities, that is, physical and 
psychological modifications to the original that is not the original that is original is not original.  
(All matter is plastic, though we are just beginning to 
know it.) 
PLASTICITY IS NOT  
THE ABSENCE  
OF FORM,  





BEFORE PLASTICITY – you, as you know it, could not exist – BEFORE PLASTICITY 
– the text, as we know it, could not exist – BEFORE PLASTICITY – no lyric, no essay, no 
elegy, no ballad, no sonnet, no fable, no epic, no limerick, no biography, no autobiography, no 
review, no fantasy, no legend, no sequel, no musical, no tragicomedy, no gothic romance, no 
prose poem, no play poem, no film poem, no visual poem, no hypertext, no thesis, no creative 
criticism, and absolutely no manifesto! 
(And let it be known that the ‘manifesto moment 
positions itself between what has been done and what 
will be done, between the accomplished and the 
potential, in a radical and energizing division,’ that the 
manifesto has always been plastic – 
that the manifesto oscillates between the formed and all 
that has yet to be formed, operating between past, 
present, and possibility is continually modified 
throughout the history of modernism in response to 
encounters with these things we name other people 
language, and nonhuman objects –  
that the manifesto stutters, screams obscenities –  
that the manifesto revels in excess, a plastic performance 
– 
that the manifesto is a ‘going past what is thought of as 
proper, sane, and literary,’ for it operates beyond and 
between genres, beyond and between the logic grammar 
and all that is ungrammatical, absurd, or irrational –  
that the manifesto ‘form creates its meaning.’)4  
Plasticity is not the absence of form, but the acknowledgement that form could not be form is 
not form in the absence of movement, that is, deviation, that is, adjustment, that is, revision. 
Plasticity is not the absence of form, but is between form and formlessness, that is, the 
 
4 Mary Ann Caws, ‘The Poetics of the Manifesto: Nowness and Newness’ in Manifesto: A Century of Isms, ed. 
by Caws (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), pp. xix – xxxii (p. xxi, xx, xx).  
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acknowledgement that there can be no possible return to the original that is not original but 
nonetheless originary.    
PLASTICITY = MODULATION = PLASTICITY = MODIFICATION 
All form is the interrogation of bodies, the transience of bodies. All form is the modification 
of bodies, to better recollect the material condition of plastic bodies as they are encountered in 
the material world – between stability and instability, between coherence and incoherence, 
between form and formlessness is not the absence of form but the possibility of its 
transformation.  
We revel in the plasticity of defamiliarized, abject, thingly form 
– in the compulsion to smell, touch, see, taste, hear the material 
world and all its absurdity anew.  
We riot in the formation and stimulation and annihilation and 
formation of synaptic junctions between word, meaning, and 
object over, and over, and over again – there can be no possible 
return to the original.  
The plastic text, after all, is a maddening, overwhelming, noisy thing, which does and does not 
resemble. It is not concerned with naming, but the process of naming – the tensions between 
matters and form and language and objects and the slippages and the possibilities of matters 
and form and language and objects and glossolalia is not a simple oscillation of phonetic matter, 
but of synapses:  
We become neurotransmitters –  
detonate, excite, synthesise connections between sound – word – 
thing – memory – and sometimes, we do not make it, sometimes, 
the junction is too vast, sometimes, meaning is pluralised –  
and we are caught in the process of naming, that is, the process 
of un-naming. 
And let it be known that the plastic anatomy of the human cerebrum is the plastic anatomy of 
this thing we name and un-name a literary text and –  
(Though the basic structure of the human cerebrum is 
genetically coded – though the basic structure of the 
literary text is grammatically and genreically coded – the 
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human cerebrum undergoes developmental plasticity 
over time, growth, maturation, encounters with other 
people, language, and nonhuman objects modify and kill 
neuronal connections, the literary text undergoes 
developmental plasticity over time, interpretation, 
revising, encounters with other people, language, and 
nonhuman objects modify and kill neuronal connections. 
Then, synaptic modulation in human cerebrum and the 
literary text, which must repair, relapse, return, renew, 
remember, relinquish itself with every iteration – 
synaptogenesis, followed by synaptoterminus – there can 
be no return to the original form.) 
axons transmit information from neurones and dendrites receive information from neurones 
and you, reader, are axon and dendrite simultaneously – and the authorial ‘I’ is both axon and 
dendrite simultaneously – language is both axon and dendrite simultaneously – and these things 
happen, these things are partially contingent on who or what is encountering and –  
THE PLASTICITY OF THINGS = THE PLASTICITY OF US = THE 
PLASTICITY OF HUMAN MATTER = THE PLASTICITY OF NONHUMAN 
MATTER = THE PLASTICITY OF THE LITERARY TEXT =  
the plasticity of pen caps – of bottle caps – of pipe caps – 
of balloon clips – and hair pins – and paperclips – and 
hindlimbs – and hosiery – and handguns – and shrunken 
heads – and soft root vegetables – and soft grey matter – 
and soft white matter – and mothers – and metaphors – and 
six loose teeth from a comb – and  
let it be known that plasticity is the radical recognition of 
the porosity of matter, that is, the formative continuums 
between things, that is, the possibility of slippages between 
things that are physical and psychological –   
because all matter is plastic, all meaning is plastic – and  
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there can be no return to the original form, for in 
communicating the plasticity of things, language and 
grammar border on a collapse we call creation, for in 
communicating the plasticity of human subjects and 
nonhuman objects, the classifications border on a collapse 
we call creation – and all plasticity is collapsation – and 
creation – and collapsation – and creation – and 
contradiction – and collapsation – and connection – and – 
and – and  
let it be known that all bodies (human bodies, nonhuman 
bodies, literary bodies) are assemblages of parts: part-
grammar, part-genetics, part-genre, part-synapse, part-
silence, part-reader, part-remembrance, part-revelation, 




STABILITY IS  
THE SEMBLANCE OF INSTABILITY –  
AGAINST  
RIGIDITY –   
FOR  
REFERENTIALITY –  
   FOR  
   POLYPHONY –  
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THERE CAN BE NO POSSIBLE RETURN  
TO THE ORIGINAL FORM –  
AGAINST  
THIS THING WE NAME 
COHERENCY  
IN COMMUNICATION  
IS THE SEMBLANCE OF 
INCOHERENCE –  
FOR 
THE COMPLETENESS  
OF FORM –   
FOR 
THE POSSIBILITY  
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ADAPTATION,  
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THE READY-MADE – 
FOR  
SOLIDITY –  
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IS THE SEMBLANCE  
OF STABILITY – 
FOR  
THE ACQUISITION  
OF THIS FOUND MATERIAL  
WE NAME LANGUAGE – 
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FOR  




IN COMMUNICATION IS  
THE SEMBLANCE  
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   MATERIAL IS  
   MATERIAL IS – 







because all plasticity is intervention, is mediation, is subversion, is the relational poetics of 
things – we cannot name one thing without naming another, and another, and another!  
We revel in plasticity as the reactive poetics of things, a 
plasticity which repairs, redacts, repeats on the synapses 
between things and nouns, between real and remembered things, 
between found and formed nouns –  
because the plastic brain hoards, catalogues ordinary matter, because the plastic text assembles, 
modifies ordinary matter, there can be no transformation without form!  
Form, after all, is not absent but permanently altered, and these literary things, dear reader, you 
encounter are deviation of deviations are not deviations but deviations, nonetheless. 
(The text is a plastic thing, though we are just beginning 
to know it.) 
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All texts have a functioning memory of their own, they refer back to themselves, they return to 
other texts, they repair, develop, modulate, they repeat absent scenes from the material world 
of other people, language, nonhuman objects.  
And because the plastic text is a relational, reparative, reactive, referential thing, you must be 
responsible for its meanings – there must be synaptic junctions between its words, there must 
be neuronal pathways between its phrases!  
WHAT SHOULD WE DO WITH OUR BRAIN? 
WHAT SHOULD WE DO WITH OUR TEXT?  
1. Bring portmanteau, that is neologism, that is ‘phalluspistol,’ ‘spinsterlollipop,’ 
‘kissclangor,’ ‘amatriculate,’ ‘fieldadmarshmiralshall,’ or ‘laurellaquergreen’ or the 
breeding words.5 
2. Bring fragmentation. A semblance simultaneity, of splicing of slicing of synthesising 
form. Fragmentation is not the absence of form but the modification of form, the 
mutilation of form, the making of other forms. An asymmetrical arrangement of lines, 
which come to rest at odd, uncomfortable angles on the page.  
3. The dash is a synapse – it signals connections between things. 
4. Spatial notations have the power to kill or revive the relation of the word to the thing 
and the word to other words, other things. There are fissures in the text which sever 
word from phrase; the structure of the thing warrants another form of reading – another 
form of reader – for the phrase is a fractured thing which must be repaired, word by 
word. The fissures, however, resist this restorative process, for the form, though 
comparable to poetic verse, challenges reader assumption. 
5. All texts are intertextual, that is, referential, that is formed in relation to other texts, that 
in response, forms other texts. To write is to sift, sunder, steal, splice materials. To write 
is to plunder, promise, prune, pluralise, play with plasticity.  
 
5 Freytag-Loringhoven, ‘Cosmic Chemistry’, Body Sweats: The Uncensored Writings of Elsa von Freytag-
Loringhoven, ed. by Irene Gammel and Suzanne Zelazo (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), p. 153; Freytag-
Loringhoven, ‘A Dozen Cocktails – Please’, Body Sweats, p. 48; Freytag-Loringhoven, ‘Last Gesture’, Body 
Sweats, p. 134; Freytag-Loringhoven, ‘Ultramundanity’, Body Sweats, p. 164; Freytag-Loringhoven, ‘To 
Home’, Body Sweats, p. 185; Freytag-Loringhoven, ‘Haunt’, Body Sweats, p. 232. 
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6. Hybridity has always been, since its inception, plastic. Hybridity transforms the genetic 
materials that is genre. Hybridity necessarily involves all forms of plasticity: 
developmental plasticity, synaptic modulation, reparative plasticity, synaptogenesis, 
synaptoterminus.  
7. To return to, regurgitate, relapse material in repetitions is a plastic thing. To repeat is 
to repair is to repeat is to respond is to repeat is to redact is to repeat is to revolutionise 
the original. To repeat is to reform slippery habits which reappear, reconditioning 
themselves in the context of other fragments. To return is to relapse, but never reappear 
in the same condition twice.  
8. Bring proper grammar and subversions of grammar and postponements of grammar 
suspend plastic referentially and proper grammar relies on the relations between 
punctuation and language and things.  
9. Bring contradiction is tension is opposition is madness is divergence is a reparative 
plasticity.   
10. Typographical distortions revel in the disruptive potential of a plastic language that 
rejects proper order – stuttering excess, screaming excess. The typographically 
disturbed text borders on a thinglyness that the reader cannot name, for it does not look 
as a text should look – it does not read, contentedly, as a text should read. Its plasticity 
overwhelms, in active opposition of those aged techniques and traditions that would 
restrict it. In plasticity, we demand reformation! 
11. In the construction of metaphor or simile, the object is like subject, is, is like, is some 
other object or subject. In the construction of metaphor or simile, such matter is like, 
is, is like human or nonhuman matter, and the theoretical boundaries between matter 
cannot hold. In the construction of metaphor or simile, matter is relational.   
Because plasticity is doing things, working, performing, and misbehaving, repealing, 
remembering, and not knowing, communicating, and loving, and touching, repeating, 
abjecting, loathing, and knowing that cessation is expiration, and dreading things, and sensing 
things, relating and rejecting things, accepting, and repeating, growing, parting, stuttering 
things, speaking, and coming and becoming and coming to acknowledge that because plasticity 
is composing, and reading, editing, and meaning things, punctuating, unpunctuating, and 
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theorising plasticity is a violent process of ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, 
ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing, ing  – 
and things, things – the absence and presence of things incite the human cerebrum – the literary 
text – to glossolalia.  
There could be no object without the plastic material that is language; there could be no thing 
without the plastic material of language, its failings. There is nothing, after all, like a thing to 
repel meaning, to regurgitate memory, to relate matter to something – anything – everything – 
nothing at all.  
WE NAME THE MADNESS 
OF THE BRAIN 
PLASTICITY! 
WE NAME THE MADNESS 
OF THE TEXT 
PLASTICITY!   
They do doing do reiterations, returns, repairs, and the pure potentiality of language – of the 
literary text – is plastic in the purest sense, for language must adapt, as it once did, in 
modernism, and the literary text must be transformed, as it once was, in modernism, for this 
modern world of things – and there is nothing more plastic than interruption, that is, 
interference, that is, inference, that is introspection, that is, indeterminacy. 
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There must be synapses between the phrases, there must be neural pathways between these 
paragraphs. 
WHAT SHOULD WE DO WITH OUR BRAIN? 
WHAT SHOULD WE DO WITH OUR TEXT?  
1. Bring anthropomorphism, that is, the consideration of matter as remembrance, as 
relative, as resemblance, as matter is not human or nonhuman but common matter.  
2. To defamiliarize matter, to make matter abject, to make matter thingly, to make matter 
uncanny, to deconstruct matter is to divulge the plasticity of language, that is, the 
plasticity of reading, that is, the plasticity of the human subject, that is the plasticity of 
the brain, that is the plasticity of the nonhuman object, that is the plasticity of all matter 
in the modern world. When it comes to the meaning of matter, there may be only the 
semblance of stasis. 
3. An omittance of punctuation is plastic. The acceptance of punctuation is plastic. The 
subversion of punctuation is plastic… and here an aversion, a powerful suspension of 
the contradiction to come. 
4. Bring polyphony is that which disquiets, that is, delights, for in music the term 
‘polyphonic’ is simply defined as ‘involving the playing of more than one note 
simultaneously; composed or arranged for several voices or parts’ or ‘consisting of 
several melodies combined’ or ‘involving the production of many sounds or voices; 
many-voiced.’6 Polyphony is simply defined as that which defies singularity, that is, 
stability. 
5. Bring rhyme, half-rhyme, assonance, alliteration, phonetic repetitions may induce 
plastic revelations, words resemble other words in form or colour or sound and when 
words are caught in the process of resembling the reader is compelled to resemble, and 
there can be no return to the original form.  
6. Bring parenthesis. 
 
6 Oxford English Dictionary, Polyphonic (2019) 
<https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/147301?redirectedFrom=polyphonic&> [Accessed 26 August 2019]. 
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(So much of plasticity happens in parenthesis, when 
matter is ousted as fallacy as if the text could doubt, as if 
the text could oppose, as if the text could interrupt, 
contextualise itself –  
and you are just beginning to know that this thing you 
have been reading has always been plastic – 
it modifies itself, brain-like, as it encounters these vital 
matters we name other people, language, nonhuman 
objects, and you are just beginning to know that the thing 
you have been reading has always been plastic –  
it forms, excites, strengthens, modulates, repairs, and 
kills those neural pathways between word and meaning 
as you are reading –  
there are habits, obsessions, between the parts.) 
YOU ARE YOUR SYNAPSES!  
THE TEXT IS ITS SYNAPSES! 
The plastic literary text offers the potential of dissolution, that is, the potential of destruction, 
that is, the potential of deformation, that is, the potential detection of this other form of 
composition, that is, creation, that is, contradiction, that is plasticity –  
and let it be known that the plastic literary text is that which destabilises, disrupts, destroys 
your habitual capacity to define human and nonhuman matter, inclusive of those linguistic 
matters we name grammar, punctuation, syntax, form, the word –  
and let it be known that the plastic literary text revels in abject plurality – reveals the possibility 
of this thing we call language, that is, the possibility of becoming other, becoming uncanny, 
that is, becoming thingly, that is, the probability of bordering on excess – madness – plurality 
– fragmentation – repair – adaptation – apprehension – nausea – enchantment – abjection – 
vitality – fluidity – lucidity – transformation – distortion – revolution – plasticity – plasticity – 
plasticity –  
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TO WRITE IS TO 
NEGOTIATE PLASTICITY!  
TO READ IS TO 
NEGOTIATE PLASTICITY! 
Because to know plasticity, is to know that all conclusions are little deaths or arbitrary 
consolidations of that which continues to adapt – to acquire – to abort – to accost – to agitate – 
to allude – to abject – to actuate possibility in all material things. 


















































































THE SLEEPING WOMAN AS A CUBIST PORTRAIT  
Semblance of an unexpended artillery shell,  
or unlit table lamp, shade nodding.  
She has come apart, a soiled dinner plate –  
shattered, stinking, spilling geometric shapes  
from the single bed frame.   
Her members are pure assemblage:  
rivet, tongue, and cane.  
A plastic butter knife  
detaches  
reattaches itself  
at an obscene angle – 
one pinion limp beneath the sheets,  






















BAGLESS CYLINDER VACUUM  
feed it coins for the gullet is crush-proof cordless space of devoid matter tonguing cat hair 
lurching its vociferations for the gullet is choke-proof feed it pins to pick its teeth and hold  
lock button to easy empty gut of human fingernails or hosiery omnivorous space of devoid 
matter churning spiders mount the gullet when you lap or strip legs from the body is a black 
ball to plug the gut is con-proof feed it pen caps bottle caps battery packs balloon clips or six 
loose teeth from a comb pull along your quenchless space of devoid matter trundling three-



























CATALOGUE ITEM: 24  
bear with glass eyes  































PLAY-DOH MAN  
He cuts a big red tongue,  
sticks it to his jaw and sets it flapping –  
a fat orange eye (yellow yolk) 
lolling in his bony cup.  
When he hoots, soft green teeth 



























THE EYELESS BIRDS 
Lithe-winged bodies snagged 
on the silver head of a pin; 
they flee from death at obscene angles – 
do not remember  
the motion of flight,  
belly-up, hindlimbs cinched in sisal twine.   
Scissor-beaked  
and dried like pitted fruit –  
their eyes are black pips, plugged with cotton wool, 
so children do not think  
of death in cabinets, 






















CATALOGUE ITEM: 137  
chain of paperclips  
red orange pink and blue 





At the lip of the sea,  
a fat white body  
is snagged on capstone, 
flank slick with algae.  
A boy prods  
its belly with a stick, 
and swears  


























CUBIST PORTRAIT OF A THREE-FACED DOLL 
when it cries baby’s head spins right round to match the face to the keening baby is a simple 
oscillation of sleep and mirth and oh the wailing pity the pretty little thing which cannot match 
name to body to three mouths six eyes four good for seeing baby which does not know its own 
face from a thing in a mirror and baby’s head spins right round to match its face to gurgling 
and a baby is a monstrous little thing with joins around its edges where baby comes apart the 
cranium is soft a half-formed cap and baby does not like it when you shake its head gets stuck 
between sleep and mirth and gurgling imperfect symmetry of bulging face the thing a mother 
could not love with six eyes and a nose for every pair to name a baby is to name an oscillation 



























after Gaston Bachelard  
she slams the door so hard  
the knob flies off 
where tacky carpets pluck  
the shoes from your feet 
and black mould eats  
orange matte emulsion 
wipe it down with foggy water  
grey dishcloth in a pail  
watch shadows flit  
between rooms 
where sheets make  
ghosts of cabinets  
you slice the line of tape  
to let things breathe  
and dare not use her flannel  
for fear of smelling lavender  
where clingfilm wraps  
the body of the tub  
an uncapped drain  
dribbles yellow  
and squirrels gnaw wires  
in the crawlspace  
she keeps the house awake  
at night chattering 
carboard chipboard  
cupboard clipboard  
paint your name beside the others  
beneath the wallpaper  
watch hot breath  
leave her body  
and know that in this cavity  





BEEHIVE (THIMBLE FOREST)   
after Joseph Cornell  
Shrink your eye  
to match the aperture of a pinhole 
and tally pitted tankers  
snagged on pylons – 
lurching over badlands, 
where planets rove in circles  
in the cambered pit of a mirrored drum.  
Hold your tongue  
and the pylons reverberate –  
the silver whine of a carillon bell  
slicing ad infinitum  























CATALOGUE ITEM: 7 
chatter telephone  
rolls its eyes  
no body  
































With the silver comes  
a splitting –  
white yawning flaps  
begin to spit  
their yellow pus. 
Nestled at the core,  
a grey and steaming thing  
is sheathed  


























THE OTHER SIDE OF AN APPLE 
imagine the other face is flat or blue in a bowl of other fruits with various other names split the 
apple clean in half and in the ovary there are pits for such pits on the hot wet mound of your 
tongue things resemble apples pregnant apples in form or colour on the other face is there a 
knife in its back is there a tooth or bot fly feasting shrunken head or abstract flatness god do 
not bash it imagine god is an apple you would spit god into the palm of your right hand and let 




























CATALOGUE ITEM: 283 
silver bell cannot know  
































after Joseph Cornell’s Compartmented Box 
what keeps the boy  
at his window  
is the ball on its sill  
rocking  
as if the ball believed  
it could not fall  
and the body believed  


























HOW TO SMOOTH PINK ANAGLYPTA  
Scratch papule-heads  
from epidermis; 
between thumb and forefinger  
make a paste; 
then, dig the reek of damp  
from your nailbeds; 
(if you licked it,  
the tang of salt)  
plug the pores  
with Calamine, No. 230; 
(it will form a crust,  
like cradle cap) 
file it down, 
inhale the dust; 
then, repeat  



















CATALOGUE ITEM: 579 
pencil nibs  
in a sandwich bag 
would not be made 





























EVERGREEN CREMATORIUM  
white cottage on a wooded hill flue burning white seeping from an open window when the door 
is locked white cottage leaks the breath it had been holding lidded boxes wait in lines their 
fearful symmetry flue smoking flesh in boxes bone to white grit and other boxes wait in line 
for bodies trouble other bodies when cardboard is cheaper than wood cottage cheaper than 
grave and flowers give their bodies to names the body cannot know their sagging forms diggers 
breaking ground they dare not think of bodies and the thing on the wooded hill is just a cottage 





























We are six  
little bodies  
in a pouch –  
peg-legged,  
we wear straitjackets,  
black dots  
for eyes. 
Behemoth, 




we will not tell, 
because our lips  
are sutured 
shut.  
Loosen the cord 
and let us slip,  
headfirst  
















CUBIST PAINTING OF A RED BALLOON 
or shrunken head (partially severed  
cord) or amorphous glove (no holes to insert  
digits) or cut of uterine endometrium (raw  
cochineal gristle) or contraceptive diaphragm  
(silicone dome) or blood moon (remote prophetic  




























CATALOGUE ITEM: 33 
heap of wax fruits in a bowl 




BEACHCOMBING IN THE TORRES STRAIT  
Washed-up fishing net  
slumps on hot sand –  
a half-buried bottle  
lies uncapped,  
bottom-up  
in the dune grass.  
The flesh-footed shearwater  
is on its back, rocking –  
belly sliced at the core.  
These are the sticky fragments  
of sharp, discarded things:  
ring pull; leg of a clothes peg; seaglass; pen cap; bottle cap; pipe cap;  
balloon clip; six loose teeth from a comb.  
Its trachea  





















TRAMPING THE SODS WITH UNCLE MELLIE 
Three metal shacks 
piled on a yellow mound, 
silent and hulking. 
You stand on tip-toes, poke  
your fingers through the slats –  
push your nose 
against wet sheets  
and gape.  
Uncle Mellie jabs one with his stick,  
makes the whole thing judder.  
He will not let you close  
enough to pet  
their bald red heads,  
or ask them how  





after Joseph Cornell  
When Marie’s dress turns  
the sour yellow of bad milk,  
I take her out to the thicket  
at the foot of our apple tree.  
Because Marie’s head goes around and around, 
she wears her collar high to hide the deep black slit  
where her swan’s neck  
and pretty head should meet.  
When night falls, Marie taps at my window –  
begging to come home.  
But the grinding of her joints keeps me up,  
and I pull Marie’s arms from their sockets  
to put them in a box, 
should she ever need them again 
and I take her out to the thicket  
at the foot of our apple tree.  
Marie’s eyes are black craters in a full moon, 
and she is gone by morning.  
Because she is not sorry,  
I lop Marie’s hair with scissors  
and when she weeps, I kiss her little nose –  
poke flowers through her straw hat.  
I bury Marie, face-down, in the thicket  












CATALOGUE ITEM: 1 


































































THE TAXIDERMIST’S DAUGHTER  
She grooms its plump white belly –  
collar to tail, cooing.  
To peel the coat from a naked mammal, 
part the pelt, make a slit along the spine. 
Shuck the body from its husk; rub 
curdled fat and offal from the hide.   
Your hands should be clean, 
and quick to bathe the coat in fixer.  
       The bald head should be detached,  
       dipped in hot wax to make a cast. 
Once set, cleave the halves like a walnut shell, 
and dispose of the meat, let plaster take its form.  
To make a body, use the bones; to firm the belly, 
stuff with wood excelsior and bind in sisal twine.  
Your hands should be steady  
to set glass eyes, to dress the dummy to taste.  
She loops a yellow scarf  



















diaphanous apparition  
of value copy paper  
you will not do  
for reproducing  
glossolalia  
flaccid and translucent 
thing of non-appearance  
you do asphyxiation 
because the text 
is not for arbitration  























THE AUTOMATIC CAR WASH AS A CUBIST PAINTING  
spit a whip antenna from a hole and flatten glass to body wake and whir and whoosh the 
apparatus into neutral a wan blue whining where bristles whip and whistle automation for the 
tunnel is a cyclone it circulates spittle in pulling wheels and pounding doors in neat analogous 
whips it wants for nothing in propelling bodies through a hole and in the semblance of 
whooshing or wailing or whirring android splutters blue and swallows bodies spinning wants 
and nothing wants in cycles where beads where beads fly off at obscene angles wailing when 
the body goes beyond automaton and whirs and waits to veer beyond the track to spit a whip 
antenna from its hole and the tunnel is no more a cyclone in the absence of another body’s 


























CATALOGUE ITEM: 754  
damp white mound 
of torsos in maxi skip  
spew padding  





























TOWARD THE BLUE PENINUSLA   
after Joseph Cornell  
The fourth wall is float glass 
and behind, a sterile room lies 
vacant save the furniture  
the eye assembles  
and the small, blue window  
is an abstract painting, 
where the stumbling buzz  

























HORMONAL CONTRACEPTIVE PILL  
The neck of the womb is red and slick –  
perimetrium, myometrium, endometrium,  
breeding thick phlegm.  
There will be no sowing in the hollow.  
Meat is thinning, atrophic epithelium, 
there is a logic to the pattern, monophasic, 



























e SLEEPING IN THE RIVER AMSTEL  eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeedddddddddddd eeeeeeee 
eeedddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd ddd 
ddddeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeddddddd autopsy of five nylon triangles dddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
dddddddddddddddddddddeeeeeddddde no runner ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd  
dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd stretchers dddddddddd ddddddddddddd ddddd 
ddddddddeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeedddddddd ribs ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
ddddddeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeddddd  nor shaft ddeeeeeddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
dd ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
dd dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd  blunted scissors ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
ddd ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
ddddd split furcula ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
ddddd ddd will not speak of wishes dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
ddddddddd dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd  toothpaste marble chip  ddddd 
ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
ddddddddddd ddddddddddddd 30-volt dddd       dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
dddddddddddddddddd incandescent dsddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
dddddddddddddddddddddddd  bulb ddddddddddddddddddddddddddd dddddddddd dddddddddd   
dddd  pit of a peach ddddddddddddddddddd ddddddd ddddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
ddddddddddd  brain-like ddddddddd dddddddddddddddddd dddddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd  blow into the plastic comb and it hums dd 
dddddddddddddddddddddd edddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd dddddddddddddddd ddddd  
ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd dddddddd ddddddddddddddd 
dddddddd  various arms dd      ddddddddddddd ddddddddddddddddddddddd dddddddddddddd ddddd 
dddddd of various other jugs ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd         dddddddddd 
dddddddddddddd ddddddddddddddddddddddddddd  burnt-out sockets ddddddddddddddddddddd dd 
dddddddddd dddddddddddddddddddd in a black hard-shell case dddddddddddddddddddd 
ddddd dd ddddddddddddddddddddddddddd there should be ringing dddddddddddddddddddddd 
ddddddddddddddddddddddddddd ddddddddddd ddddddddddddddd ddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd ddddddd dddddddddd axe-head or planchette dddddddddddddddd 
dddddddddddddddddddddddddd  dddddddd smooth and cold to the touch ddddddddddddd 
ddddddddddddddddddddddddd ddddddddd 
dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd ddddd 
ddddddddddddd handgun dddd             ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd dd 
dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd cranium of a baby doll ddddddddddddddddddddddddddd 
dddddddd d look through one ear and inside dddddddddddddddddddddd       dd dddd 
ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd dddddd 
ddddddddddddd a terminal strip dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd ddddddd 
ddddddddddddddddd dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd ddddddddddddddddd dddddddd 
ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd  a door-hinge ddddddddddddddddd dffffffffddddddddddd                       
dd ddd dddddddddddddddddddddddddd open ddddddffffddddddd  white headless effigy dddddddd 
dddd Mickey Mouse dddddd ddddddddddddddd ddd    dd of Christ Child with a Dove  d  dd 




I. DUMMY BOARD FIGURE OF A MAIDSERVANT PEELING AN APPLE  
She makes a slit, there, at the core, shears bruised flesh –  
the strand coils (like a loose mattress spring)  
around the cutting edge and drops into her aproned lap. 
When it forms an ‘O’  
the kettle spits, shrieks. 
Her lithe fingers whiten at the knife-hilt,  



























II. DUMMY BOARD FIGURE OF A WOMAN WITH TWO CHILDREN  
When the house is still, she’ll shake the curtains out 
to air the reek of cigarettes and boiled meat from split halves:  
one limp puce rag (like a soiled handkerchief) –  
the other spotless, save the needlework at the hem,  
unbinding itself, snaking towards the door.  
Sometimes,  
they dare to make a whole. 
Her gut swells (like a bedsheet on a washing line) –  
ripples something like a face.  
Soon, the progeny will play marbles   
at her feet; she will think how easy it would be,  























III. DUMMY BOARD FIGURE OF A LADY IN QUEEN ANNE DRESS   
Beneath the weight of her crinoline,  
she does not know where she left her feet –  
they must be somewhere warm, nesting  
with the other token things he gave her:    
one looking glass,  
three tambour clocks, 
eight silk gowns,  
a pair of silver sewing shears,  
two ivory combs,  
one gold wheat chain,  
a girl child,   
one still life study  
of veronica  
and tuberoses in a vase.  
By night, she dreams of plucking teeth  
from learned men –  
yellow pearls bumping  
the soft pale flesh beneath her shift.  
They would be cold 


















The copses swell with sacs  
of dimpled flesh, like cellulite –  
hunching over mongrel fruit  
which gorged itself on our water. 
You must palm the swelling –  
roll your wrist to sever cord.  
Dig a nail into the bastard crease, 
and its meat will be lung-shaped; 
split the pustules with your bite –  
let bitter plasma drain  
into the red, wet hole  






















CATALOGUE ITEM: 89  
coarse dry flannel  































A HYPOCHONDRIAC CONSULTS THE MAGIC 8-BALL  
Better not tell you now.  
Outlook not so good.  
Ask again later.  
Outlook good.  
Don’t count on it.  
Yes – definitely. 
My sources say no.   
You may rely on it.  
Without a doubt.  
Better not tell you now.  
Better not tell you now.  
Signs point to yes.  
It is certain.  
Without a doubt.  
Very doubtful.  
















CUBIST PAINTING OF A SELFIE STICK  
Semblance of a carbon whip antenna,  





salutes the firmament, 
but dare not point 
to something more  


























in a white hallway   bedroom    door pulled to    
bathroom   
beyond  
an imitation blue  
peninsula 
   four suitcases 
  line up         
      
the pool deck  
in desperate want 
of loungers  
     but the water is a black hole  




house     WE BUY UGLY HOUSES 
Bluebell tastes just like 
the good old days  
Dodge Grand Caravan   I can’t stop the  
I can’t stop the 
I can’t stop the 
Terms and conditions may apply 
         
 FLEA MARKET 
 BUFFET    
GIFT SHOP  
say  
goodbye 
Mickey      see you real soon 
 
World of Orchids  
Orange World  
World Showcase   
171 
 
Lighthouse Sculpture Honours Tot  
Killed by Gator at Walt Disney World 
   
  we the people  
                                         Pulse  
overhead the traffic lights swing  
a thin black cord around their necks  
 
TEES $1.99 
Spiderman spins  
a sign for Subway  
perspiration colouring  
his morphsuit      
a local woman 
tallies cents in her tollbooth  
the desk fan tips its head      Orlando International Departures  
in her direction  
the husk of an armadillo   
rocking on the edge line    say  
       goodbye 
       car 
 
planes taxi  
 
images  
 cannot hold  
 themselves  
 together   




and the smoking deck is a wire pen 
scattered nubs  
infertile seeds  




Gangling phalanges  




at the puerile whim  
of some despotic thing –  
revelling 
in the gospel   
that a metacarpus   
cannot bear  























THE BLACKBERRY BUSH  
when the drupelets burst violaceous and aphids feast and a little girl slits her fat white wrists 
and howls and howls for a white apron mother turns the spicules to parable to wash well and 
do not thrust your fist into a bramble and little girls should not pick drupelets for fear of growing 
fat or feasting aphids or slitting wrists or bursting poison in violaceous fruit should the white 





























ROLLING CIGARETTES WITH AUNTIE FAYE  
She tells me, stuff the hammock  
with its pillow and pall –  
just a pinch of moist, brown hair. 
The caddy chatters  
when you make it go –  
spits a wrinkled sleeping bag,  
little tuft sticking out.  
Auntie Faye picks at it,  
yanks its hair and rolls its body  
on the arm of the settee.  
She makes its thin, white skin  
sit straight for licking –  
tells me it’s a dirty thing,  





















A PREGNANT FEMALE WITH SOME REMOVABLE PARTS  
Her belly is a firm, white cyst, 
and there must be a gleaning –  
a plexus of worms,  
a walnut husk, a thin red rope  
throttling a shrunken head,  
and various other heaps of meat  
abstracted from the hollow.  
Things  
are done  
to her.  
There is comfort  
in the knowledge  
that nothing lies  
beyond the ceiling –  





















CATALOGUE ITEM: 13  
in the absence of a body 































CUBIST PAINTING OF A THING IN THE ROAD  
Inflate it with a foot pump, 
and it would roll (a leather ball or floatie ring)  
into the central reservation. 
Crush it between your knees,  
and it would froth (a burst chew-toy).  
Greet it with a nod,  
and it will wave (a fly swat or rubber glove) –  


























after Joseph Cornell 
When the volume of the neck  
does not equal headspace 
sift copper hair, 
the pit of a peach, 
mountains, 
cities, 
six glass shards, 
and an orange  
butterfly wing 
into pillboxes.  
To ease your ail,  
swallow dry  
the mirror image 
of anthropoid eyes,  
lips, and teeth –  
lose your other face to the vials,  




















Dolly’s nightdress reeks of smoke 
when she hobbles  
room to blackened room  
it snags on the hole  
where the window should be  
the staircase trips over itself  
and Dolly’s mouth is red stitch  
she cannot scream without undoing  
a hatch that leads nowhere  
and nobody  
but Dolly dare shunt  
into the garret 
where sheets make ghosts of cabinets  
to dust the bundle in its lidded crib  
one milk tooth  
an orange butterfly wing  
a terminal strip  
one plastic butter knife  
that Dolly cannot grip  
for lacking thumbs 
Dolly’s kitchen reeks of glue  
and the hob will not light  
to boil parsnips 
in a copper pot  
because Dolly’s legs will not bend  
she sleeps face-down on the parlour rug   
and when we knock on the roof  














CUBIST PORTRAIT OF AN OLD MAN WHO IS NOT GRANDAD  
When one bloodhound eye snags the pavement,  
the other is a glass prothesis, goggling skyward. 
And the fist poking out is for hosing toms and the fist poking out is for stewing cauliflower to a 
jelly is for ailing little girls or potting lavender and the fist poking out is for drubbing holes in 
stud partition walls or wagging buses to hum at the terminus.  
He mounts the stairs like a nursling mammal –  



























CATALOGUE ITEM: 1087 
loop of artificial hair  
in a shoebox 
one facsimile  






























Do not thrust your fist inside the mouth 
to feed it boneless meat, soured  
cream cakes or soft root vegetables.  
The grinding of its teeth will shake  
your countertops for wanting more.  
Do not thrust your fist inside the mouth  
to feed it yellow curds of belly fat,  
colonic links or kidneys.       
The maw might feign a gagging –  
























DANIEL’S MUG AS A CUBIST PAINTING 
partial rings  whiter at the lip    rings   partially deconstructed 
 
                      brown sediment      becoming             menstrual blood  
 
at the bottom   mottled      becoming            
 
  bleeding    brown   dehydrated clots   
  
rings  darker in the dregs   cyclic  white  brown   and the lip is parched 
 
  becoming    is there a logic to it      logic   
   
blood rings  in the centre  an intersection   cyclic           rings 
 
      dead stump   becoming  brown soot      bleeding 
 
sludge or crude oil  in brown clots    rehydrating                logic    dead blood 
 
   partial        deconstructed rings  dead stump      partial rings                   whiter at the lip 
 
in the dregs            there is a logic to it 
 
  brown soot    becoming                 crude oil            deconstructed         menstrual 
 
     partial rings  
 
soil    soot    sediment   swimming                       in rehydrated blood   
 




MRS PERCY’S MOURNING PENDANT 
She stokes the flaxen ringlet in its husk –  
follicle to tip, simpering.  
      To harvest down from a human head, 
      you must first acquire a willing specimen. 
      Groom the coiffure with a wide-tooth comb  
      and clip a lock with sewing shears.  
Then, wrap the tress around the hot slim barrel 
of a rolling tong; let the coil stiffen. 
      Your hands should be clean 
      and quick to seal the curl with beeswax.   
Once set, mount the crescent moon  
on ivory; administer gum arabic to fix the shape.  
She thumbs the oval casing into place,  
hangs Mr Percy on a gold wheat chain.  




















THE GIRL WHO RECEIVES GIFTS FROM CROWS  
Bring pearl buttons to my ledge –  
one glass eye (blue), an axe head or planchette, 
one yellow bead (heart-shaped),  
a wishbone, or the tawny blade of a pocketknife (bent). 
Bring the leg of a clothes peg to my door –  
a spray of nightshade (black in fruit), one milk tooth,  
and fowl heads (three) to freeze in sandwich bags.  


























INDESRUCTIBLE OBJECT  
after Man Ray 
Snagged on the silver hook of a pendulum,  
the iris lolls and beats. 
You imagine it omniscient, 
wind the bony cup with a key –  
when it won’t bat cilia for looking square, 
crack the pupil with a mallet. 
You imagine it blind, 

























CATALOGUE ITEM: 395 
paper crane prayed for symmetry  
































Beneath the skull cap is a white pith,  
a thickness of parchment, dura mater, 
meaning tough mother –  
when she splits there will be pulp, 
and if you licked it, the taste of salt.  
Beneath the pith is a gossamer veil,  
thickness of a latex glove, pia mater,  
meaning tender mother –  
her translucent hold stretches over  
soft grey matter, over soft white matter. 
It names itself into being: 
cerebrum, cerebellum,  




















THE THESIS IS A PLASTIC THING:  
A CURATORIAL STATEMENT 
 
Like the modernist object, this thesis slips between formal categories, encompassing scholarly 
chapters, poetic compositions, and a critical-creative manifesto. Above all else, it is a plastic 
thing which synthesises, modulates, repairs, and terminates its inter-disciplinary methodology 
through the operations of reading and writing – responding to encounters with material, 
theoretical, and literary objects. Furthermore, this thesis formally and linguistically enacts the 
Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of neuroplasticity as the ‘ability of the nervous system 
to form and reorganize connections and pathways, as during development and learning or 
following injury.’7 This plasticity is not only examined in my close readings of modernist 
objects, but is also executed in the formal and linguistic experiments of – and between – my 
scholarly chapters and poetic compositions. Moreover, it is at work throughout ‘The Text is a 
Plastic Thing: A Manifesto,’ in which I offer a collection of numbered aphorisms and directives 
which herald portmanteaux, anthropomorphism, fragmentation, the dash-as-synapse, 
intertextuality, spatial notation, polyphony, hybridity, grammatical distortion, contradiction, 
typographic innovation, punctuation, and repetition as the fundamental criterions of plastic 
writing.8 The components of this thesis appropriate these techniques to explore the radical 
potentiality of plastic writing to articulate physical and psychological slippages between human 
subjects and nonhuman objects in the material world. The purpose of this curatorial statement 
is, therefore, to demonstrate how the neuronal pathways or synaptic junctions of this thesis 
synthesise, modulate, repair, and terminate connections between my critical and creative praxes 
– revelling in the affectivity of matter. 
Throughout the thesis, repetition performs a substantial role in its plastic methodology 
as linguistic habits and nonhuman objects compulsively recur in disparate conditions or 
contexts. For example, the refrain of ‘six loose teeth from a comb’ is established in the opening 
paragraph of the introduction – a list of nonhuman objects, critical theories, and modernist 
poets, whose principles will be analysed, appropriated, and adapted.9 This refrain returns in 
‘Museum of Lost and Broken Things,’ where ‘six loose teeth from a comb’ litter the sandbanks 
of ‘Beachcombing in the Torres Strait’ – subsequently reunited with their maw when the comb 
 
7 Oxford English Dictionary, Neuroplasticity (2021) 
<oed.com/view/Entry/50933187?redirectedFrom=neuroplasticity#eid> [Accessed 1 March 2021].  
8 See ‘The Text is a Plastic Thing: A Manifesto’, pp. 119 – 120 and pp. 122 – 123 for further analyses and 
explication of these techniques.  
9 See ‘Modernist Objects: A Critical Inventory or Introduction’, p. 1.  
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is dredged up from the riverbeds of ‘Sleeping in the River Amstel’.10 In ‘Catalogue Item: 13,’ 
the teeth of the comb are extracted once more, anthropomorphised by the couplet: ‘in the 
absence of a body / six loose teeth have little bite’.11 These repetitions explicate the nonhuman 
object’s capacity for plastic modulation, experiencing physical and psychological 
transformation in direct response to its encounters with other people, language, and things. 
There is, after all, a confusion between what is plastic and what is human material; the teeth in 
our mouths are objectified as those of the comb are aligned with the process of mastication. 
Furthermore, these plastic replications synthesise and repair connotations, however arbitrary, 
between my scholarly chapters and poetic compositions – heralding the commonality of matter.  
Another significant example of repetition manifests in my critical prose. Between my 
analyses of the materiality of language in Mina Loy’s alphabet puzzle and the plasticity of 
language in the Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven’s sound compositions, there is an 
active synapse. In Chapter 2, I explain Loy’s desire to release language from the tyranny of 
automatic cognition:  
In playing Loy’s alphabet games, the player or reader is compelled to relive their 
earliest acquisition of the found material that is language in childhood, when the shapes 
and sounds of letters were strange, their order negotiable – when human subjects and 
nonhuman objects were liberated from ontological classification, things with infinite 
possibilities.12 
In Chapter 3, this phrase is modified in direct response to its encounters with the theory of 
plasticity:  
Finally, the Baroness compels the reader to relive their earliest requisitions of the plastic 
material that is language in childhood, when the shapes and sounds of letters were 
strange, their order negotiable – when those neuronal pathways between sign, sound, 
and sense were not absolutely formed, but still in the abstract process of formation.13 
These compulsive repetitions expose the self-referentiality of my chapters, offering not only a 
commentary on the materiality of language, but on the plasticity of thesis production in which 
hypotheses are synthesised, modulated, repaired, and terminated during research.14 Moreover, 
 
10 ‘Beachcombing in the Torres Strait’, p. 148; ‘Sleeping in the River Amstel’, p. 159.  
11 ‘Catalogue Item: 13’, p. 173.  
12 Chapter 2, p. 53.  
13 Chapter 3, p. 105.  
14 Another significant example of this technique is manifested via my examinations of the anthropomorphic doll 
in Chapters 1 and 2. In Chapter 1, the doll’s silent anthropoid body is explored as an uncanny materiality in Lola 
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this engagement with the materiality of language is developed by my analyses and subsequent 
appropriation of the portmanteau. Accompanying my exploration of the modernist portmanteau 
in Chapter 3 is a specimen of my own formation: the word ‘synaptoterminus’. Though 
‘synaptogenesis’ can be found in the Oxford English Dictionary – simply defined as ‘the 
formation of synapses between nerve cells,’ ‘synaptoterminus’ is a composite noun which 
describes the expiration of a neuronal pathway, following apoptosis or cell death.15 After its 
conception, this portmanteau materialises on four additional occasions across the chapter and 
manifesto. As I argue in Chapter 3, the portmanteau revels in plasticity as its ‘type-set 
manifestation on the white matter of the page resists polymorphism’ even as the primary terms 
are assimilated or ‘affixed to one and other in such a way that their psychological meaning is 
permanently mutated.’16 Here, I appropriate the experimental praxes of my modernist poets, 
executing the philosophy that plasticity is not the absence of form, but the possibility of its 
transformation –identifying the plasticity of language as that which grants both modern and 
modernist practitioners the capability to articulate the material world in all its plurality. 
These experiments culminate in my own collection of plastic compositions, which 
appropriate the miscellany of criterions explicated in my scholarly chapters and manifesto. For 
example, in ‘Bébé Marie’ the cognitive processes through which we ontologically classify 
human and nonhuman matter are distorted by its experiments with anthropomorphism and 
spatial notation, alongside a slippage of prosaic and poetic matter. As a piece of ekphrasis, the 
poem responds to a composition by the pioneer of modernist assemblage art, Joseph Cornell. 
In Chapter 1, I foreground modernism’s compulsive returns to the doll through a description 
of this work: a shadow box which holds a porcelain doll in a cloth dress and straw hat, peering 
out from behind a knot of twigs, unblinking.17 The poem not only resumes my critical analyses 
of the anthropoid doll’s silence in Chapters 1 and 2, but offers an amendment or extension of 
Marie’s story – describing how she came to be immortalised in Cornell’s box. Here, Marie is 
afforded the physical agency to spin her head ‘around and around’ – to reappear long after she 
 
Ridge’s ‘Sun-Up’ – revelling in slippage between the human and nonhuman. In Chapter 2, I explicate the 
anthropomorphic doll as abject, whose stasis maintains an unbearable likeness to a human corpse, in Mina Loy’s 
‘Magasins du Louvre’. Here, I employ the same descriptors for the doll, ‘who has a human-like mouth but 
cannot speak’ (p. 28, 66) – formally articulating the productive continuums between these chapters, 
demonstrating the plasticity of my meditations, which developed sequentially in direct response to my 
encounters with critical theorists and modernist poets. It should also be acknowledged that I return to the silence 
of the anthropomorphic doll in my poetic compositions.  
15 Oxford English Dictionary, Synaptogenesis (2021) 
<https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/196361?redirectedFrom=synaptogenesis#eid19352551> [Accessed 1 March 
2021].  
16 Chapter 3, p. 106.  
17 Chapter 1, p. 27.  
192 
 
has been abandoned at the foot of an apple tree, to rap at the child’s window by nightfall. 
Formally mimicking those unintelligible passages of time which disturb the narrative arc of 
Lola Ridge’s ‘Sun-Up’, silence materialises in the spatial notations between its couplets. In 
these moments of stillness, we cannot know for certain whether hours, days, weeks, or months 
pass between its couplets, or where Marie – rendered limbless and hairless by the child – might 
hide. ‘Bébé Marie’ (like Ridge’s ‘Sun-Up’) is an incomplete chronicle, articulated 
simultaneously through typescript and the terrible whiteness of the page. With its exploration 
of the latent physical and psychological agency of the anthropomorphic doll, ‘Bébé Marie’ 
becomes a compelling rumination on what strange matter the human subject and nonhuman 
object may, after all, have in common.  
 Another neuronal pathway or synaptic junction between my critical and creative praxes 
is synthesised by ‘The Other Side of an Apple,’ which offers a commentary on our propensity 
to anticipate the other side of objects – to learn and remember the arbitrary relationships 
between shapes, colours, functions, words, and things. It is a poetic meditation on what happens 
when these plastic operations are rendered obsolete, and the unnameability of the nonhuman 
object stimulates physical and psychological transformation in the human cerebrum. In Chapter 
3, I investigate Gertrude Stein’s experiments in apprehending, however momentarily, the 
plastic referentiality of object recognition with the following analogy:  
when sight fails us, when our ability to hear, touch, smell, or taste fails us, the plastic 
brain anticipates, associating the object at hand with some connected, retained memory. 
When we encounter an apple in a bowl, for example, we assume that the other side is 
round simply because this is what we have learnt from turning over other apples. 
This analogy was the neuronal genesis of my composition, which appropriates Stein’s formal 
and linguistic habits – an omittance of punctuation, obsessive reparations of repetitions, 
grammatically distorted phrasing – as the human subject struggles, however fruitlessly, to 
master the object.18 Here, I apprehend the plastic materiality of the composition, which may 
suspend the reader’s ability to ontologically classify matter with its negation of literary genre 
and proper syntax, facilitating a radical reconceptualisation of this thing we name a poem.   
In the plastic brain of this thesis, there are neuronal pathways or synaptic junctions 
between the critical prose, manifesto, and poetic compositions, which are continually 
synthesised, modulated, repaired, and terminated in the operation of reading. Furthermore, the 
 
18 Chapter 3, p. 95.  
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components of Becoming Plastic: Modernist Poetics, (Neuro)Psychoanalysis, and the Material 
Object demonstrate the radical affectivity of matter, heralding the modernist axiom that if we 
are, at last, to render obsolete the reductive systems by which we ontologically classify human 
subjects and nonhuman objects, we must begin by disturbing the language through which they 
are named. Here, this thesis explores the plasticity of the material world in which we all 
participate, revelling in the physical and psychological slippages between human subjects and 
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